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Abstract
This study will explore the Trump administration’s views of national security as
expressed through its international trade policy and ask whether the U.S. is now a
mercantilist, a liberal, or an economically nationalist nation. This study will define
mercantilism, liberalism and economic nationalism turning for assistance to the writings
of Alexander Hamilton, Adam Smith, and Friedrich List.
The study will then explore how those concepts may have been revealed in
America’s international trade policy as the U.S. navigated the economic and national
security events of the 20th century, and on to 2016 as President-elect Trump prepared to
take office. Next will come a discussion of the defense and trade views of President
Trump himself, as well as those of his key economic advisors. The study will then
describe how the Trump administration applied its views about national security in four
areas of international trade policy -- the control of imports, the regulation of foreign
direct investment, the control of exports, and the implementation of emergency economic
powers.
The study ends with the conclusion that America’s 20th century history in security
and trade revealed it to be mercantilist, liberal and economically nationalist in its
approach. It concludes that though Trump altered the balance somewhat between
mercantilist and liberal elements in his policies, both elements remained present
ii

throughout Trump’s term. Further, the study finds that the U.S. had long expressed its
international trade policy in economically nationalist terms, but President Trump’s
language was more strident than his recent predecessors. As of this writing, most of the
Trump administration’s international trade and security policies remain in place. It seems
likely that President Biden’s policies will continue to reflect a balance between
mercantilism, liberalism and economic nationalism that has characterized the U.S.
approach to security and trade since World War II.
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INTRODUCTION
This study will explore the Trump administration’s views of national security as
expressed through its international trade policy and ask: Is the U.S. now a mercantilist, a
liberal, or an economically nationalist nation?
Such a question might infer an often-presented dichotomy between mercantilism
and liberalism which suggests that the two approaches are mutually exclusive. Such a
question might also infer that economic nationalism is necessarily harmful to the interests
of other nations. This study will explore those inferences by supplying a definitional
context in its first chapter that is derived primarily, though not exclusively, from the
views of three key thinkers often identified with these ideas -- Alexander Hamilton for
mercantilism; Adam Smith for liberalism; and Friedrich List for economic nationalism.
This exploration will reveal that these three writers had very nuanced positions that have
often been mischaracterized. Nevertheless, the broad outlines of mercantilism, liberalism
and economic nationalism will emerge.
With general definitions in hand, to understand the Trump administration’s
positions it is necessary to further investigate how ideas of mercantilism, liberalism, and
economic nationalism played out in 20th century U.S. economic history. The second
chapter will briefly summarize key economic and national security events during this era.
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The analysis will reveal the emergence of liberal free trade as a tactic in an
otherwise mercantilist contest against Communism. The analysis will also point out that
economic nationalism was an element of U.S. policy because American leaders identified
the wellbeing of the U.S. economy with world security. What was good for the U.S. was
good for the world, it was thought.
The end of the Cold War seemed to increase the influence of liberal free trade,
which helped successfully vanquish Communism and rebuild Western economies out of
the ashes of war, particularly among U.S. policy makers. However, it was not to be a
tactic of mercantilism any longer, but rather a tool to help spread democracy and
freedom. This led to the Uruguay Round of international trade agreements and the
creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), further institutionalizing liberal free
trade ideas into law and practice both in the U.S. and around the globe.
However, the increasingly liberalized global economy contributed to the
displacement of manufacturing workers, the growth of multinational corporations, and
uneven income distribution within the U.S. and among nations. A perceived stagnation
for many workers seemed to contribute to grievance-driven populism and sometimes
authoritarianism.
Out of this environment in the U.S. came the successful candidacy of Donald J.
Trump for U.S. President. The third chapter of this study will look at President Trump’s
views on international trade and national security. This chapter will review three Trump
books which revealed Trump’s irritation with free-riding allies, his embrace of
mercantilist views including the importance of international trade balances in the measure
2

of a nation’s economic health and power, and his opinion that China’s rise came at
America’s expense. The tone of these books seemed sharply economically nationalistic
and dismissive of free trade liberalism.
The third chapter will also explore the attitudes of two other key economic policy
aides, Peter Navarro and Robert Lighthizer, and identify contending groups of advisors
who argued over economic policy. Although the Trump administration settled on the
phrase, “economic security is national security,” this study will show that these
contending groups had very different views about what that meant when it came to
making policy decisions.
The stage now having been set, the remainder of this study will analyze how the
Trump administration’s views on national security in international trade manifested into
specific U.S. trade policies on imports, foreign direct investment, exports, and emergency
economic powers. For instance, the fourth chapter looks at “Section 232,” a law that
allows a President to impose quotas or tariffs to prevent imports that “threaten to impair
the national security.” The study will show that the Trump administration’s use of this
authority to impose tariffs on steel imports began a trade war with America’s allies, who
promptly applied retaliatory tariffs and then brought trade complaints to the World Trade
Organization (WTO). At the WTO, the Trump administration claimed that Article XXI
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) allowed its actions. But this
study will show that Article XXI does not go as far as Section 232, setting up the
possibility that the Trump administration’s Section 232 tariffs will be held to violate
GATT. The study will share evidence that the President’s tariffs ultimately harmed U.S.
3

employment and injected a level of uncertainty into the U.S. and world economy that
eroded economic growth.
The fifth chapter takes up an examination of U.S. controls over foreign direct
investment by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). The
analysis is placed here because the legal standard used to review foreign investments is
largely similar to Section 232, allowing the President to block foreign investments that
“threaten to impair the national security.” The study will show that rather than broadly
applying this standard, as was done with Section 232 to impose tariffs on steel imports,
one of the competing groups in the White House seemed to limit the extent of CFIUS’s
operation.
The sixth chapter studies export controls. Preventing a nation’s goods from
helping enemies was a classic mercantilist tool that the U.S. had made full use of during
the Cold War. This study will show that the U.S. legal and bureaucratic structures built
to defeat the Soviet bloc remained largely unchanged despite the end of the Cold War and
despite the fact that the U.S. no longer enjoyed the manufacturing and technological
dominance that it had when these structures were built. The Cold War experience had
also demonstrated the need for international support on export controls to prevent the
targets of the controls from simply obtaining the desired goods elsewhere. Unfortunately,
as the chapter on imports demonstrates, the Trump administration’s initiation of a trade
war alienated the very allies needed to make export controls effective. On top of that,
President Trump’s vacillations on export controls injected yet more uncertainty into a
U.S. and world economy already anxious about the direction of Trump’s trade policies.
4

The seventh chapter takes up the broad economic authorities a U.S. President has
available to address national emergencies – what the author calls the “Full Monty,”
because they empower a President to entirely sever economic relations with another
country. This chapter will reiterate that President Trump’s threats and vacillations
alienated allies and compounded uncertainties still further. The chapter will note that
though President Trump could have used his emergency authorities to halt all U.S.
investment in Chinese companies, he showed some surprising restraint.
This study will conclude with an argument that the supposed dichotomy between
mercantilism and liberalism does not exist at least in U.S. international trade policy in the
20th century. Instead, this policy has usually been a balance of mercantilism and
liberalism. The balances might shift from administration to administration but both
elements remained present. Further, most U.S. international trade policy has been
expressed in a rubric of economic nationalism directed at promoting the U.S. economy
while helping most other nations (at least the non-Communist ones). The author will go
on to argue that the Trump administration elevated the tone of economic nationalism and
increased an emphasis on the use of mercantilist tools, particularly in trade policy toward
China. However, the deep interconnections of the U.S. economy with global trade likely
compelled President Trump to retain liberal free trade elements in U.S. trade policy
despite his anti-globalist rhetoric. Thus, this study concludes that at the close of the
Trump administration the United States remained a country that embraced liberalism,
mercantilism, and economic nationalism.

5

I. DEFINING TERMS
A. Mercantilism
Mercantilism is often presented as an anachronistic economic doctrine utilized
before the world was enlightened by “modern” economic theory. Sometimes advocates
of “mercantilist” policies are viewed as Luddites ignorant of the universal benefits of free
trade. 1 However, a closer analysis shows these views to be incorrect on several levels.
Decades of examination and volumes of written works have been devoted to
understanding and explaining mercantilism. This study will briefly summarize efforts to
define mercantilism, describe its key elements, and identify those aspects of mercantilism
that continue to have relevance in today’s economic debates.

What is Mercantilism?
In a two-volume study, Eli Heckscher defined mercantilism as a “phase in the
history of economic policy” and identified the era’s “ends,” or goals of state policy, and
the “means” applied to reach the goals. 2 The goals were power and wealth for the state,

Friedrich List wrote, “Boasting of their imaginary superiority in science and knowledge, these disciples of
Smith and Say are treating every defender of common sense like an empiric whose mental power and
literary acquirements are not strong enough to conceive of the sublime doctrine of their masters.” Friedrich
List, Outlines of American Political Economy (Philadelphia: Parker, 1827), 5.

1

2
Eli F. Heckscher, Mercantilism, trans. Mendel Shapiro, 2 vols. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1935),
19-26.
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he argued, and the means were protectionism and a positive balance of trade. Heckscher
thought that the mercantilist “phase” began in the Middle Ages and continued until the
advent of laisses-faire economics. 3
Lars Magnusson described mercantilism more broadly in his book, The Political
Economy of Mercantilism. 4 He thought of it as a “discourse” or “literature” about ideas,
politics, and economics trying to understand the relation between “power and plenty” for
the state. 5 Magnusson argued that this literature built a common vocabulary and
developed shared concepts about commerce, such as prices responding to supply and
demand, which remain in use today. 6
There seems agreement among analysts that “mercantilism” did not establish
itself as a coherent “doctrine” or “theory.” 7 Policy applications varied through time and
by location, with countries experimenting, adapting, and reacting to the various economic
circumstances that faced them. The variety of applications defied any ability to identify
an “orthodox” form of mercantilism.
Yet why some nations became rich, and others stayed poor was the recurring
question mercantilist writers were trying to address. 8 These writers were trying to

3

Heckscher, Mercantilism, 20.

4

Lars Magnusson, The Political Economy of Mercantilism (London: Routledge, 2015).

5

Magnusson, The Political Economy of Mercantilism, x, 49, 219.

6

Magnusson, The Political Economy of Mercantilism, 223.

7

Magnusson, The Political Economy of Mercantilism, 1.

8

Magnusson, The Political Economy of Mercantilism, 9.
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understand, explain, and sometimes influence the explosion of commerce starting in
medieval times. They grappled with its impact on social organizations that had been
largely locally focused based on clans, tribes, or villages, and devoted primarily to
agriculture. These writers grasped that commerce could create or destroy wealth. 9 They
also recognized that wealth allowed communities to defend themselves, and those that
did not defend themselves were vulnerable to both poverty and predation.
Though the “phase” Heckscher describes begins in the Middle Ages, it should be
noted that the term “mercantilism” itself was first used by the Physiocrats in 1763,
according to Magnusson. 10 Ironically, Magnusson points out that it was Adam Smith’s
Wealth of Nations that first described mercantilism as a “system” (Smith also referred to
it as the “commercial system”). 11 Smith may have given the mercantilist system more
coherence than it deserved to serve as a strawman against which to more clearly contrast
his theories about freer liberal trade.

Features of Mercantilism
Heckscher’s study had five parts which can be described as interrelated features
of mercantilism. 12 His first part was a discussion of mercantilism as a set of economic
policies with a goal of unifying the state. The second part regarded economic measures

9

Magnusson, The Political Economy of Mercantilism, 220.

10

Magnusson, The Political Economy of Mercantilism, 3.

11

Magnusson, The Political Economy of Mercantilism, 3, 217.

12

Heckscher, Mercantilism, 21-28.
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intended to increase the power of the state. The third and fourth parts could be described
a “means” to reach the two goals, which were policies meant to maximize the
accumulation of money and policies intended to protect domestic economic interests.
Heckscher’s final part described how mercantilism expressed a particular “conception of
society.” The following paragraphs will briefly explore each of the five parts in turn.
Heckscher’s first stated “end” to mercantilist economic policies was to leverage
expanding commerce to help form nation-states out of medieval social structures. 13 Over
centuries, these policies brought under state control, fitfully and inconsistently, trade
measures first enacted at the village and town level. These were policies that sought to
keep out foreigners, protect local currencies, and prevent foreign goods from displacing
local wares. As German scholar Gustav Schmoller stated, these policies formed the
broader community into an economic organization, unifying the efforts of millions in
commerce and finance, to help consolidate the state. 14 By consolidating the policies
under the state, leaders could exercise control over larger resources of population,
commerce, industry, and finance to better provide for defense externally, and to better
promote prosperity internally, it was thought. It should be noted that in this system the
interest of the individual was subordinated to the state, 15 just as it had been previously
subordinated to the interests of the clan, village, or town.

13

Heckscher, Mercantilism, 21-22.

Gustav Schmoller, The Mercantile System and Its Historical Significance (New York: Macmillan,
1897), 49.
14

15

Magnusson, The Political Economy of Mercantilism, 28.

9

Heckscher’s second “end” for mercantilist policy was state power. 16 In an era of
high uncertainty and near constant war, power was typically measured militarily in a
literal win or lose, zero-sum comparison with rival powers. 17 Heckscher cites British
economic historian William Cunningham who noted that the state regulated all
commercial and industrial activity to enhance the power of the state. 18 Only power could
protect the state, and its commercial interests, from the predations of thieves, pirates, or
other nations. Internally, state power was necessary to consolidate and resolve the
conflicting aims of competing local interests of towns, guilds, merchants, and financiers.
Clearly power was necessary to unify a state, and unification was necessary to enhance
power. Again, individual welfare was not a factor in this calculation.
Having described the “ends” of mercantilist policy, Heckscher went on to
describe “means.” 19 The first was money. In this era, money was linked to precious
metals for which there was a fixed supply in the world. The readiest way for a nation to
increase its share of the world-wide supply of precious metals was to export a higher
value of goods than were imported, thus achieving a favorable balance of trade.

16

Heckscher, Mercantilism, 24.

Military historian Edward Mead Earle noted that war was inherent in this system and was, in fact,
virtuously continuous from 1650 to 1815; England prevailed. Edward Mead Earle, “Adam Smith,
Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: The Economic Foundations of Military Power,” Makers of Modern
Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1986), 219. This book, including the cited essay, was originally published in 1943 as Makers of Modern
Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1944).
17

Heckscher, Mercantilism, 28. Heckscher does not give an exact cite, but see William Cunningham, The
Growth of English Industry and Commerce in Modern Times (London: C.J. Clay and Sons, 1882), 256.
18

19

Heckscher, Mercantilism, 25-26.
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Adam Smith’s blistering critique in the Wealth of Nations accused mercantilists of
confusing money with a nation’s true wealth, which he believed included domestic
production and consumption. 20 Scholars point out that this was incorrect. 21 Certainly,
some early mercantilists were fixated on money, so much so as to be labelled
“bullionists.” However, many later mercantilist writers recognized that a nation’s wealth
included production and not just money.
Mercantilist writers also demonstrated more sophistication than just wanting to
achieve a favorable balance of trade by exporting more than importing. 22 They noted the
link between prosperity and ready access to money; they observed that scarce money
meant less employment. Consequently, while not a perfect measure, the availability of
currency served as a rough economic barometer as to whether a nation’s trade policy was
successful in a world with a fixed money supply. 23
Mercantilist writers also focused on more than the sheer volume of exports and
imports. They recognized the importance of manufacturing to add value to exports
compared to the lesser value of exported raw materials. 24 Consequently, these writers
sought to promote domestic manufacturing by putting tariffs on the import of foreign

20

Smith’s claim will be discussed in more detail in pages that follow.

Jacob Viner, Studies in the Theory of International Trade, (1937; repr., New York: Augustus M. Kelley,
1965), 19-21. Magnusson, The Political Economy of Mercantilism, 217-218.
21

22

Magnusson, The Political Economy of Mercantilism, 218-219.

23

Magnusson, The Political Economy of Mercantilism, 218.

24

Magnusson, The Political Economy of Mercantilism, 218.
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manufactured goods. They also exploited colonies and sought favorable trade terms from
other nations to secure cheaper raw materials for their manufacturers.
Nor did some mercantilists exclude export of services or the flow in an out of
capital in their measures. 25 The term “balance of trade” was sometimes loosely used in
mercantilist literature when writers were really referring to a current account balance
which captured all inflows and outflows of money.
Early mercantilist writers also described the importance of building a state reserve
in precious metals for emergencies, such as paying for war. 26 However, the leading
mercantilist nation, England developed a highly refined system of public debt funded by
effective tax collection that paid for most of its wars after about 1720. 27 The
effectiveness of this system of public credit contributed to England’s military victories
over rivals Holland, Portugal, Spain, and France. Robust international trade made this
system successful because it was the wealthy merchants and their financiers who could
purchase state debt.
Merchants were critical to national defense in another way. They built the first
world-wide trading networks which developed local contacts and provided critical
intelligence that typically surpassed anything a newly formed state could generate via its

25

Viner, Studies in the Theory of International Trade, 13-14.

26

Viner, Studies in the Theory of International Trade, 22-24.

Larry Neal, A Concise History of International Finance: From Babylon to Bernanke (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2015), 100-109.

27
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ambassadors. 28 Further, this was an era when world trade required ships -- and ships
required money. Conti points out that ships were the most expensive assets of that time,
their costs far surpassing any existing industrial facilities. 29 Ships also needed sailors.
Both were readily employed for war as well as commerce. Such was their importance to
England’s defense and prosperity that even Adam Smith supported England’s Navigation
Acts which gave English shipping sole access to British ports from 1651 to 1849 in an
effort to debilitate the maritime resources of any rival nation and strengthen her own. 30
The fourth part of Heckscher’s description of mercantilism was protection. 31 This
was the trade policy most frequently identified with mercantilism and for many oftenconnoted tariffs. However, as a later chapter discussing 20th century trade negotiations
makes clear, tariffs were not the only means of trade protection. Other measures included
licensing requirements, voluntary restraints, health inspections, quality controls, currency
exchange controls and many more. Additionally, mercantilists by no means sought tariffs
on all goods. 32 They often advocated for duty-free imports of raw materials but put
tariffs on foreign manufactured goods to encourage their citizens to purchase, and

Thomas Victor Conti, “Mercantilism: A Materialist Approach,” Scandinavian Economic History Review
66, no. 2 (2018): 186-200, 190, 193.
28

29

Conti, “Mercantilism: A Materialist Approach,” 195.

Neal, A Concise History of International Finance, 69-70, 191. Smith’s defense of the Navigation Acts
will be discussed in following pages.
30

31

Heckscher, Mercantilism, 25-26.

Following pages will describe how Alexander Hamilton, described as an American mercantilist,
advocated for duty-free import of raw materials and protective duties on certain, but not all, foreign
manufactured goods.
32
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domestic producers to export, their nation’s own manufactured goods. This was because
manufactured exports generated more value than the export of raw materials and thus
contributed to a more favorable balance of trade. To mercantilists, which goods were
protected was as often as important as how they were protected.
Some American commentators can be vitriolic denunciators of “protectionism.” 33
Many need to be reminded that America was highly protectionist and mercantilist for
most of the period from 1816 to the end of World War II. 34 Indeed, economic historian
Eckes noted that most successfully industrialized nations had a phase of intense
protectionism in the course of their economic development – the U.S. certainly did. 35
Indeed, many modern economic development theorists view protectionism as an
important component to consider in a nation’s development strategy. 36
One thing that protectionism did not mean to mercantilists was “autarky.”
Mercantilists accepted that international trade, not isolation, was essential to developing a
nation’s wealth.

As noted in a footnote above, List was responding in 1827 to Dr. Cooper who described support for
protectionism as dependent on eleven “ignorances.” Thomas Cooper, Lectures on Elements of Political
Economy (Columbia, South Carolina: Doyle E. Sweeney, 1826), 196.
33

34
See for example Paul Bairock, Economics & World History: Myths and Paradoxes (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1993), 32-38, 52-53.

Alfred E. Eckes, “U.S. Economic History,” in William A. Lovett, Alfred E. Eckes Jr., and Richard L.
Brinkman, U.S. Trade Policy: History, Theory and the WTO (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004),
45.
35

36
Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (London:
Anthem Press, 2005), 66-68.
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The last aspect of Heckscher’s study of mercantilism reflected on the question of
whether mercantilism offered a particular “concept of society.” 37 He concluded that it
did. As interpreted by Magnusson, Heckscher thought mercantilist society saw itself as
secular and material. 38 It gave priority to the interests of the state in developing its power
and wealth, with interests of the individual or broader mankind subordinated to those of
the state. 39 It eschewed any belief in a natural harmony or equilibrium providing a
guiding “invisible hand” as posited by Adam Smith. 40 Rather, mercantilists believed that
only positive state action would provide victory in an anarchic world of zero-sum
economic contests with other states.
Although Heckscher sought to describe a long-ago epoch, clearly some features of
mercantilism continue into the present day. Certainly, the central economic question as
to why some nations were rich and others were poor still puzzles modern economists as
much as it did the early mercantilists. Further, Magnusson noted how 20th century
totalitarian states looked as though they were mercantilist. 41 He also noted how modern
economic development policies like “import substitution” or “strategic trade policy” had
mercantilist overtones. 42

37

Heckscher, Mercantilism, 28.

38

Magnusson, The Political Economy of Mercantilism, 28.

39

Magnusson, The Political Economy of Mercantilism, 28.

40

Magnusson, The Political Economy of Mercantilism, 28.

41

Magnusson, The Political Economy of Mercantilism, 31.

42

Magnusson, The Political Economy of Mercantilism, 222-223.
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Conti pointed out that centuries ago leaders turned to mercantilist policies to
address uncertainty and conflict. He observed that more recent leaders also turned to
mercantilist policies in the aftermath of economic crises or as their nation’s veered
toward war, such as in the 1930s. 43 This was a reminder that despite the globalization of
trade, the state remained responsible for national security and the welfare of citizens and
mercantilism was a proven, if imperfect, approach to carrying out those responsibilities.
Therefore, regardless of any negative connotations, mercantilist policies remain among
those a nation might reasonably employ to promote its economic and national security
even today.
In summary, as Earle relates it, a doctrine of “mercantilism” guided early nationstates as they sought to establish both political control over their communities and to
ensure their independence from other states. 44 Under this doctrine, the power of the state
was an end to itself, with the national economy directed toward, and individual citizens
subordinated to, the preparation of the state for war. 45
For mercantilists, the accumulation of gold was critical to finance war. 46
International trade provided a source of gold so long as a nation had a surplus in the
balance of trade with another nation – thus nations wanted to sell everything and buy

43

Conti, “Mercantilism: A Materialist Approach,” 187, 197.

44

Earle, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton,” 218.

45

Earle, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton,” 217, 219.

46
Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (1945; repr., Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1980), 4-5.
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nothing. Because of the finite quantity of gold available, for one nation to gain gold,
another had to lose it. Under mercantilism, wealth in gold equaled power, and the power
of the state was always measured relative to other states. To increase one state’s power
was always at the expense of others – in other words a “zero-sum” contest.
Consequently, Earle concluded that a nation’s policy under this system was typically
protectionist, autarkic, expansionist, and militaristic. 47
Earle noted that war was inherent in the mercantilist system and was, in fact,
virtually continuous from 1650 to 1815. 48 England prevailed in this contest crushing the
competing powers Spain, Holland, and France, despite the loss of the American
colonies. 49
Some view Alexander Hamilton as a statesman who adopted mercantilism to
America’s circumstances. 50 Like European mercantilists, Hamilton was concerned about
binding the American colonies into a single independent nation. 51 He was also keenly
aware of the economic and political challenges to achieving this independence.
However, the new United States had ample advantages and opportunities as well.

47

Earle, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton,” 218-19.

48

Earle, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton,” 219.

Earle, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton,” 219. Earle describes totalitarianism as a modern form of
mercantilism. Ibid. For a discussion of how the Axis powers focused their economic policies toward
developing national power before the outbreak of World War II, see chapter 1 in Alan S. Milward, War,
Economy and Society, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), 1-17.

49

50

Earle, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton,” 231-32.

51

Earle, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton,” 232.
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For instance, Hamilton saw advantage in America’s relative geographic isolation,
abundant land, vast natural resources, and growing population. Further, Hamilton
grasped the enormous economic potential for the former American colonies 52 which had
been shackled by England’s Navigation Acts and which were now free to trade openly in
the global economy. But, to capitalize on this potential, America had to first address its
immediate dependence on foreign goods. In his Report on Manufactures, Hamilton
asserted that increasing domestic manufacturing and aggregating America’s regional
economic diversities would be essential to creating the self-sufficiency needed to
eliminate dependence on foreign suppliers. 53
Hamilton was particularly concerned about America’s vulnerability to European
powers, especially England, with their mature economies and global military reach. 54 To
add political independence to economic independence, Hamilton urged President
Washington to embrace a strategy of neutrality, as vividly displayed in his debates with
then-Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson regarding the global war emerging out of the
French Revolution. 55
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Hamilton knew this strategy required that the U.S. place a priority on developing
domestic defense industries. 56 He understood that creating sufficient military strength
(and corresponding political power) would give America the best chance to preserve its
neutrality and keep it from being drawn into the seemingly endless European disputes.
Hamilton noted that “security is not possible without power…for a nation, despicable by
its weakness forfeits even the privilege of being neutral.” 57 “Only if we are strong can
we choose peace or war as our interest guided by justice shall dictate.” 58
To that end, Hamilton argued for what became known as “infant industry
protection,” a broad range of steps that would encourage U.S. manufacturing that
included tariffs, subsidies, government procurement, and even direct government control
Lin-Manual Miranda’s musical, Hamilton, where Hamilton replies to Jefferson’s plea to support America’s
first ally, France, in its war with England
You must be out of your GODDAMNED mind
If you think
The President is gonna bring the nation to the brink
Of meddling in the middle of a military mess
A game of chess
Where France is queen and king-less
We've signed a treaty with a king
Who's head is now in a basket
Would you like to take it out and ask it?
"Oh should we honor our treaty King Louis head?"
Uh do whatever you want, I'm super dead!
Lin-Manual, Miranda, et al., “Cabinet Battle #2,” Hamilton: An American Musical, (album) (New York:
Atlantic Recording Corporation, 2015), Act II.
56
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of critical defense industries like firearms and munitions production. 59 Hamilton asserted
that these protections were essential to developing key American industries in the face of
mature European competitors who benefited from mercantilist protections in their own
countries. 60
Hamilton’s overall impact on the American economy is most profound when
viewed from a macroeconomic level where three achievements particularly stand out.
First, as Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton was able to secure the assumption by the
United States government of the various colonies’ debts accumulated during the war for
independence. 61 Second, he was able to establish a national bank. 62 Third, Hamilton
built an efficient system to collect the revenue needed to pay the debt.
These steps enabled Hamilton to consolidate, market, and pay for public debt at
the national level. Hamilton noted that the U.S. must “cherish credit as a means of
strength and security,” 63 because he understood that sound national credit was essential to
funding military operations in the future crises he was certain the U.S would face. 64

59

Lodge, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, IV:143-198. Earle, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton,” 234.

60

Lodge, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, IV:96-97, 101-102, 105-107.

61

Earle, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton,” 232.

See Hamilton’s report to President Washington advocating for the National Bank, which Washington
ultimately supported over the objections of Jefferson and Attorney General Edmund Randolph. Lodge, The
Works of Alexander Hamilton, III:445-493.
62

63

Paltsits, Washington’s Farewell Address, 193. Earle, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton,” 237.

Hamilton suggested President Washington state in his Farewell Address that America should “cherish
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Hamilton’s remarkable achievements secured these essential macroeconomic economic
foundations for the United States.
Hamilton’s trade proposals certainly have a mercantilist ring. However, claiming
that Hamilton was entirely a mercantilist would miss important nuances in his views. For
instance, Hamilton had read Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and fully comprehended
the benefits of “equitable” international trade. 65 But, Hamilton pointed out that this was
not the way international trade actually functioned at the time. 66 Nor did he agree that
expanding international commerce would lead to peace. 67 Rather, Hamilton thought,
trade could lead to tension and conflict. 68
Claiming Hamilton as a mercantilist might also miss that the policies he
advocated were intended to unify and strengthen the United States, but not necessarily to
the detriment of any other country. Nowhere does Hamilton seem to apply the
mercantilist notion that a nation can gain strength only by diminishing another. His goal
was merely U.S. political and economic independence.

Historian and U.S. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge reported in his editorial note to Hamilton’s Report on
Manufactures that Hamilton had read Smith’s Wealth of Nations and prepared an extensive commentary in
1783, a writing that had been lost. Lodge, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, IV:198-199. Hamilton
opened his Report on Manufactures with a restatement of the benefits of free trade. Ibid., IV:70-73. Adam
Smith will be discussed more fully below.
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Smith, Alexander Hamilton,” 232.
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Similarly, claiming Hamilton was solely a protectionist would overlook the many
proposals Hamilton offered beyond protective tariffs to advance America’s industrial
development. For instance, Hamilton suggested the elimination of import duties for raw
materials and other manufacturing inputs important to several growing U.S. industries. 69
Hamilton also suggested offering subsidies; offering awards (“premiums”) for significant
manufacturing achievements; paying for the immigration of skilled foreign workers;
granting generous patents not only for inventors but also for “introducers” 70 of new
techniques; and the creation of a government board to promote innovation. 71 Hamilton
also noted the importance to economic growth of a sound infrastructure that facilitated
the transportation of and payment for goods. 72
Unlike mercantilists for whom both the economy and the individual were
completely subsumed in the pursuit of national power, Hamilton recognized the need to
balance individual liberties with national security. 73 Hamilton, like Smith, supported a
standing professional army and strong navy but recognized the danger to liberty such
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institutions represented. 74 Like Smith, he thought appropriate safeguards could
nevertheless preserve individual liberties. 75
Hamilton saw that America’s political power and economy were indissolubly
interwoven – just as expressed in the preamble to the new constitution, which sought to
form a more perfect union, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare
and secure liberty. 76 Earle summarized Hamilton’s contributions as having “built the
structure of American economic policy.” 77 “As one who combines economics with
politics and statecraft…Hamilton ranks with the great statesmen of modern times,” Earle
wrote. 78 By often invoking Hamilton’s name, President Trump and his advisors sought
to lend credibility to the administration’s views on trade deficits, tariffs, and
protectionism.
As it turned out, Hamilton’s position in support of high protective tariffs to
encourage key manufacturing was initially rejected by Madison and Jefferson 79 -America’s first tariffs were set at only 5% for most goods and were intended to raise

Alexander Hamilton, “Number 25: The Same Subject Continued [The Powers Necessary to the Common
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revenue, not be protective barriers. 80 It is perhaps one of American history’s more
interesting economic ironies that both Madison and Jefferson later adopted more sharply
mercantilist policies when they each served as President. Jefferson established a full
embargo on British goods and Madison temporarily doubled tariffs during the War of
1812, then sought permanent higher duties in the Tariff Act of 1816. 81 America’s tariffs
remained relatively high until after World War II. In the interim, America could fairly be
described as largely mercantilist with policies focused on isolation and internal
development.
As the 20th century began, America’s mercantilist policies created tensions in
light of increasing U.S. industrial development and with the emergence of the U.S. as a
net international creditor following World War I. 82 These tensions magnified through the
Great Depression and into the outbreak of the Second World War. For the U.S.,
rebuilding the post-war world based on the perceived mercantilist-driven failures after
World War I created an opportunity to apply the “liberal” free trade doctrine of which
Hamilton’s Scottish contemporary, Adam Smith, was thought to be the founder.

Because of the crucial need for revenue for the new federal government, one of the first bills introduced
in the new U.S. Congress was the Tariff Act of 1789. It set a five percent ad valorem duty on most
imported goods. John M. Dobson, Two Centuries of Tariffs: The Background and Emergence of the U.S.
International Trade Commission (Washington, D.C.: U.S. International Trade Commission, 1976), 6.
80

81

Dobson, Two Centuries of Tariffs, 8-9.
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free trade and protectionism in an 1885 essay that accompanied Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures, “The
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B. Liberalism
First published in 1776, Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations attacked most of the
prevailing notions of mercantilism of his time. 83 Smith rejected the mercantilist view of
the zero-sum nature of international trade which led nations to impose mercantilist
policies intending to “beggar” or “impoverish” their neighbors; he argued that there was
always mutual gain from such exchanges, though it was not always equal gain. 84 This
was because of the benefit in focusing economic effort on what one could produce most
efficiently, then using the surplus to buy what a trading partner produced more cheaply. 85
Liberal theorists postulated that the result would be the more efficient distribution of
resources globally which would raise potential output, and presumably welfare, for all
participants. 86 Smith, and the liberal free trade theorists who followed him, thought
protectionist policies blocked these efficiencies and inhibited economic growth. 87
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Carmel, Indiana: Liberty
Fund, 1976), 2 vols. Smith devoted eight chapters, about one fourth of this monumental work to
demolishing most of the mercantilist policies trade practices in his time. Ibid., book IV, chapters i-viii,
429-662 (hereafter denoted by book, chapter and page, for example, IV.iii.494).
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Smith, Wealth of Nations, IV.iii.489, 493-498. Hirschman asserted that Smith broke the mercantilist
causal link between national welfare and national power by observing that both trading nations could
benefit from trade, thereby each improving their welfare. Hirschman, National Power, 6. Thus, under
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security played out through the Trump Administration and remain evident today.
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The mercantilist doctrine held that a favorable balance of trade generated the
accumulation of gold that was necessary to pay for war, 88 making the balance of trade the
essential measure of national wealth and power. 89 Smith argued that this doctrine
subordinated the domestic economy to international trade, even though it was the
domestic economy that generated the greatest employment and revenue for a nation. 90
Wealth, he said, was not reflected in money but rather in what money could buy. 91 It
was the nation’s annual product of domestic industry and revenue from land, labor and
“consumable stock” that enabled it to pay for war. 92 Thus, it was the “annual produce of
the land and labor of the country,” and not the balance of trade, that was the essential
measure of national wealth and power. 93
Smith also attacked the mercantilist policy of granting monopolies which he
thought benefitted merchants at the expense of the public. 94 Smith called monopoly laws
“oppressive,” “absurd,” and “extorted from the legislature;” “like the laws of Draco,” he
wrote, “these laws may be said to be written in blood.” 95 Smith thought that the English
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monopolies that controlled trade into and out of the American colonies were particularly
oppressive, violating the colonists’ “most sacred rights” and serving as “impertinent
badges of slavery.” 96
When it came to national defense, however, Smith granted exception from his
otherwise anti-mercantilist position, acknowledging the stark reality that rich nations had
the advantage in war over poor and barbarous ones. 97 Most notably, Smith supported
Britain’s Navigation Acts, a centerpiece of mercantilism protecting England’s merchant
marine, noting “defense was more important than opulence.” 98 Smith also thought
protective duties and subsidies were entirely appropriate to support defense industries. 99
Further, Smith supported a professional standing army, noting that the demands of
modern warfare required expertise and discipline that only a specialized, professional
force could create. 100 Smith accepted this as a necessary national expense and rejected
the prevailing political doctrine in England at the time that standing armies represented
an unacceptable risk to liberties. 101 As alluded to earlier, Smith’s position regarding
international trade and defense was quite akin to Hamilton’s.
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Writing in 1945, scholar Albert O. Hirschman built on Smith’s theory of free
trade, and further contrasted it from mercantilist doctrine. Hirschman noted that in
liberal theory the pursuit of national power was only a secondary objective of
international trade, whereas mercantilist doctrine gave it preeminence. 102 The liberal
notion of free trade, it was thought, would lead to peace by increasing commercial and
political contacts between nations, and would thus create interest groups in the respective
trading partners who would mutually benefit from trade but who would also mutually
lose if trade were interrupted by war. 103 This interdependence, it was thought, would
deter war. Moreover, trade would replace conquest as a means for acquiring needed
materials. 104
The liberal theorists also argued that free trade would make a country richer and
therefore better able to afford the cost of national defense. 105 They further asserted that
free trade would allow nations with limited resources or adverse climates to escape those
constraints. 106 Free trade could also encourage a broadening of sources of supply so that

Hirschman, National Power, 3. Schlesinger notes that there never has been universal free trade; there
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a country would not be dependent on any single foreign source for critical needs. 107 Of
course, international commerce depended on safe, reliable transportation – which often
meant secure sea lines of communication, which implied policing of the world’s oceans
by one’s own navy or that of a strong, benign maritime power.
Critics might point out that, in practice, free trade did not necessarily mean fair
trade. 108 Smith had noted that benefits to trade, while mutual, were not necessarily
equal. 109 Uneven bargaining power could be reflected in imbalanced trade agreements
generating an asymmetric distribution of burdens against, or benefits in favor of, some
countries versus others. 110 Consequently, mercantilist influences and the promotion of
special interests could still find their way into free trade. 111 A related question might also
be asked: does economic nationalism also find its way into free trade? The next section
will explore that question.
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C. Economic Nationalism
Economic nationalism can be defined as “economic policy toward the outside
world which seeks to advance the interests of a particular nation-state, even at the
expense of other states or the world as a whole.” 112 Though it is often identified with
protectionism, it can perhaps be better understood as a description of the justification for,
or the motive behind, an economic policy. Eric Helleiner noted that economically
nationalistic policies could vary broadly from totalitarianism to protectionism to
socialism to liberal free trade. 113 He also observed that such policies could have a
strongly cultural aspect, as with Great Britain’s decision to exit from the European
Union. 114
One sociologist identified four types of economic nationalism: populist, liberal,
militarist, and developmental based on the specific political or economic motives behind
particular policies. 115 The “populist” type uses economic nationalism to win votes, and
hopefully, elections. 116 The “liberal” version embraces free trade to advance national
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interests though not necessarily global interests. 117 The “militarist” type of economic
nationalism focuses on preparing a nation for conflict by developing the resources
necessary to increase military capabilities. 118 The “developmentalist” version of
economic nationalism seeks to increase a nation’s means of production but not
necessarily its military power. 119 To foreshadow the discussion in coming chapters, this
scholar concluded that the Trump administration’s policies reflected economic
nationalism with populist, militarist and developmental influences. 120
Before turning to the Trump administration in more detail, it is appropriate to
discuss the writer most associated with economic nationalism, 19th century German
economist Friedrich List.
Born in Wurttemberg in 1789, educated at the University of Tubingen, List came
to the United States in 1825 fleeing persecution for his efforts to bring political and
economic reforms to the German states in Central Europe. 121 He arrived at a German expatriot community in Reading, Pennsylvania and became involved with the Pennsylvania
Society for the Promotion of Manufactures and the Mechanic Arts. In 1827, List wrote a
series of letters to Charles Ingersoll, the Vice-President of the society which were
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published in pamphlet form as the Outlines of American Political Economy. 122
According to Edward Mead Earle, Outlines included all the key ideas List later developed
in more detail for his National System of Political Economy. 123
In his Outlines, List contrasted his approach with views he assigned to Adam
Smith and J.B. Say, though not infrequently misstating Smith’s position in the process.
The “Smithian” free trade position, List asserted, was that it was ignorant not to buy a
good that another nation could make more cheaply. 124 List rejected this position and
presented the detailed case for why it was not ignorant at all, but rather a common
sensical policy to forgo purchase of the cheaper foreign good now in favor of investing in
future domestic productive capacity.
List began Outlines by describing three levels of political economy: individual,
national, and “cosmopolitical.” 125 Smith’s theory, List argued, dealt only with the
individual and with the cosmopolitical, ignoring the critical intermediary role of the
nation. 126 List went on to describe the “individual economy” as focusing on procuring
the necessities of life for oneself and one’s family, which was necessarily geographically
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limited to the local community, and primarily focused on the present not the future. 127 At
the other end of the spectrum, the “cosmopolitical economy” had to do with providing for
the needs of all mankind, List argued. 128 Both the individual and cosmopolitical
economies sought wealth, List thought, but neither sought power which he described as a
characteristic of the “national economy.” 129
List described the “national economy” as arising out of the nation which was
necessarily the “medium” between individual and all mankind. 130 It was a separate
society which possessed common government, laws, and history, and that addressed both
peace and war, the present and posterity. It provided a common defense protecting the
rights of individuals and their property both within the country and outside it. 131 As to
internal security, List asserted that it was only national power that could provide a
common currency, standard weights and measures, protection of commerce from
predation, safe titles to property, patents, copyrights, and large infrastructure projects. A
nation that did not exercise these authorities was destined for “ruin” and was committing
“suicide,” List argued. 132
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However, a nation also had the authority to regulate the interests of individuals
“in order to create the greatest common welfare in the interior and the greatest quantity of
security as regards other nations.” 133 For instance, the government could restrict trade to
avoid depression and loss of political power. 134 But List warned that a government
should seek balance and not try to regulate everything.
List wrote that the object of the national economy was not just the wealth of the
individual and the cosmopolitical economies, which he averred was the focus of the
“Smithians,” but national power and wealth. List argued that wealth and power were
interrelated in that “national wealth is increased and secured by national power, just as
national power is increased and secured by national wealth.” 135 Further, List argued that
economic policies in support of this object were necessarily political too because an
individual could become wealthy but could lose it all without the protection of the state
from foreign enemies or domestic instability. 136
List went on to describe how a nation’s power and wealth depended on “a
harmonious state of agriculture, commerce and manufactures” within the country. 137 List
argued that the government has the authority to ensure this harmony by, if necessary,
restricting individual industry. Further, List asserted, the government had an obligation
133
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to increase the wealth and power of the nation by, for instance, protecting commerce with
a navy, protecting maritime industries with navigation acts, developing transport
infrastructure, implementing patent laws, and protecting manufacturing with tariffs. List
argued that these steps should not be applied thoughtlessly, however, but rather based
whether they would be “efficacious” given country’s particular conditions. 138 He also
recognized that these policies might help some individuals and hurt others, but he viewed
individual welfare as secondary to the interests of the nation. 139
A country’s economic potential, List thought, was based on both its natural
resources, what he called “capital of nature,” and its “capital of mind.” 140 This latter
category List described as the intellectual and social conditions that created an
environment for the productivity of capital. 141 It was the goal of the national economy to
improve the social and intellectual conditions of the nation and thereby to increase wealth
(and thereby increase power) because of the increased productivity. Improving this
“capital of mind” justified, List believed, sacrificing present goods to invest in learning
new skills or developing future productive power. 142 Here, List expressly rejected the
Smithian notion that it was always better to buy the cheaper foreign good than to try to
make something oneself.
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Like Hamilton, List thought that developing manufacturing was critical to
increasing national power and wealth. A national economy based entirely on agriculture
would always be limited in potential, he argued. 143 He noted that manufacturing required
a level of freedom, security, and education to be successful, i.e., the requisite “capital of
mind.” But he recognized that it was not appropriate for the government to promote all
industry, rather it should be selective, he thought, and it should proceed in steps.
Despite the association many make between List and protectionism, List actually
pointed out that free trade might work better for some countries than protective tariffs. 144
But List did think that tariff protection was usually an essential facet to developing
manufacturing. New manufacturing ventures toke time to organize, incurred high initial
costs, had uncertain access to capital and credit, and faced crushing competition from
established foreign manufactures who had their own domestic protections. 145 If applied
in a “steady” fashion, protective tariffs would provide the space needed for a new
industry to organize, benefit from a temporary monopoly within the domestic market, and
build the economies of scale that would then allow it to expand into international
markets. 146 List described this as building a “fortress” within which a nation could build
its productive power. 147
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List thought this fortress was necessary because foreign nations, particularly
Britain, sought to dominate all competitors in the global economy. List described how
free trade allowed British manufacturers to crush nascent German efforts. 148 Like
Hamilton, List believed that economic and political power were linked and therefore
increasing the nation’s productive powers was essential to developing the self-sufficiency
necessary to protect a nation’s independence.
List pointed out that procuring cheaper foreign goods now rather than developing
a nation’s productive capacity was a satisfactory policy in peacetime, but would be
catastrophic in war when that trade could be cut off. 149 Reminding American readers of
the economic challenges they faced before and after the War of 1812, List argued that it
was better to forgo the immediate benefit of buying a cheaper foreign good in favor of
developing the industries that would be needed in wartime. 150 He put it even more
starkly in his National System of Political Economy, “And who would be consoled for the
loss of an arm by knowing that he had nevertheless bought his shirts forty per cent.
cheaper?” 151
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It can be pointed out here that List described war as a “duel between nations.” 152
But he went further to say that trade restrictions, such as those England used to protect its
domestic manufacturers, were “nothing but a war between powers of industry of different
nations.” This further indicates how intertwined economic security and national security
were in List’s thinking.
In taking this position, List was applying a realism and rejecting the utopianism
he saw in the Smithian approach. He thought the Smithian view of a cosmopolitical
economy assumed an eternal global peace and “union of humanity” that simply did not
exist. 153 Instead, List thought history revealed that human development came out of
conflict, which is how states emerged from cities, and how the United States formed out
of the American colonies’ overthrow of English rule. 154 In this reality, List thought it
wrong to sacrifice the independence of a nation by pursuing free trade based on an
argument that it would better serve mankind. 155 List was also rejecting the Smithian
inference that free trade was “universally” beneficial because it was best for the
cosmopolitical economy. Just as the developmental measures he set out, including
protective tariffs, did not work for every nation in every circumstance, free trade work
would not work for every nation. 156 List was also rebuffing the Smithian notion that “all
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would flow in its natural current” if left alone. 157 On the contrary, the nation was needed
to provide stability and security in an anarchic world.
The point of List’s Outlines was to defend the “American System” of higher
protective tariffs against the criticisms of Smith’s followers, such as Dr. Thomas
Cooper. 158 List noted that it was America’s goal to attain power and wealth without
injury to other nations. 159 List’s construction here embraces a central point of
mercantilism, the pursuit of wealth and power, but rejects the mercantilist notion that
gaining wealth and power was always at the expense of another nation. This makes clear
that economic nationalism is not perfectly synonymous with mercantilism.
List noted that America’s purpose in pursuing wealth and power was to promote
the common welfare of its citizens, not to benefit all mankind. 160 He thought it foolish to
embrace free trade which would, he thought, sacrifice America’s independence. This
was particularly so given the idea of free trade was emanating from Britain, which at the
same time sought to expand its trade globally, secure its commercial supremacy, and
consolidate its power 161 under the pretense of serving all humanity. On the contrary, List
argued, America’s independence was reliant on the development of independent industry
and productive power. That was the point of the “American System.”
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This summary of List’s views makes clear his connection with Hamilton. Both
List and Hamilton were intent on the economic unification of their respective nations,
Germany and America, and they both saw that national economic integration was an
essential aspect of political unification. Both List and Hamilton saw that developing
manufactures was essential to developing the wealth and power needed to be
economically and politically independent. Thus, both can be described as economic
nationalists. However, it is not fair to call either entirely mercantilist because neither
intended their policies to gain economic and political strength at the expense of other
nations. Though both are identified with protectionism, this label is not fair either as they
both saw protective tariffs as but one of many possible tools for economic development,
and then to be used only when conditions warranted.
Having set the stage with definitions of mercantilism, liberalism and economic
nationalism, the next chapter will explore what role these concepts may have played in
20th century U.S. economic history.
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II. 20TH CENTURY U.S. ECONOMIC HISTORY
From President Madison’s administration through the end of the 19th century
America’s economic policy focused on internal development and its foreign policy
focused on preserving neutrality. Protectionist measures, like those advocated by
Hamilton and List, dominated U.S. international trade policy. It was not until Woodrow
Wilson’s election as President in 1912 that glimmers of liberal free trade emerged. In a
single bill the following year, Congress passed a reduction in tariffs and replaced tariffs
with a national income tax as the principal source of federal revenue. 162 Unfortunately,
the economic disruptions that accompanied the outbreak of World War I dimmed this
brief flicker of trade liberalism in the U.S. 163
But Wilson continued to advocate for his ideals. Wilson’s hope to rebuild postwar economies based on liberal free trade was expressed in the third of his “Fourteen
Points,” a speech articulating the U.S. objectives for the war:
The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of
an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and
associating themselves for its maintenance. 164
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But Wilson was unsuccessful. In the one and only joint conference on economic
issues in 1916 (not including the U.S.), the participating allies expressed the conviction
that the conflict with Germany and Austria-Hungary would continue “in the economic
plane” even if a military victory was secured. 165 This attitude prevailed at the Paris peace
conference as evidenced by the punitive economic terms imposed on the losing
nations. 166 While Wilson was able to secure a “most favored nation” provision in the
peace treaty, victorious nations remained free to exercise any other trade measures,
including tariffs, as they wished. 167
Further, the U.S. rejection of the League of Nations evidenced America’s return
to isolationism as a national strategy. The U.S. Congress also rejected liberal efforts to
reduce U.S. tariffs post war. 168 The Great Depression then drove the U.S. and other
countries toward even higher tariffs to promote self-sufficiency and economic
recovery. 169
The 1932 election of President Franklin Roosevelt initiated a period of economic
experimentation through unprecedented government intervention in America’s domestic
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economy. 170 One of the earliest steps away from purely mercantilist trade policies was
the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. For the first time in the nation’s history,
Congress delegated its constitutional authority to set tariffs to the President. 171 The idea
was that, on an item-by-item and country-by-country basis, the President could negotiate
tariff reductions from a foreign trading partner and promise in return a reduction in U.S.
tariffs. This led to over 30 new bilateral trade agreements with mutually lowered tariffs
between 1934 and 1944. 172
World War II led to direct government control of virtually all aspects of the U.S.
economy as it mobilized national resources for war -- a clearly mercantilist approach
necessitated by the existential threat posed by the Axis powers. However, in 1941, even
as the U.S. began to apply mercantilist principles to mobilize its economy for war,
President Roosevelt, like Wilson before him, expressed a liberal vision for a global postwar economy in his annual speech to Congress. 173 That speech included the “Four
Freedoms.” Freedoms one, two and four were freedom of speech, freedom of worship,
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and freedom from violence. The third freedom focused on economics, where Roosevelt
stated
“The third is freedom from want – which translated into world terms, means
economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime
life for its inhabitants – everywhere in the world.” 174
While this vision framed U.S. post-war efforts, the perceived failures of the 1919
peace process also shaped those efforts, such as the inadequacy of international
institutions to ensure global security and stability. Another was the perception that the
aggressive mercantilist economic policies by some countries had sparked international
conflict. These twin perceptions led to the proposed creation of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later
called the World Bank), and the International Trade Organization (ITO). Further, the
rules of international trade would be set in a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) which would work to lower tariffs world-wide. Wilson’s Fourteen Points had
foreshadowed GATT’s aspiration to reduce global trade barriers.
But the goal of completely free trade remained constrained by domestic and
international factors. Domestically, certain industries were considered too critical from a
political, economic or security perspective to include in tariff reductions – defense and
agriculture, for instance. Further, nations soon divided themselves between Communist
and non-Communist blocs which sought to limit trade with each other. Since a return to
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total war would have meant a nuclear exchange, the international antagonism found
expression in “limited wars” and, ultimately, the “Cold War.”
Thus, in the 1950’s the U.S. settled into a national strategy of “containment” of
the Communist bloc politically, militarily, and economically. In essence, the political
and economic relationship between East and West became a classic mercantilist “zerosum” contest. For the U.S., this ideological conflict resulted in a hybrid trade policy
applying “liberal,” generally free trade, among non-Communist trading partners, and
“mercantilist” policies to deny Communist countries access to trade and financial
resources. These mercantilist policies included blocking exports and prohibiting
financial exchanges with the Communist bloc. The U.S. built an extensive bureaucracy
to enforce those prohibitions.
As in any mercantilist contest, economic power was key. A classified 1953 report
from President Eisenhower’s National Security Council noted that the resources needed
to sustain military forces for the foreseeable future required the “maintenance of a sound,
strong, and growing economy capable of providing through the operation of free
institutions, the strength to provide [that military force] over the long pull.” 175 It goes
further to state that “not only the world position of the United States, but the security of
the whole free world, is dependent on the avoiding of recession and on the long-term
expansion of the U.S. economy. Threats to its stability or growth, therefore, constitute a
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danger to the security of the United States and to the coalition which it leads.” 176 In case
any of its readers missed the point, NSC 162/2 stated again later, “A strong, healthy and
expanding U.S. economy is essential to the security and stability of the free world.” 177
This long-term struggle against Communism also had significant effects in the
domestic U.S. economy because it demanded unprecedented peacetime levels of defense
spending. The idea of nuclear war, Cold War, or limited war demanded significant
standing forces – there being no time for a mobilization from a peacetime economy, as
the U.S. had been able to do in the two world wars. 178 But it was thought the U.S. could
afford this increased peacetime defense spending since it had the only undamaged
economy, as well as global superiority in manufacturing and technology.
The 1950s witnessed the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula, the launch of
Sputnik, and the Cuban missile crisis, all of which focused American attention on the
Soviet threat. As an economic weapon of the new Cold War, this led the U.S. to seek to
promote economic development of both allies and former foes from the Second World
War. After expiration of the Marshall Plan, which was viewed as a short-term emergency
response, the mantra in U.S. foreign policy for the longer term became “trade not aid,”
under the thinking that outright aid would be much less politically popular and engender
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greater Congressional and public scrutiny. 179 This manifested itself as an opening of U.S.
markets to Europe and Japan without demanding full reciprocity.
Lovett, Eckes and Brinkman note this as the beginning of an institutionalized
trade asymmetry that would ultimately put tremendous economic pressures on the United
States. 180 The 1947 GATT, and six rounds of trade negotiations under it in the 1950s
and 1960s, set these asymmetries in place with the U.S. essentially unilaterally lowering
its tariffs while trade partners either resisted or delayed liberalizing their markets. 181
Further, the 1947 GATT included qualifications to complete trade liberalization in that it
permitted countries to invoke protective measures to restrict damaging imports, to
address current account imbalances, to counter dumping and subsidies, and to protect
security. 182 The negotiation of voluntary export restraints between parties also became
an accepted practice. 183
The economic mobilization for World War II and the post-war recovery in the
1950s and 1960s had left the United States as one of the higher wage-paying nations of
the times. 184 Consequently, labor intensive U.S. industries employing relatively low-
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skilled workers, such as in textiles and apparel, were the first to feel pressure as foreign
competitors recovered in Europe and Japan. Additionally, a surge of oil imports into the
U.S. also led to the creation of a quota system to regulate oil imports in the late 1950s
which continued until 1973 – key foreign exporters of oil reacted by forming the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960. 185 OPEC’s
economic power would be directed against the U.S. in the 1970s.
Also, in the 1960s, U.S. trade policy granted duty-free re-importation of goods
that U.S. companies sent overseas for final assembly. 186 Consequently, U.S. companies
increased their overseas operations hoping to lower their costs by moving the most laborintensive parts of their production to lower wage countries, such as Mexico. Many
developing countries actively sought to attract these U.S. companies.
The 1960s also saw the reemergence of European and Japanese competition out of
the ashes of war – in this regard, U.S. post-war policy had been tremendously successful.
To that was added a transportation revolution through the use of containerized shipping
which dramatically improved efficiency. 187 These factors, coupled with the lowering of
U.S. tariffs, greatly increased imports into the U.S. such that by 1971, the U.S. had its
first trade deficit since 1935. 188
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The 1960s closed with the ramping up defense costs by escalating the war in
Vietnam and with new domestic spending commitments from President Johnson’s “Great
Society” programs. These and other factors contributed to a major recession running
from 1968 to 1971. 189
Another significant pressure on the U.S. economy came from significant
overvaluation of the dollar. This derived from the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate
system where other countries fixed their currencies to the dollar, which was itself fixed to
gold. European countries and Japan resisted lowering the value of their currencies to
protect their growing exports to the U.S., refusing U.S. requests to let their currencies
appreciate against the dollar. This led to a substantial growth of foreign holdings of
dollars, some $50 billion, against U.S. gold reserves totaling just $10 billion.
Fearing foreign countries would rush to exchange their dollars for gold, on
August 15, 1971, President Nixon declared a suspension of the dollar’s convertibility to
gold. 190 At the same time, he used his emergency economic authorities under the Trading
With the Enemy Act, to be discussed in a later chapter, to impose a ten percent surcharge
on all imports. Finally, he used recently passed economic stabilization legislation to
impose wage and price controls. Collectively, this became known as the “Nixon Shock.”
Nixon’s bold action was enormously popular -- for a time. 191 The import tariff
and convertibility measures got the attention of trading partners who eventually let their
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currencies appreciate. Nixon ended the import surcharge in December 1971. The wage
and price controls stayed in place through the 1972 presidential campaign, perhaps
contributing to Nixon’s landslide victory.
Also, in 1972, President Nixon made his famous trip to China, opening diplomatic
relations for the first time since 1948 when the Communists prevailed in the Chinese
Civil War. This was part of a U.S. strategic initiative to put increased pressure on the
Soviet Union.
The temporary suspension of gold convertibility became permanent in 1973
bringing an end to the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rates system. With it ended global
limits on capital flows, setting the stage for countries to run large and persistent current
account deficits. 192 The United States became one of those countries.
Having safely won the election, President Nixon lifted the wage and price
controls in January 1973. However, William N. Walker, a member of the Nixon
administration, argued in a recent op-ed that these controls were a spectacular failure
because they led to pent up demand for goods and pressure for wage increases that
unleashed significant inflationary pressures when the controls were lifted. 193
Consequently, he asserted, the control program ushered in the era of stagflation that
dominated the rest of the decade. President Nixon tried to impose a second price freeze
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in June 1973 which proved deeply unpopular. Events in the Middle East soon added
more economic pressures.
In October 1973, war broke out between Israel and Arab nations prompting OPEC
to impose an oil embargo against the U.S. for supporting Israel. 194 This triggered a
recession that had significant impact on the U.S. auto industry as U.S. demand for
Japanese cars with higher fuel efficiency led to an increase in Japanese imports. The
foreign market share in U.S. car sales doubled between 1975 and 1980, deeply worrying
America’s “Big Three” producers. Japan’s export of cars and other goods led to trade
surpluses with the U.S. and contributed to Japan overtaking Great Britain in 1978 as the
largest holder of U.S. Treasury notes and bonds. 195 Foreign holders of dollars preferred
the purchase of U.S. assets to the purchase of U.S. exports, contributing further to record
U.S. trade deficits.
Pressure in the U.S. from textile and apparel producers led President Nixon to
seek a voluntary export restraint with Japan. 196 When Japan refused, Nixon threatened to
use the Trading With the Enemy Act to set quotas. That led Japan to agree to limits,
though its textile and apparel producers were already moving to lower wage countries in
Asia. European countries soon faced similar import pressure and negotiations led to a
1974 multilateral agreement called the “Multifiber Arrangement” that controlled trade in
textiles until 1994.
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In 1978, Chinese President Deng Xiaoping decided to open China’s state-run
economy to limited private enterprise and foreign investment. 197 In 1980, President
Carter granted China “most favored nation” trade status entitling China access to U.S.
markets at much lower tariff rates. However, Congress required this status to be renewed
annually.
Foreign policy crises in the late 1970s included the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and the revolution in Iran that included the taking of U.S. hostages. The
Iranian revolution contributed to a second oil crisis in 1979, which along with Federal
Reserve Chairman Paul Volker’s efforts to break the 1970’s “stagflation” with tighter
monetary policy, helped trigger a severe U.S. recession that began in 1979 and ran until
1983. 198 Contributing to difficulties was an appreciation of the dollar from 1980 to 1985,
as again trading partners were taking active measures to prop up the value of their
currencies to protect their export industries. 199
When President Reagan took office in 1981, his administration applied an
expansionary fiscal policy that included lowering taxes while increasing defense
spending. 200 At the same time, he faced protectionist pressure from several industries,
including autos, steel, and semiconductors. These pressures focused on Japan which had
maintained significant barriers to U.S. exports and actively promoted its producers in key
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industries. 201 Other Asian countries, like South Korean, Taiwan, Singapore and Thailand
followed the Japanese example. President Reagan extended import relief through
voluntary export restrictions in several but not all industries.
The 1980s saw the transition of the U.S. economy from one based in
manufacturing to one based in services, much as previous generations had transitioned
from agriculture to manufacturing. 202 Manufacturing had dropped as a percentage of
U.S. Gross Domestic Product. The U.S. saw increases in overall manufacturing output,
but not increases in employment as companies invested more in technology and capital to
increase their productivity. By the end of the 1970s manufacturing had ceased to be a net
creator of jobs in the U.S. Through the 1980s, structural changes in employment
continued with drops in employment in primary metals manufacturing, textiles, and
apparel while employment increased in transportation and electronics. Irwin pointed out
that this transition was typical when incomes and standards of living increase, has they
had in the 1950s and 1960s, and increasingly well-off consumers demanded more
services. 203
By the time President George H.W. Bush took office in 1989, U.S. economic
conditions had greatly improved. 204 An economic recovery from the recession began in
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1983. U.S. pressure on trading partners prompted the depreciation of the U.S. dollar
against other currencies in 1985.
A U.S. frustration with the 1947 GATT system in the 1980s led to an increased
use of unilateral measures, like voluntary agreements, as well as a shift in U.S. focus to
developing bilateral or regional trade arrangements. 205 The first bilateral agreement was
with Israel in 1985. A 1988 agreement with Canada followed. Hoping to spark its own
economic development, in 1990 Mexico approached the U.S. in hopes of an agreement.
The U.S., Canada and Mexico signed the North America Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in 1992, shortly before the November presidential election that brought Bill
Clinton to the White House.
The U.S. sought a new round of GATT negotiations in 1982 but encountered little
enthusiasm at first. But foreign interest in further multilateral trade negotiations
increased with the dramatic dismantling of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent
the fall of the Soviet Union. The Soviet collapse had undermined the credibility among
some poorer nations for state-led, socialist-style economic development, leading them to
seek more international trade. Additionally, following the U.S.-led victory in Iraq, some
smaller nations sought a new multilateral trade arrangement to both constrain U.S.
hegemony and to reduce U.S. use of unilateral trade measures. Negotiations on the
“Uruguay Round,” as these new trade discussions were called, continued into the 1992
U.S. election year.

205

Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce, 613-619.

54

When President Clinton took office in 1993, he found a completed NAFTA on his
desk to present to Congress. Irwin described the fight for Congressional approval of
NAFTA as “one of the most contentious and divisive trade-policy debates in U.S.
history.” 206 Labor unions led the opposition joined by human rights, environmental, and
consumer groups. President Clinton pushed for the agreement arguing that America
needed the jobs and needed to compete in the global market. 207 He also stated, “But far
more is at stake, for this new fabric of commerce will also shape global prosperity or lack
of it, and with it, the prospects of people around the work for democracy, freedom, and
peace.” 208 Clinton was clearly echoing the liberal free trade ideals of Wilson and
Roosevelt.
Business interests supported NAFTA. 209 President Clinton arranged for side
deals on environmental standards and labor issues with the Mexican government to
persuade more Democrats to vote for the deal. That effort helped split the environmental
opposition. However, only a full court press gathered enough support to win a very close
vote in the U.S. House of Representatives on November 17, 1993. Republicans voted
mostly for it, Democrats mostly against. The U.S. Senate passed NAFTA a few days
later.
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Irwin referenced studies indicating that NAFTA significantly impacted North
American trade by allowing companies to further integrate their supply chains across the
continent. 210 At the same time, NAFTA’s effects on prices and welfare were “modest”
and the underlying issues in either the U.S. or Mexican economies were neither improved
nor worsened. However, the rancor that had developed as each side amped up the
rhetoric to try to win the close vote left bitter feelings among Democrats lasting for the
next 25 years, Irwin noted. 211
Just a month after the NAFTA vote, 117 countries’ delegates signed the Uruguay
Round’s sweeping multilateral agreements significantly altering the international trade
environment. The Uruguay Round had a been a reaction to criticisms of the 1947 GATT
agreement that included its failure to effectively address non-tariff barriers, its lack of
effective dispute resolution, and its lack of effective enforcement. Further, the original
GATT did not extend to services, intellectual property, or investment rules. Negotiations
to address these issues had been started under the Reagan administration, concluded
under the G.H.W. Bush administration, and submitted for Congressional approval under
the Clinton administration. Among other issues, the U.S. hoped to address agricultural
subsidies but conceded that point, once again, in the face of European objections
(particularly from France). 212
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The U.S. also conceded that it would “stand still” in its use of unilateral trade
restrictions. 213 Apparently multinational corporations wanted the “stand still”
commitment to ensure their continued access to open U.S. markets while they relocated
plants to lower wage countries. Lovett calls this a significant “blunder” because it
surrendered leverage to secure greater opening of foreign markets, leaving entrenched the
asymmetries that had plagued the U.S. in past agreements. 214
The final Uruguay Round agreements left developed country tariffs low, but
significantly lower than developing countries who only modestly reduced their much
higher tariffs. 215 Also, they abolished the “Multifiber Arrangement” (MFA), prohibited
voluntary export restraints, and made U.S. unilateral safeguards harder to use. 216 Of
significant importance to the U.S. were new agreements on services, intellectual property
protection, and investment measures, though these measures were often aspirational,
voluntary, or required lots of time to implement. 217
One of the most significant aspects of the Uruguay Round was to elevate the
secretariat of the 1947 GATT to a full-fledged international organization under the
United Nations umbrella called the World Trade Organization (WTO). 218 Unlike the
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other international financial organizations (IMF and World Bank), which used a
“weighted” voting system that favored the large developed countries because they
supplied the bulk of the funding, the new WTO would be a one country--one vote
system. 219 This gave substantial leverage to developing countries, and to the European
Union countries who each got a vote but tended to vote as a block. 220
Another new element was a strengthened dispute resolution system. In the past,
GATT panels had been used to help mediate resolutions between parties. Now WTO
panel decisions would be “enforceable” in that the losing country’s non-compliance
allowed the winning country to seek WTO permission to apply retaliatory measures. 221
Panel decisions could be appealed before a new “Appellate Body,” and then before the
entire WTO membership which could only overturn lower decisions by unanimous
vote. 222
Critics of the new dispute resolution mechanisms pointed out how legalistic they
were, and how unsuited they were to resolving contentious political differences behind
trade disputes that could only be settled by negotiation between the parties. 223 Eckes also
noted that WTO panels and appellate bodies were increasingly being asked to interpret
ambiguous terms in the agreements, where the ambiguity masked the fact that negotiators
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had not been able to achieve consensus on a more specific meaning. 224 Consequently, a
panel’s or appellate body’s legal interpretation might not have, in fact, been a position to
which the member state had actually agreed.
Once President Clinton submitted the Uruguay Round agreements to Congress,
debate was minimal. 225 They were supported by business and the opposition was muted
in comparison to the NAFTA debate. They passed in the U.S. House in November 1994,
with two-thirds of both Democrats and Republicans voting for it. They easily passed the
Senate the next month.
The Uruguay Round’s impacts are disputed. Asymmetries disfavoring the U.S.
remained entrenched, Lovett argued, contributing to the continued expansion of the U.S.
trade and current account deficits. 226 Commitments to lowering agricultural protections
and subsidies were only modest, but even those seemed not to come to fruition. 227 And
the dispute resolution system was accused of creating a new body of law not agreed to by
the member countries. 228 The dispute resolution system remained ill-equipped to handle
sensitive politically driven trade issues. 229
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President Clinton benefitted from a strong U.S economy through his term.
Protectionist pressures of the 1980s had receded with economic recovery, dollar
devaluation, and Japan’s relative stagnation. 230 Liberal ambitions for free trade had
produced NAFTA and the Uruguay Round. Hoping to “advance the cause of freedom
and democracy around the world,” President Clinton sought to build on these successes
by initiating another set of multilateral negotiations. 231 In 1999, these efforts were
blocked in Seattle by diverse anti-globalist interests and critics of the Uruguay Round. 232
Further, the Democratic party remained bitterly split on trade after the NAFTA debate,
contributing to the erosion of domestic support for additional multilateral trade efforts.
Increased partisanship became another feature of the 1990s, especially noticeable
after the Republicans won back the U.S. House of Representatives in the 1994 midterm
elections. 233 It became particularly evident in discussions for further fast-track trade
negotiating authority in 1997-1998. Though the Republicans backed it, President Clinton
could not gather enough Democratic support and asked Republican Speaker Gingrich to
cancel the scheduled vote on the measure. Gingrich went ahead with the vote, knowing it
would not pass, reportedly intending to embarrass the Democrats before the 1998
midterm elections.
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Toward the end of his term in 1999, President Clinton agreed to support China’s
efforts to join the WTO. 234 Congress approved “Permanent Normal Trade Relations”
status for China in 2000. Some opposition came from human rights advocates and from
security hawks. However, it was overcome by business interests enamored with China’s
huge, largely untapped market and its low wage workers. One business leader called it
the “economic equivalent of tearing down the Berlin Wall.” 235 U.S. businesses had
already been present in China, importing labor-intensive goods under U.S. labels back to
America. Though an unsurprising surge in Chinese imports to the U.S. followed, there
was not the call for protectionist countermeasures that faced Japan in the 1980s. The
Clinton administration hoped that engagement in China would foster the development of
liberal ideals there, such as respect for the rule of law, protection of human rights, and
increased political freedom. 236 China had not yet revealed its global and political
ambitions.
The 21st century began with a close presidential election ultimately decided by the
U.S. Supreme Court in favor of Republican George W. Bush. The terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, brought more attention to perceived domestic vulnerability,
particularly to what came to be called “critical infrastructure,” including the information,
food, energy, and transportation systems that Americans had perhaps taken for granted.
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War followed in Afghanistan, soon to be joined by war in Iraq in 2003. Few expected
these to be long wars ultimately expending thousands of lives and trillions of dollars.
The surge in Chinese imports continued into the 2000s and China’s close currency
control prompted concerns that China was manipulating the renminbi to keep its value
low to protect its exports and its dramatic economic growth. 237 China was also thought to
be delaying the implementation of its WTO obligations and directly or indirectly
supporting the piracy of U.S. intellectual property. 238 Other Asian countries were
thought to be following China’s example. The Bush administration did little publicly to
counter the allegations, though by 2005 China began to allow the renminbi to appreciate
against the dollar. 239
The Bush administration became frustrated with the new Doha round of
multilateral negotiations and sought smaller bilateral and regional arrangements instead,
agreeing to some 15 pacts with countries like South Korea, Australia, and Chile. 240 This
included an effort to establish a Central America Free Trade Area that included
Caribbean countries. Several passed Congress but with no Democratic support.
President Bush’s term closed out with the 2007 to 2009 global financial crisis
sparked by the collapse of the U.S. sub-prime mortgage industry. This produced the
greatest U.S. and global recession to that point since the Great Depression with world
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trade dropping 12 percent. 241 However, unlike many past recessions, such as in the
1980s, there was not a strong demand in the U.S. for a protectionist reaction, partly due to
the drop in U.S. imports by 22 percent in the second quarter of 2009 from the same
quarter the year before. Governments also had available more robust economic policy
tools with which to respond. For instance, central banks led by the U.S. Federal Reserve
actively intervened to inject liquidity when necessary to prevent complete market
collapse. Also present were WTO rules limiting protectionist measures. Finally, the
globalization of foreign investments and supply chains diminished the desire for
multinational businesses to seek protection in any single country.
President Obama came to the White House in 2009 as a former Illinois
Democratic senator carrying a hesitation about international trade that had now become
dominant among Democrats from the Northern U.S. 242 In fact, he had campaigned
against NAFTA. When the Republicans took the U.S. House and Senate in the 2010
midterm elections, they passed the remaining bilateral and regional agreements
completed by President Bush.
Obama’s own international trade agenda waited until his second term. In 2013,
the Obama administration began negotiations on a trans-Atlantic trade pact and, as part of
a strategic “pivot” to Asia, a “Trans-Pacific Partnership” agreement (TPP) which was
concluded in 2015. 243 The TPP generated significant criticism in the 2016 presidential
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election both from the Republican Donald Trump and from Democrats like Senator
Bernie Sanders. Even the Democratic Presidential nominee Hilary Clinton ultimately
abandoned support for it.
It is appropriate to summarize the movements in international trade that had taken
place in America up to 2016 as President-elect Donald Trump prepared to take office.
First, liberalizing world trade had been the ideal stated by Wilson and Roosevelt and was
the guiding principle of U.S. trade policy since the end of World War II. It was seen as a
tool toward building a global prosperity that would promote world peace and stability. It
was also a rejection of the punitive approach victors took after World War I. By all
accounts, this must be viewed as profoundly successful as post-war global incomes and
standards of living grew to unprecedented levels, notwithstanding the obstacles presented
by the Soviet bloc.
This success, however, sowed the seeds of challenges the United States faced in
2016. The urge to help non-Communist countries after World War II had built
“asymmetries” into trade agreements where the U.S. had unilaterally opened its markets
without demanding full reciprocity from other nations. The U.S. had sacrificed its own
economic interests for the foreign policy and national security imperatives of the time.
Lovett argued that this “trade not aid” mentality contributed to a stagnation of real wages
since 1973 and to the loss of between 10 and 12 million U.S. jobs.244 It also led to the
ascension, some might say domination, of multinational corporations and international
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banks who increasingly captured government international trade policy through their
world-wide presence and intense local lobbying. 245
As has been described, trade asymmetries coupled with the end of the Bretton
Woods fixed currency system set the stage for record U.S. trade and current account
deficits. This had been compounded by increasing U.S. budget deficits financed by
foreign investors. Further, a lack of supervision over capital flows led to increasingly
destabilizing financial speculation. That, and globalized supply chains, increased
economic vulnerability to war, terrorism, and pandemics. 246 The U.S. had so far evaded,
to a degree, the consequences of this profligacy because the dollar remained the world’s
reserve currency. But Lovett argued that dramatic changes in U.S. trade and fiscal policy
would be necessary to prevent a future economic catastrophe.
Additionally, some could argue that the perception of U.S. stagnation and loss of
manufacturing contributed to a growth of populism fed by grievances against
globalization. This trend also manifested overseas, sometimes accompanied by an
increase in authoritarianism.
On the other hand, Irwin argued that increased foreign competition was the
expected result of U.S.-led post-war reconstruction, as was a return to a more historically
typical multipolar trade and political balance. 247 It was the U.S. domination in the 1950s
and 1960s that was an aberration, he thought. Irwin further argued that structural changes
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were inevitable as developed economies transitioned away from manufacturing to
services, just as prior generations moved from agriculture to manufacturing. 248
The embrace of the liberal ideal was not universal in the U.S., however. Congress
also sometimes voiced objections to the perceived lack of reciprocity, the concession of
economic interests in favor of foreign policy interests, and the “unfair trade” practices of
other countries. The U.S. Congress also gave voice to public demands for protection by
inserting measures into U.S. law, such as Sections 201, 232, and 301. Moreover,
Presidents sometimes provided protections to industries like car-making, textiles, apparel,
and electronics. Thus, U.S. trade policy demonstrated an economically nationalist
attention to its own wellbeing by demanding liberalism be balanced with some
protectionism.
Additionally, U.S. policy had a clear mercantilist element devoted to containing
and ultimately defeating first communism then a host of other perceived global ills like
terrorism or the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. This study
will explore these mercantilist elements in more detail in later chapters. However, the
mercantilist, zero-sum equation was generally not applied in America’s relations to nonCommunist countries.
Thus, since the end of World War II, as part of its national strategy of
containment, the U.S. had sponsored the free trade system to block the expansion of
communism while pursuing increased mutual economic growth in the non-Communist
world. The U.S. had also borne the cost of providing the global security and stability

248

Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce, 271-272.

66

necessary to contain the Communist bloc and to allow free trade to flourish. While the
U.S. hoped allies would help foot the bill, global security was a “collective good” that the
U.S. national strategy of containment obligated America to provide. 249 This resulted in
classic “free rider” tensions as other Western states had incentives to contribute as little
as they could get away with because they knew the U.S. would always be there. This
became a long-standing a source of strain between the U.S. and its allies. As will be seen
below, it was an issue that particularly irked President Trump.
As President-elect Trump prepared to take office in 2016, the economy remained
divided between a (mostly) liberal free trade system that had led to unprecedented
globalization of much of the U.S. economy and a mercantilist system that remained
focused on security. 250 Successive presidential administrations since the end of World
War II strove to balance the tension between the liberal and mercantilist divisions in U.S.
international trade policy -- the incoming Trump administration would be no different.
From an institutional perspective, on the “liberal” side of the equation, U.S.
leadership had helped establish the World Trade Organization (WTO). This entity filled
the role originally envisioned for the International Trade Organization (ITO), the third of
the triad of international institutions proposed after World War II to stabilize post-war
commerce and to help prevent trade from becoming a future cause of war. The U.S.
rejected the ITO at the time because the U.S. Congress feared giving up too much
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sovereignty over trade. 251 The U.S. did join the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, an arrangement seeking to broadly lower tariffs on goods. Many GATT
provisions found their way into U.S. law, essentially institutionalizing liberal free trade
into the American legal system.
Once the Uruguay Round agreements took effect in 1995, the WTO became a
formal international institution under the umbrella of the United Nations, elevating the
global status of liberal ideals for free trade. However, the WTO was not without its
critics, including some in the Trump administration, as will be explored more below.
The U.S. institution established to lead the negotiation of international trade
issues, including at the WTO, was the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), an
independent cabinet-level official answering directly to the President. Congress had
transferred trade negotiations away from the State Department in 1962 because of a
perception that they were too ready to concede American commercial trade interests in
favor of other U.S. foreign policy objectives. 252 Additionally, the USTR investigated
complaints about unfair trade practices and the failure of other countries to abide by their
trade commitments under GATT or other agreements, known as “Section 201” and
“Section 301” investigations. 253
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President Trump appointed veteran international trade lawyer, Robert Lighthizer,
to serve as USTR. As will be discussed in the next chapter, Lighthizer would be a key
player in Trump’s attempt to recalibrate the liberal versus mercantilist balance in U.S.
international trade policy. Lighthizer was also particularly critical of the WTO which he
thought exercised an inappropriate global sovereignty. 254
There were other agencies of the U.S. government which also focused on
international trade. One of the most important was the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Commerce was responsible for controlling exports, applying processes widely described
as costly, overly-complicated, highly bureaucratized and dilatory, and whose mercantilist
focus since World War II had been denying goods and technology to the Communist
bloc. 255 By 2016, its objectives, while still mercantilist at their core, had shifted to
preventing the flow of money, goods, and technology to terrorists and an ad hoc list of
“bad actors,” as well as to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The Commerce Department also had an important role in import control. It was
responsible for making recommendations to the President for the imposition of protective
or retaliatory tariffs in a variety of circumstances. For instance, the department
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adjudicated dumping complaints. More important for this study, however, was the
department’s responsibility for investigating whether the import of certain goods was so
excessive that it “threatened to impair the national security of the United States,” known
as “Section 232” investigations. 256 President Trump would select long-time friend and
billionaire businessman Wilbur Ross to serve as his Secretary of Commerce.
Another executive agency with extensive international trade responsibilities was
the U.S. Department of the Treasury. The Treasury Department managed the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which was responsible for
investigating foreign direct investments that might adversely impact national security.
The department also administered regulations under the Trading with the Enemy Act
(TWEA) and International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) which can
prohibit Americans from having financial or trade relationships with those countries or
individuals named by the President. President Trump would appoint Steven Mnuchin, a
former Goldman Sachs executive and movie producer, to serve as his Secretary of the
Treasury.
Somewhat in the background as far as international trade was concerned, but
nevertheless a central element in the expression of national power, was the U.S.
Department of Defense. In 2016, the department continued the legacy of the U.S.
investment in large standing military forces whose world-wide presence promoted global
peace and security, though no longer focused on the Communist bloc. From an economic
256
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point of view, the defense budget continued to consume a large portion of federal
expenditures, having no small macroeconomic impact, though defense spending was
increasingly dwarfed by “non-discretionary” social spending. Retired U.S. Marine Corps
General James Mattis would serve as President Trump’s first Secretary of Defense.
This study will explore the roles that the U.S. Trade Representative and
Secretaries of Commerce, Treasury and Defense had in the shaping of international trade
policy as President Trump took office. The next chapter will discuss these men, and
others, who shaped and implemented international trade policy in the Trump
administration.
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III. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION – KEY ECONOMIC PLAYERS
This chapter will turn in more detail to the key economic policy players in the
Trump administration. Of course, the discussion must start with President Trump
himself. Three of President Trump’s books highlight his views on foreign policy,
economics, and international trade.
President Trump wrote The America We Deserve in 2000 when his ruminations
about running for President first became more serious. 257 In it, Trump opined that China
will be America’s “biggest long-term challenge.” 258 Trump thought that U.S. politicians
and businessmen were conceding too much to China to get access to its large potential
market, even at the cost of U.S. national security interests. He also noted China’s lack of
respect for human and political rights, stating that “China’s current government has
contempt for our way of life.” 259 Trump opined that China did not aspire to a strategic
partnership with the U.S., but rather intended to dominate Asia. 260 Trump also pointed
out that China was then investing $80 billion a year in its military, spending more
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and arming faster than others. 261 Trump observed that the U.S. had sold China satellite
and missile technology which might “come back to haunt us.” 262 Trump also asserted
that China had been stealing U.S. technology, supplying nuclear technology to Iran and
Iraq, threatening South Korea and Taiwan, and compromising U.S campaign law. 263
As policy if he were President, Trump stated “under no circumstances will we
keep our markets open to countries that steal from us.” 264 Trump noted that trade with
China was also “unfair” because China sold four times the products to the U.S. than the
U.S. was allowed to sell in Chinese markets. 265 Further, he asserted China was flooding
U.S. markets with cheap goods produced by forced labor. 266
Later in the 2000 book, Trump hinted at a mercantilist leaning in his discussions
about how to deal with Russia. “We need to tell Russia…that if they want our dime
[financial aid] they had better do our dance, at least in matters regarding our national
security…We have leverage, and we are crazy not to use it to better advantage.” 267
Trump also suggested pulling out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), saying there was no longer a need for it, and it was a waste of money. 268 He
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further pointed out that “our allies don’t seem to appreciate our presence anyway”
observing that “we pay for the defense of France yet they vote against us at the United
Nations…”
The clearest evidence of Trump’s mercantilist inclinations was in a brief section
in The America We Deserve on international trade. He began, “You only have to look at
our trade deficit to see that we are being taken to the cleaners by our trading partners.” 269
Trump continued, “business, especially trade, is like war.” 270 He claimed further that
“America has been ripped off by virtually every country we do business with.” 271 To fix
this, Trump said, he would appoint himself as his own trade representative and
renegotiate these trade agreements. 272 In a gentle acknowledgement to liberal free trade
ideals, however, he said was not advocating for protectionism but rather for reciprocal
trade. 273
A decade later, President Trump’s mercantilist inclinations and concerns about
China were on full display in his 2011 book, Time to Get Tough. 274 Trump’s most
revealing statement, “money is a weapon” 275 arose as he highlighted the danger of China
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holding America hostage by owning so much U.S. debt. He quoted a Hillary Clinton
comment, “How do you deal toughly with your banker?” 276
Trump was further exorcised by China’s currency manipulation, destruction of
U.S. manufacturing jobs, and theft of intellectual property. 277 He cited Peter Navarro,
who will be discussed further below, to argue that the U.S. trade deficit, most of that with
China, caused the loss of one million American jobs per year. 278
President Obama was the target of repeated Trump criticisms, but as for failing to
confront China on trade Trump asserted, “Obama claims we can’t do what’s in our
interests because it might spark a ‘trade war’ – as if we’re not in one now.” 279 Trump
blamed Obama’s weak negotiating skills for worsening America’s trade deficit with
China. 280 To fix this, Trump declared in Time to Get Tough that if President he would
impose a 25 percent tariff on all Chinese goods as a sanction for China’s currency
manipulation. 281 Additionally, Trump pronounced that he would charge a 20 percent
“tax” to be paid by all countries exporting goods to the U.S., commenting “if they want a
piece of the American market, they’re going to pay for it.” 282
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Foreshadowing the Trump administration’s actions to be discussed more fully
below, Trump made particular note of the damage currency manipulation had done to
America’s steel industry. 283 He pointed out that the steel industry regarded the artificially
low value of the renminbi as “the single-largest subsidy” to Chinese manufacturers. 284
Trump repeated his comment from The America We Deserve that China is an
“enemy.” 285 He mentioned frequently how much China was spending on military
expansion and observed that the increasing sophistication of their weapons had been
often accelerated by the Chinese theft of American military technology. 286 Trump also
pointed out the increasing threat that China’s growing cyber capabilities represented. 287
Trump’s declared remedy for all these ills was better negotiation, an unsubtle hint
that voters should pick him as the next President. 288 He pointed out that negotiations are
to gain maximum advantage, implicitly a zero-sum calculation. 289 Trump appreciated
how much the Chinese had gotten away with stating, “If we could get away with it
against them, I would strongly encourage us to do so.” 290
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The ire expressed in Trump’s earlier book about “free-riders” appeared again
repeatedly in Time to Get Tough. Trump lamented that President Obama missed an
opportunity to negotiate a better trade agreement with South Korea by not leveraging the
ongoing U.S. defense of the Korean peninsula. 291 In a chapter called, “Take the Oil,”
Trump noted that though the U.S. had repeatedly provided protection for countries in the
Middle East, America still faced high oil prices from OPEC. 292 He noted that the U.S.
had liberated Iraq and helped remove Libya’s Qadhafi but yet had missed opportunities to
demand their oil in return. 293 “Either you pay us to defend you,” he said, “or we take the
oil.” 294
In his 2015 book, Great Again: How to Fix Our Crippled America, President
Trump continued the same themes about China, unfair trade, and the mercantilist exercise
of economic power. 295 In describing what his foreign policy would be as President,
Trump said, “We have to demonstrate our willingness to use our economic strength to
reward those countries that work with us and punish those countries that don’t.” 296 Later
he continued, “We need to use the economic strength of American markets and the
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American consumer to assist our friends and remind our enemies of the benefits of
cooperation.” 297
Trump lamented that America had been losing the trade “battle” with China and
that China held more of America’s debt than any other country. 298 However, Trump
asserted that these facts also made China dependent on the U.S. as well. 299 He again
referred to China as America’s “enemy,” because “they have destroyed entire
industries…cost us tens of thousands of jobs, spied on our businesses, stolen our
technology, and have manipulated and devalued their currency.” 300 The way to fix it was
to hire better negotiators, he averred. 301
Trump continued to vent against America’s allies for being free riders. America
should transform its military, but allies should pay the cost, he said. 302 “We need to put
some of the bill for this transformation on the Saudi Arabians, the South Koreans, the
Germans, the Japanese, and the British. We’re protecting them after all, and they should
share in the costs.” 303
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Trump also continued the claim that the U.S. had lost out in trade deals and
needed better negotiators who could “bring jobs back from places like China, Japan, and
Mexico.” 304 Again, Trump’s cure was better negotiators – implicitly him.
To summarize from his three books, President Trump appeared to measure
international trade as a mercantilist contest, with the score card for winning or losing
being the balance of trade. Trump consistently lamented over the U.S. trade deficit as
evidence of America’s general economic decline, the erosion of the U.S. manufacturing
base, and the destruction of American jobs. Another consistent theme was concern about
China. Trump’s particular ire seemed to be based on the mercantilist zero-sum
conclusion that China’s economic and military rise necessarily came at America’s
expense. These mercantilist attitudes would be repeated in Trump’s 2016 presidential
campaign.
Out of the long 2016 presidential contest, one Trump appearance especially stands
out. On June 28, 2016 in Monessen, Pennsylvania, Trump gave a speech that focused on
confronting China on trade which was written by economist Peter Navarro and Stephen
Miller. 305 In it, Trump blamed President Clinton, and by inference Hillary Clinton, for
supporting China’s admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Bill Clinton’s
decision about China and the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Trump
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said, were the causes of America’s loss of “nearly one-third of its manufacturing jobs
since 1977,” which he called “the greatest jobs theft in history.”
Trump blamed Secretary of State Hilary Clinton for standing by while China
engaged in currency manipulation, stole intellectual property, and unfairly added to the
U.S. trade deficit. 306 Trump also attacked Hillary Clinton for a “job-killing deal” with
South Korea that he said doubled the trade deficit with that country and cost 100,000
American jobs. Called “KORUS,” as will be discussed below, this agreement became the
subject of significant controversy once Trump took office.
Trump also attacked globalization generally. He blamed the elites and politicians
for their pursuit of globalization at the cost of moving U.S. jobs, wealth, and factories
overseas. Trump described U.S. power as being based in manufacturing saying,
“America became the world’s dominant economy by becoming the world’s dominant
producer.” Yet the U.S. let its focus shift from promoting American economic
development to developing other nations. In the process, the U.S. had allowed other
nations to “subsidize their goods, devalue their currencies, violate their agreements…”
As an example foreshadowing Trump administration actions to be discussed in a later
chapter, Trump identified the dumping of “subsidized foreign steel” as a particular threat
to American factories. Trump also noted that the U.S. trade deficit was $800 billion.
This was evidence, he said, that through globalization America had now become
dependent on foreign countries.
Donald J. Trump, “Declaring America’s Economic Independence,” (speech) (June 29, 2016), in “Full
Transcript: Donald Trump’s Job Plans Speech,” Politico, http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/fulltranscript-trump-jobs-plan-speech-224891.
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To bolster his position in support of American industry, Trump referenced the
founding fathers and their promotion of manufacturing, specifically Washington and
Hamilton. Trump also noted that President Lincoln had supported trade protection.
As an insight into his approach to economic analysis, Trump talked about how
trade deficits “directly subtract from Gross Domestic Product (GDP).” He blamed the
drop in U.S. GDP since 2002 on the opening of U.S. markets to Chinese imports. 307 He
claimed that for every single percentage point loss in U.S. GDP, there was the failure to
generate one million jobs. As a result, Trump asserted, there was a “job creation deficit.”
Renegotiating trade agreements and confronting China would restore U.S. jobs, he
claimed.
Echoing themes from his books, Trump said his trade policy would include seven
steps. First, he would withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Second, he would
hire the best trade negotiators. Third, he would identify trade agreement violations and
use “every tool” to end them. Fourth, he would renegotiate NAFTA for better terms, and
if better terms were not forthcoming, he would withdraw from it. Fifth, he would declare
China a currency manipulator. Sixth, he would confront China by bringing trade
violation cases in the U.S. and in the WTO. Seventh, if necessary, he would turn to trade
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sanctions. It is the seventh step, particularly import sanctions under Section 232 which
are based on threats to national security, which is the focus of this study. It should be
noted that Trump did not advocate for withdrawing from the WTO in this speech.
The transition from candidate to executive took place on January 20, 2017. The
language in President Trump’s inaugural address expressed the direct link in his mind
between international trade and national security. 308 Trump noted that “For many
decades, we’ve enriched foreign industry at the expense of American industry,
subsidizing the armies of other countries, while allowing for the very sad depletion of our
military.” Later in the speech he said, “We must protect our borders from the ravages of
other countries making our products, stealing our companies and destroying our jobs.
Protection will lead to great prosperity and strength.”
As has been noted, President Trump was not the first American President to link
U.S. prosperity with U.S. power – economic security with national security. As with
preceding Presidents, Trump would rely on others in his administration to turn this
rhetoric into policy. For President Trump, two very influential economic contributors
were Dr. Peter Navarro and Robert Lighthizer.
Peter Navarro was a Harvard-trained economist and professor at the University of
California, Irvine. 309 Navarro served as chief economic advisor to the Trump campaign.
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He came to Trump’s attention for a book he wrote in 2011 called Death by China. 310 In
fact, Trump provided a marketing blurb when the book was made into a movie. 311
Navarro’s argument in Death by China was succinctly captured in an op-ed he
wrote for the Los Angeles Times, “How China Unfairly Bests the U.S,” which President
Trump cited several times in his book, Time to Get Tough. 312 Navarro argued that
America’s persistent trade deficit was the “primary structural problem underpinning our
slow growth and high unemployment.” He asserted that the trade deficit cost the U.S.
“close to one percent of GDP growth a year at a loss of almost one million jobs
annually.” Seventy percent of the trade deficit, Navarro said, was with China and was
due to China’s unfair trade practices: export subsidies, piracy of intellectual property,
counterfeiting, currency manipulation, and forced technology transfers. These practices,
Navarro claimed, were all in violation of World Trade Organization rules and U.S. law.
China’s practices belied free trade’s promise of mutual benefit, he argued. Instead, “a
mercantilist China uses unfair trade practices to wage war on our manufacturing base.”
Unsurprisingly, many of these arguments made it into Trump’s 2016 campaign messages.
In a 2018 speech, Navarro expanded on President Trump’s economic policy as
being “four points to the compass—tax cuts, deregulation, unleashing the energy sector,
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and fixing our trade deals.” 313 After the inauguration, Navarro was named as a director
of a new “National Trade Council.” 314 The job eventually morphed into “Director, White
House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy,” another newly-created post. 315
Whatever the title, Navarro said his mission in the administration was “to create goodpaying jobs in the manufacturing sector for Americans who work with their hands.” 316
Navarro argued that he and President Trump supported “free, fair and reciprocal
trade.” 317 Navarro further described this as “five zeros” – zero tariffs, zero non-tariff
barriers, zero subsidies, zero currency manipulation, and zero advantage from valueadded tax versus income tax treatment. Navarro noted that he had taught
macroeconomics and understood the Ricardian principle of comparative advantage that
created the potential for mutual gains in international trade. But, he said, “That’s not the
world we live in.”
The real world of globalization, Navarro continued, had weakened national
security by weakening the manufacturing and defense industrial base. 318 Specifically,
Navarro pointed to a detailed interagency report identifying almost 300 “gaps and
vulnerabilities” in the supply chain for critical defense goods where there was a foreign
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supplier, even an adversary such as China, that provided a critical component. 319
Navarro believed that in some cases strategic rivals, particularly China, targeted
vulnerable sectors, such as those involving rare earth metals.
Despite the personnel turnover that seemed particularly rampant in the Trump
administration, Navarro served in the White House for the entirety of President Trump’s
term. Navarro shared that achievement with another key economic advisor, Robert
Lighthizer.
As noted above, President Trump appointed Robert Lighthizer to be his trade
representative. Lighthizer was a lawyer who had served on Senator Robert Dole’s staff,
as Deputy U.S. Trade Representative in the Reagan administration, and as a trade
litigator. In 1996, Lighthizer served as treasurer for Senator Dole’s unsuccessful
presidential campaign.
Lighthizer was a frequent contributor to the opinion pages of several newspapers.
Many of these pieces involved international trade. For instance, in 1998 Lighthizer wrote
an op-ed opposing admission of China to the WTO disputing Clinton administration
claims that doing so would encourage China to better respect human rights and to
demonstrate more responsible international behavior. 320 Lighthizer argued that it was
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foolish to think that increasing trade would reduce tensions between the U.S. and China.
“Trade alone cannot defuse the flames of international rivalry,” he said. To the contrary,
he wrote, prosperity can contribute to conflict.
In another piece written in 1999, Lighthizer pointed out flaws in the arguments for
free trade. 321 Lighthizer noted the apparent contradiction that arose when liberal free
trade advocates pushed for the reduction or elimination of labor and environmental
standards in international trade agreements yet would never tolerate the weakening of
those same standards in their home countries. Lighthizer pointed out that the U.S. had
implemented such standards because it was understood that free markets did not
adequately protect those interests. “As a nation,” he wrote, “we have decided that we
value free markets, but only to a point.” Lighthizer argued that a global free market will
not raise standards world-wide by itself noting that “It cannot be assumed that businesses
and countries will get richer and do the right thing.” Similarly, he said, it is wrong to
believe that “free trade solves all, or any, social ills.”
Amid the 2008 presidential campaign, Lighthizer discussed the place of
protectionism in Republican politics. 322 Lighthizer identified Alexander Hamilton as one
“who could be considered the founder of American conservatism.” Lighthizer observed
that the Republican party had strongly supported protectionism beginning with President
Lincoln and continuing for nearly 100 years. Lighthizer said that President Eisenhower
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was the first Republican free-trader and questioned whether Eisenhower could really be
called “conservative.” Lighthizer further noted that President Reagan, whom he called
“the personification of modern conservatism,” often broke from “free-trade dogma” by
advocating voluntary restraints to limit imports of automobiles and steel, as well as
import relief for other companies and industrial sectors. In contrast, Lighthizer pointed
out that free traders seemed to allow no room for nuance or flexibility, even though free
trade “helps China become a superpower” or created foreign dependence for food or
military equipment. Lighthizer argued in favor of pragmatism, lowering trade barriers
where appropriate but applying protection when necessary. He asserted that Hamilton
and Reagan “always understood that trade policy was merely a tool for building a strong
and independent country.”
Early in the 2012 presidential race, Lighthizer wrote an op-ed defending thencandidate Trump’s position on trade. 323 Apparently, some Republicans had claimed
Trump was a “liberal” for being willing to confront China and for being protectionist.
Lighthizer countered by pointing out that for most of the Republican Party’s history it
had supported protective trade policies to help build domestic industries. He once again
referred to Alexander Hamilton as a founding American conservative. Lighthizer also
observed that Lincoln was a political descendent of Henry Clay who had advocated the
“American System” of high protective tariffs. Lighthizer next cited President Nixon, and
again Reagan, as Presidents willing to limit trade and protect U.S. industries.
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Lighthizer’s conclusion was that free trade was more an “aberration” than a “hallmark of
true American conservatism.”
Lighthizer further noted that confronting China was hardly a “liberal” position
and that confrontation was particularly appropriate given China was an adversary
manipulating currency, using subsidies, stealing intellectual property, and practicing
other unfair trade practices to run up a (then) $270 billion trade surplus, taking U.S. jobs
in the process. Lighthizer further noted that Chinese practices hardly achieved the
efficiency sought by free trade and open markets. Rather, he said, China’s trade practices
had created huge market distortions that needed correction.
Once confirmed as U.S. Trade Representative in May 2017, Lighthizer set to
work carrying out Trump’s campaign agenda. 324 Lighthizer led the renegotiation of
NAFTA which produced a new trade pact, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(USMCA). He also negotiated a new free trade agreement with Korea to replace
KORUS.
In addition to trade negotiations, Lighthizer oversaw unfair trade investigations
regarding the import of Chinese solar panels under Section 201 and China’s alleged theft
and forced transfer of intellectual property under Section 301. Both investigations
resulted in the imposition of U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports. This started a “trade war”
where China retaliated, the U.S. countered, and a tit-for-tat continued until the execution
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of a “Phase One Agreement” on January 15, 2020. 325 That agreement left most tariffs in
place on both sides, but China committed to addressing intellectual property theft and to
buying more American goods. 326
Later in 2020, Lighthizer defended President Trump’s conduct of trade policy in
two pieces in Foreign Affairs. In the first, Lighthizer described the administration’s
approach to trade as navigating between policies pursued for purely geopolitical purposes
and those that sought to maximize economic efficiency and overall output. 327 The Trump
policy sought, Lighthizer asserted, a middle course supporting the U.S. economy by
providing a path to middle class prosperity via stable, well-paying manufacturing jobs.
The policy did not embrace either protectionism or autarky, he argued. Rather, the goal
was “a balanced, worker-focused trade policy that achieves a broad, bipartisan consensus
and better outcomes for Americans.”
Lighthizer made two additional points. First, he defended a worker-centric trade
policy by observing that economic efficiency in trade theory did not take into
consideration the full adverse impacts to workers who lost their jobs -- not only did the
workers lose income, but they also lost “the personal dignity of a job,” he wrote. 328 This
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could not be offset, he argued, by cheaper consumer goods or a welfare check.
Lighthizer noted workers displaced by free trade were typically unable find other jobs,
even in the service and technology sectors. That was especially true, he said, for former
manufacturing workers without college degrees. America’s consumer spending, he
argued, was employing foreign workers instead of Americans.
Lighthizer’s second point was about trade deficits. Lighthizer challenged the
analogy sometimes made about an individual purchasing a product creating a “trade
deficit” with that vendor but that such a deficit was not a problem since the individual’s
income came from another source. 329 Lighthizer contended there was in fact a problem if
there was a trade deficit “with everyone.” If persistent, he argued, such a deficit could
only be funded by selling one’s assets. This was America’s situation, Lighthizer
contended, because the U.S. had been for too long selling its assets to fund its persistent
trade deficit.
Lighthizer concluded his first Foreign Affairs piece by asserting that “The United
States must avoid the stale, reductionist paradigm of free trade versus protectionism,
which oversimplifies complex issues and stifles creative policymaking.” 330 Lighthizer
asserted that “most Americans want the same thing: balanced outcomes that keep trade
flows strong while ensuring that working people have access to steady, well-paying
jobs.” “Neither old-school protectionism nor unbridled globalism will achieve that,” he
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said. The appropriate policy, Lighthizer declared, was one that “prizes the dignity of
work.”
In his second piece in Foreign Affairs, Lighthizer responded to specific critics of
U.S. trade policy toward China by asserting that “absent reform, China’s economic model
poses an existential threat to the economic security of the United States.” 331 Lighthizer
argued that this reality left the Trump administration no choice but to use the best
economic tools it had to address this threat. This included, he noted, tariffs under
Sections 301 and 232.
Navarro and Lighthizer were not the only economic players in the Trump
administration. However, they number among the very few who served all four years.
For instance, the Chair of the National Economic Council had three occupants during
Trump’s term, Gary Cohn, Larry Kudlow, and Tyler Goodspeed. Gary Cohn was a
former president of Goldman Sachs and, along with Steve Mnuchin, the Secretary of the
Treasury, and Cohn’s successor Larry Kudlow, belonged to what one reporter called a
“Wall Street Clique.” 332 Unlike Navarro and Lighthizer, this group was against
confronting China and supported the free-trade status quo.
Journalist Bob Woodward reported that it was Cohn who confronted Trump about
his attacks on trade deals during the transition and that it was Cohn who had argued for
“free, fair and open trade” because America’s was a trade-based economy. 333 As will be
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seen below, a similar aspirational phrase would find its way into the Trump
administration’s statement about trade policy in its 2017 National Security Strategy, to be
discussed further below.
Journalist Josh Rogin reported that the “Wall Street Clique” was supplemented by
frequent unofficial and out-of-channel communications by billionaire friends of the
President, who would sometimes call the White House or mingle with the President at
Mar-a-Lago. 334 These included Hank Greenberg, Hank Paulson, Stephen Schwartzman,
Steve Wynn and John Thornton, most of whom had substantial financial interests in
China. 335 That these interactions impacted policy was confirmed in a revealing statement
Peter Navarro gave to the Center for Strategic and International Studies:
And DOD clearly views China as an identified threat to America’s defense
industrial base. Nothing could be clearer than that in this report [cited above]. But
this is a very different view. This is a very different view that DOD and other
elements of this government have than the Wall Street and the – Wall Street
bankers and the globalist elites. Let’s think about this now. Consider the shuttle
diplomacy that’s now going on by a self-appointed group of Wall Street bankers
and hedge fund managers between the U.S. and China. As part of a Chinese
government influence operation, these globalist billionaires are putting a fullcourt press on the White House in advance of the G-20 in Argentina. The mission
of these unregistered foreign agents – that’s what they are; they’re unregistered
foreign agents – is to pressure this President into some kind of deal. 336
Woodward also reported one remarkable example of the Wall Street Clique
operating to constrain President Trump, when in early September 2017, Gary Cohn
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pulled from President Trump’s desk a letter that would have withdrawn the United States
from the Korea-US free trade agreement, called KORUS. 337 Trump had threatened do to
this for months despite arguments that the agreement was “one of the foundations of an
economic relationship, a military alliance, and most important, top secret intelligence
operations and capabilities.” Trump was enraged that Koreans were not doing more to
pay for their own defense and about the $18 billion U.S.-South Korea trade deficit. In
addition to Cohn, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Secretary of Defense James Mattis,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Marine General Joseph Dunford, and National
Security Advisor Army Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster all argued that this was the
best national security investment that could be made to protect against the nation’s most
direct threat, North Korea. 338 Ultimately, South Korea did agree to a new trade pact.
It is appropriate to shift the narrative to another occasional member of the Wall
Street Clique whom Rogin observed to be a “wild card” moving between the Wall
Streeters and Navarro’s anti-China camp. 339 That was Wilbur Ross – whom Trump
appointed Secretary of Commerce. Ross was a billionaire private equity investor, and a
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long-time Trump acquaintance. However, despite being a long-time friend, Rogin
reported that in April 2017 Ross lost influence with Trump because of Trump disliked the
way Ross had negotiated with the Chinese. 340 Thereafter, Mnuchin and Lighthizer took
over the Chinese trade talks.
It is important to introduce here President Trump’s early national security team, a
group often described as the “Axis of Adults.” 341 Secretary of State Rex Tillerson had
been chief executive of Exxon-Mobile. Secretary of Defense James Mattis was a retired
Marine Corps general. Another retired Marine Corps General, John Kelly, served as
Secretary of Homeland Security and then as White House Chief of Staff. President
Trump’s second National Security Advisor (after Army Lieutenant General Michael
Flynn’s quick departure) was Army Lieutenant General H.S. McMaster. These men
were thought to be highly experienced professionals who would provide “guardrails” to a
chief magistrate with no prior government experience. It turns out that these men did not
last long in the Trump administration.
In May 2017, McMaster and Cohn teamed up to report on President Trump’s first
overseas trip in an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal headlined, “America First Doesn’t
Mean America Alone.” 342 They reveal some clues as to the Trump administration’s early
international trade positions, mostly confirming Trump’s statements during the campaign.
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First, President Trump reiterated his concerns to other heads of state about trade deficits
and the importance of reciprocity in trade. Next, the President and other leaders in the
Group of Seven wealthy nations shared a communique indicating their willingness to
“stand firm ‘against all unfair trade practices.’” Finally, President Trump repeated his
demands that allies pay more for mutual defense.
McMaster and Cohn summed up the Trump administration’s views on the world
in ringing mercantilist and economically nationalistic tones: they said the Trump
administration’s outlook was “clear-eyed,” recognizing “that the world is not a ‘global
community’ but an arena where nations, nongovernmental actors and businesses engage
and compete for advantage.” The administration was resolutely committed, they said, “to
use the diplomatic, economic and military resources of the U.S. to enhance American
security, promote American prosperity, and extend American influence around the
world.”
One of the first formal statements of the Trump administration on economic
policy was the 2017 National Security Strategy issued in December 2017. 343 By law, the
executive branch is called upon to issue annually a “National Security Strategy” (NSS)
that describes the worldwide goals, interests, and objectives of the U.S. that are vital to
national security. 344 The NSS is then to identify both short-term and long-term uses of
the “political, economic, military and other elements of national power” to promote U.S.

National Security Strategy, December 2017, The White House, 17-23. Hereafter “NSS.”
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
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goals, interests, and objectives. Incoming presidential administrations often use the NSS
as their first formal opportunity to distinguish their approach to national security from
that of the outgoing administration.
The Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy described economic
welfare as the second of four pillars to national security, a pillar entitled “Promote
American Prosperity.” 345 At the head of the section stood a quote from President Trump,
“economic security is national security.” 346
The NSS never explicitly defined “economic security” or “national security.” Nor
are those terms defined anywhere in U.S. law. Clues to what the Trump administration
meant by these terms could be deduced from the NSS’s introduction:
As we took our political, economic, and military advantages for granted, other
actors steadily implemented their long-term plans to challenge America and to
advance agendas opposed to the United States, our allies, and our partners. We
stood by while countries exploited the international institutions we helped to
build. They subsidized their industries, forced technology transfers, and distorted
markets. These and other actions challenged America’s economic security.
At home, excessive regulations and high taxes stifled growth and weakened free
enterprise—history’s greatest antidote to poverty. Each time government
encroached on the productive activities of private commerce, it threatened not
only our prosperity but also the spirit of creation and innovation that has been key
to our national greatness. 347

The other three pillars were “Protect the American People, the Homeland, and the American Way of
Life (Pillar I);” “Preserve Peace Through Strength (Pillar III);” and “Advance American Influence (Pillar
IV). NSS, v-vi.
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The Trump administration committed itself to reversing these trends through its clearly
economically nationalistic “America First” policy. 348
As noted above, the NSS pillar “Promoting American Prosperity” began with the
Trump quote that “economic security is national security.” 349 The articulation of this
pillar started with the argument that the American economy was in a general decline
because of a long list of domestic economic ills: low economic growth, stagnant wages,
increased taxes, increased health care costs, education costs, slowing productivity growth,
government regulation, and poor infrastructure (physical and informational). The NSS
also argued that the U.S. economy had suffered due to fair trading practices. Among the
unfair trading practices the NSS listed was, ominously, “economic aggression,” which the
NSS did not expressly define but seemed to be linked to comments elsewhere in the NSS
about currency manipulation, intellectual property theft, and pervasive non-tariff trade
barriers.
To address these ills, the NSS first enumerated the general economic steps that the
Trump administration intended to take to rejuvenate the domestic economy: tax reform;
improvement to infrastructure; reduction of the federal deficit; and promotion of
apprenticeship and workforce development. 350 Turning to international trade, the NSS
stated that the Trump administration intended to promote “fair, free and reciprocal
economic arrangements,” meaning that administration would attack persistent trade
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imbalances, break down trade barriers, and expand U.S. export opportunities. 351 Further,
the Trump administration intended to oppose “closed mercantilist trading blocks” and
bring aggressive enforcement actions for violations of international trade rules.
Additionally, the administration expressed its intent to renegotiate old trade agreements
and enter new bilateral, not multilateral, trade agreements that ensured fair and reciprocal
treatment and enforced high standards for intellectual property, digital trade, agriculture,
labor, and the environment.
The NSS next turned to protecting America’s lead in technologies “critical to
economic growth and security.” 352 The NSS identified the theft of intellectual property
as a key threat, particularly to America’s “National Security Innovation Base” which it
defined as “the American network of knowledge, capabilities, and people…that turns
ideas into innovations, transforms discoveries into successful commercial products and
companies, and protects and enhances the American way of life.”
To protect intellectual property, the administration committed to aggressive
domestic and international action, including counterintelligence operations and criminal
prosecutions. The administration further committed to strengthening the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an entity that reviews foreign
acquisitions of U.S. enterprises for national security risks. CFIUS will be discussed in a
later chapter.
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A section of the NSS entitled “Tools of Economic Diplomacy” revealed tensions
between the liberal free trade practices that dominated the global economy and the
enduring mercantilist calculus of national security. 353 There, the NSS pointed out that
America had a central role in expanding “a community of free market economies” who
were “defending against threats from state-led economies.” 354 The NSS declared that the
U.S. would strengthen its economic ties to its allies, but apply its economic power to
diminish its adversaries – continuing to blend liberal and mercantilist policies just as
every administration had done since World War II.
Elsewhere, the NSS stated that the contest for power was “a central continuity to
history” and declared China and Russia to be the key challengers to the U.S. in that
contest. 355 The following chapters will explore how well the Trump administration
navigated this balance between liberalism and mercantilism as it addressed the great
power contest, particularly with China. The study will show that at times the Trump
administration was confused in its approach.
Some of the confusion was the result of competing understandings of “economic
security is national security” between factions within the Trump administration. The
“Axis of Adults” held a traditional view that a strong U.S. economy served as the
foundation for a robust foreign policy and ability to fund a strong military.
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This traditional view had evolved out of the recognition that the U.S. was the only
economy undamaged by World War II, and therefore it had to anchor the rebuilding of
the Western economies to confront and contain the expanding Soviet bloc, which was
viewed as an existential threat to the United States and other Western nations. The
traditional view necessarily embraced free trade among non-Communist countries
because it was thought essential to help confront the Soviet bloc economically.
The national security professionals in the Trump administration – Tillerson,
Mattis, Kelly and McMaster – advocated for the traditional view and its support of free
trade and global economic stability. 356 The “Axis of Adults” were apparently not yet
ready to replace the Soviet Union with China as the focus of a more mercantilist U.S.
trade policy, despite Trump’s campaign rhetoric and the allusions to such a confrontation
in the NSS. Rogin reported that they did see China as a security threat but did not believe
that the use of mercantilist economic tools based on national security was yet justified. 357
Additionally, the Wall Street Clique, led by Treasury Secretary Mnuchin and Gary Cohn,
raised fears that a confrontation with China would adversely impact financial markets and
the U.S. economy. Thus, the “Axis of Adults” and the “Wall Street Clique” in the Trump
administration did not see “economic security is national security” as a basis for
confronting China on trade.
The anti-China group in the Trump administration had a very different view.
Rogin reported that Peter Navarro, Steve Bannon, and Stephen Miller thought that
356
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“economic security” meant keeping industries critical to national security in the United
States. 358 In particular, they advocated weening the American economy from
dependence on Chinese goods. They observed that China’s own economic plan, “Made
in China 2025” sought a similar self-sufficiency. In fact, Navarro wanted to go further
and argued for complete “decoupling” of the U.S. and Chinese economies. 359
One mercantilist tool available to the Trump administration to protect domestic
industries from national security threats was the imposition of import tariffs under
Section 232. This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. For now, it suffices to
say that in February 2018, claiming a threat to national security, President Trump used
Section 232 to impose tariffs for virtually all steel and aluminum imports into the United
States.
Interestingly, only about 6 percent of these imports came from China. The bulk
came from Canada, Australia, and the EU. Therefore, the heaviest impact of the tariffs
fell upon America’s closest partners in not only trade but security. The allies retaliated
by threatening tariffs of their own on U.S. exports. Consequently, the Trump
administration started a trade war, but not one that was directed against China or Russia,
America’s key challengers as proclaimed in the NSS, but rather against the very allies the
U.S. would need in any great power confrontation. Trump never seemed to grasp how
undermining allies might weaken the U.S. against its greater foes.
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The national security professionals in the Trump administration constantly
repeated to the President that economic and security issues were intertwined for allies and
that, therefore, peremptory economic actions like imposing tariffs or withdrawing from
trade agreements which harmed their economic interests also harmed their national
security. This strained allied relationships with the U.S. which could ultimately
undermine U.S. security interests that were dependent on strong relationships. Trump,
Navarro and Lighthizer did not seem to accept that just as the U.S. claimed that
“economic security is national security,” so too did other nations.
But the trade war started against allies soon escalated to include China, the main
U.S. challenger, when in March 2018 when the Trump administration announced the
results of Lighthizer’s Section 301 investigation. 360 That investigation claimed to find
substantial Chinese theft of American intellectual property and determined to levy
punitive tariffs on $50 billion in Chinese goods. 361 As stated above, this sparked several
back-and-forth rounds of additional tariffs. Thus, after starting trade tensions with allies
under Section 232, a trade war began under Section 301 against America’s biggest source
of imported goods and biggest foreign holder of public debt – China. Rogin reported
this as a victory of Navarro’s and Lighthizer’s anti-Chinese group over Mnuchin’s and
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Cohn’s Wall Street Clique. 362 It also represented a repudiation of the Axis of Adults and
the traditional view of economic and national security they advocated.
As noted above, it was the imposition of Section 232 tariffs that was the first shot
fired in President Trump’s trade war. Because of Section 232’s explicit reference to
national security, the next chapter will explore the Trump administration’s use of that law
in more depth.
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IV. NATIONAL SECURITY AND IMPORTS
A. Background
Among several weapons taken up in the trade war, the Trump administration
invoked “Section 232” authorities which empowered a President to take whatever trade
action was thought necessary against imports that presented a “threat to impair the
national security.” The first part of this chapter will explore this Section 232 authority
and how President Trump used it. The second part will share some early estimates of the
economic impacts of Trump administration tariffs, including those imposed under
Section 232. Because several U.S. trading partners brought trade complaints to the
World Trade Organization about the Trump administration’s use of Section 232, the third
part of this chapter will explore the meaning of “essential security interests” in Article
XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The chapter’s final part will
compare and comment on both Section 232 and Article XXI.
“Section 232” is a title given to specific authority delegated to the President to
“adjust” imports that “threaten to impair the national security.” 363 A detailed review of
the statute can be found in Appendix A.

It is so named because it comes Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act. It is codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1862 (2021).
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To begin, Section 232 does not define “national security.” The fact that the term
is left undefined gives a President latitude in assigning it the definition he or she thinks
appropriate at the time. A President may take a different interpretation than earlier
executives. Further, Section 232 authorities may be invoked when imports occur “in the
quantities” or “under such circumstances” sufficient to threaten to impair national
security. The statute does not set a threshold “quantity” of imports necessary to invoke
the statute. Nor does it specify the particular “circumstances” necessary for its
invocation. The statute tasks the Secretary of Commerce with doing an investigation but
does not require “findings.” Nor is the Secretary required to find that national security
has actually been impaired – only that there is a threat of such impairment.
More information on how past presidential administrations have used Section 232
appears in Appendix A. The most notable of the prior Section 232 investigations for
purposes of this study is the 2001 investigation of steel imports undertaken during
President George W. Bush’s administration. It is worthy of discussion because the Bush
administration expanded the narrower definition of “national security” used by all
previous administrations to include “the general security and welfare of certain industries,
beyond those necessary to satisfy national defense requirements, that are critical to the
minimum operations of the economy and government” – what was termed “critical
industries.” 364
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The G.W. Bush administration’s broader definition blurs distinctions between
broad economic welfare and national security much as NSC 162/2 did. However, this
broader definition had never been used before in Section 232 cases. Now firms seeking
protection from imports under Section 232 simply needed to make a colorable argument
that they were in a “critical industry” to gain trade protection. Consequently, the Bush
administration’s expansion of the notion of “national security” in 2001 set the stage for
the Trump administration to unleash Section 232 with an even broader practical effect.
One reason prior presidential administrations had avoided use of a broader
definition of national security in Section 232 cases may have been a concern about its
impact on foreign trade agreements, like GATT, which included provisions discussing
“security.” The concern would be that if the U.S. blurred “national security” and
“economic welfare” to impose import controls, it would trigger an avalanche of trade
complaints from trading partners of GATT violations, not to mention retaliatory
measures. In turn, other nations might feel similarly compelled to exercise GATT’s
“security” exemption to justify their own protections against competing imports. As a
result, GATT’s carefully negotiated framework could be undermined, ultimately
damaging global trade.
These apprehensions were well founded. The Trump administration’s use of
Section 232 generated exactly these tensions, not just with the America’s nascent global
rival China, but with steadfast trade and security allies like Canada and the EU.
Whatever the concerns about using a broader definition, in enacting Section 232,
Congress was clearly concerned about U.S. employment and general economic welfare.
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This is clear from language in the statute about the need to “recognize the close relation
of the economic welfare of the nation to our national security” and the admonition that
the executive be attentive to the possibility that the “weakening of our internal economy
may impair national security.” 365
The Trump administration initiated eight Section 232 investigations. 366 In the
first two investigations regarding steel and aluminum, the Secretary of Commerce
expressly used the expanded definition embraced by the Bush administration’s 2001 Steel
Report. This is unsurprising given the Trump administration’s 2017 National Security
Strategy stating that “economic security is national security.” 367
Because of time and space limitations, this study will focus only on the
investigation into steel imports which was the first of the eight Trump administration
Section 232 investigations. This investigation began in April 2017 (three months after
President Trump’s inauguration in January 2017). Commerce held public hearings and
gathered public comments in May 2017. The report was announced in February 2018
and President Trump imposed a global 25% tariff on steel imports on March 8, 2018. 368
As its standard for making a decision, the 2018 Steel Report embraced the broader
definition of national security discussed in the 2001 Steel Report and specifically
365

19 U.S.C. § 1862(d).

Congressional Research Service, “Section 232 Investigations: Oversight and Issues for Congress,”
August 24, 2020, Report R45249, Appendix B.
366

367

NSS, 17-23.

Rogin, Chaos Under Heaven, 135. Proclamation 9705, “Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United
States,”, 83 Fed. Reg. 11625-11630 (March 8, 2018).
368

107

included analysis on the impacts of steel imports on 16 critical industries. 369 The report
reiterated the close link between national security and broader economic welfare in both
the statute and in how the Trump administration was going to interpret it. Further, the
report pointed out that under Section 232 there need be no actual impairment of national
security, just the threat. Finally, the report reiterated that it was in the Secretary’s
discretion to describe the quantities or under such circumstances as the imports are made
that renders such imports to be a threat to impair the national security.
For “circumstances,” the report focused on three areas. 370 First, the report
indicated that it would consider the impact of foreign competition on the welfare of a
particular domestic industry – steel production, in this case. Second, the report stated it
would analyze the “serious effects” resulting from the “displacement of domestic
products by excessive imports.” Finally, the report stated that it would consider “massive
global excess capacity” in steel production, even though that criterion does not appear in
Section 232. The findings of the report are spelled out in more detail in Appendix B.
The report concluded that the overall impact of these pressures on the U.S. steel
industry would cause a “serious weakening of our internal economy” which would “place
the United States in a position where it was unable to be certain it could meet demands
for national defense and critical industries in a national emergency (emphasis added).” 371

U.S. Department of Commerce, “The Effect of Imports on the National Security: An Investigation
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The report concluded that this would put the U.S. at risk of being dependent on foreign
sources to meet these needs which “may impair national security (emphasis added).” 372
As noted, the final criterion considered in the report was “global excess steel
capacity.” The report noted that there was a 700 million metric ton excess of global
capacity over demand. 373 China’s overcapacity was 300 million metric tons, more than
the entire U.S. steel production capacity. 374 Despite this, the report noted that many
countries were still planning to add to their capacity. 375 The report found that this put a
persistent downward pressure on global prices which would continue to damage U.S.
steel producers.
Based on these findings, the report concluded that steel imports threatened to
impair the national security and recommended that the President impose a trade action.
Specifically, the report recommended quotas or tariffs to reduce imports sufficient to
enable U.S. steel producers to use 80 percent of their capacity. 376 The authors utilized the
“Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) Model” to indicate that, based on 2017 trade
levels, it would take a 63 percent global quota or 24 percent global tariff to reduce
imports by the 13.3 million metric tons needed to allow U.S. producers to reach
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utilization of 80 percent of their production capacity. 377 Alternatively, the report
recommended tariffs on a select subset of countries and fixing all other countries at their
2017 import levels. 378
Appendix B contains a detailed analysis of the 2018 Steel Report and concludes
that it lacks key elements which one might have expected in a more objective economic
analysis. If not an objective economic inquiry, what was the objective of the 2018 Steel
Report? By including provisions to delay implementation of trade action while the
executive negotiates with the offending trade partner, the statute clearly envisioned that
Section 232 investigations would be used as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations. 379
The Trump administration made exactly this use of the 2018 Steel Report. 380 After
imposing the Section 232 tariffs, the U.S. struck new trade agreements with Canada and
Mexico (the USMCA replaced NAFTA). It also revised the bilateral trade relationship
with South Korea (a replacement for KORUS). Additionally, the administration struck
“phase one” agreements with China and Japan. Of course, this begged the larger question
-- at what cost?
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B. The Economic Impacts of Punitive Tariffs
This part of the chapter will sample some of the economic assessments of the
impact of the Trump administration’s trade tariffs on the U.S. economy. Time and space
limitations did not permit a complete literature review. Instead, the author selected
representative reports sponsored by non-partisan entities, such as the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB).
The selected reports study the impacts of the Trump administration’s punitive tariffs as a
whole and do not differentiate between the various tariff authorities, Sections 201, 301
and 232.
It should first be noted that in terms of raw data, overall imports dropped 1.6
percent from 2018 to 2019, and another 6.4 percent from 2019 to 2020. 381 The overall
trade deficit dropped 2 percent from $872 billion in 2018 to $854 billion in 2019, but
then rose again by 5.9 percent to $905 billion in 2020. 382 The following reports will help
interpret those data.
The first report is from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). In its Budget
Outlook for 2020-2030, prepared in January of 2020, the CBO estimated that the thenpresent tariff barriers would lower the U.S. gross domestic product by 0.5 percent in 2020
and raise consumer prices by 0.5 percent. 383 The CBO estimated that the cost per
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household of the tariffs was $1237. 384 The CBO also observed that tariffs applied in
2018 had reduced business investment in 2019 because of the uncertainty created by
shifting trade policies. 385 The CBO was concerned that the ongoing uncertainty would
continue to cause delays or cancellations in business investment in the U.S. 386 Notably,
the CBO assessments did not account for additional tariffs imposed during 2020. 387
Next are two reports sponsored by the FRB. 388 The first empirically linked
Trump administrations punitive import tariffs to reductions in the rate of growth for
American exports because of the increased reliance of U.S. businesses on global supply
chains. 389 This “tariff spillover” arose, the report opined, because the import products

https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-01/56020-CBO-Outlook.pdf. The CBO’s most recent update of
this product from September 2020 did not alter these assessments. See Congressional Budget Office,
Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook: 2020 to 2030 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget
Office, September 2020).
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subject to tariffs were disproportionately “intermediate goods” that American
manufacturers used to make other products for export. 390 The authors estimated that at it
broadest some 84 percent of exports were made by a firm that imported at least one good
that was subject to tariffs. 391 The study found that the tariffs dampened growth of U.S.
exports by 2 percent. 392 This amounted to a 2 percent ad valorem tax on each good
exported from the U.S. That does not count the reduction of U.S. exports caused by the
retaliatory tariffs imposed on U.S. goods by trading partners. The report estimated that a
further loss of $165 billion may have occurred because some manufacturers shifted their
supply chains to avoid the U.S. tariffs. None of this captures the adverse economic
impact of uncertainty, the report noted, which might compel businesses to defer or cancel
their future investments.
The report identified those firms that imported products subject to the tariffs. 393 It
estimated that this amounted to 33 percent of all importers and that those importers
employed 32 percent of all non-farm, private workers in the U.S. economy. The authors
also identified those exporters likely to be subject to retaliatory tariffs and concluded that
they made up 19 percent of all exporters and employed 23 percent of private, non-farm
workers. They noted that these exporters and importers tended to be larger entities 394
390
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who typically paid higher wages than firms not participating in international trade. 395
Consequently, it appeared to the report’s authors that the punitive tariffs adversely
impacted a substantial portion of the U.S. economy, including some of its biggest and
highest-paying employers.
One of the report’s main observations was that simple mercantilist ideas about
balance of trade were no longer applicable to a world economy dependent on globally
interconnected supply chains. 396 One could no longer hope to balance the international
trade ledger by simply applying tariffs to lower imports. Because of interconnectedness,
tariffs adversely impacted one’s own exporters both directly and because of retaliation.
In the modern global economy, policies that lowered imports in turn lowered exports,
leaving unaltered any existing trade imbalances. Thus, it appears that the reality of
globalized trade demolished the traditional mercantilist rationale for controlling imports.
Another report assessed the impact of tariffs on U.S. manufacturing employment
and output from their imposition in 2018 to August 2019. 397 This report found that while
tariffs reduced imports and increased employment among certain manufacturers, this
increase was more than offset by losses in employment of U.S. downstream
manufacturers who used the tariff-affected imports as intermediate goods, and whose
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prices were now increased by the amount of the tariff. 398 In addition, the report found
that there were greater offsetting employment losses in U.S. manufacturers for export
where those exports were subject to retaliation for the U.S. tariffs. 399 The report found no
statistically significant increases in U.S. manufacturing output. Thus, at least in the
short-term, the tariffs appeared to have caused measurable losses in U.S. employment
with no measurable increases to U.S. manufacturing output.
If one directly tied the broader economic welfare of the United States to national
security, as the Trump administration did, then these reports seem to indicate that the
administration’s punitive tariffs may have actually impaired the national security of the
United States by weakening the U.S. economy, at least in the short term. Importantly, the
above reports weighed the condition of the U.S. economy before the onset of the COVID19 pandemic. Was the American economy in a weaker condition because of the trade
war as the COVID-19 pandemic hit? The evidence suggested so.
Turning to the global economy, in their World Economic Outlook for 2019 the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) assessed the impacts of trade tensions. 400 The IMF
noted that the increased uncertainty in confidence caused lower global economic
growth. 401 The IMF assessed that 2019 global economic activity would be 0.8% below

398

Flaaen, “Disentangling the Effects of 2018-2019 Tariffs,” 3, 15, 17-20.

399

Flaaen, “Disentangling the Effects of 2018-2019 Tariffs,” 3, 17-20.

International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: Global Manufacturing Downturn, Rising
Trade Barriers (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, October 2019) (hereafter WEO 2019).
400

401

WEO 2019, xvii.

115

baseline because of international trade tensions. 402 The report did acknowledge that these
effects might diminish over time as economic resources were reallocated to minimize
them. 403 However, the IMF indicated that impacts in the mid-term could continue to
exact a toll on productivity growth, disrupt supply chains, and cause a “buildup in
financial vulnerabilities [that] could amplify the next downturn (emphasis added).” 404
This last observation served to be prescient with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic
which dominated the IMF’s World Economic Outlook for 2020. 405

C. “Security” in the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
This part of the chapter shifts attention to the Global Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade of 1947 (GATT). In reaction to the imposition of Section 232 tariffs, nine of
America’s trading partners initiated complaints through the World Trade Organization’s
dispute resolution system claiming that the unilateral U.S. tariffs violated America’s free
trade obligations under GATT. 406 As of this writing, seven of the nine cases remain
pending before a single WTO dispute resolution panel. 407
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The U.S. position before the panel was that its actions were permissible under
Article XXI of GATT which allows member states to take “any action which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests … taken in time of war or
other emergency in international relations.” 408 The U.S. further claimed that decisions
under Article XXI were solely the province of the member state and not subject to review
under GATT.
In a nutshell, the U.S. argued that the Article XXI language, “which it considers
necessary” meant that a member state had complete discretion to decide if measures were
necessary to its essential security and that, therefore, such decisions were outside the
jurisdiction of the WTO dispute resolution system. The U.S. argued that security
decisions were inherently political and left up to member states to address as they thought
appropriate. The U.S. noted that there was no definition of “essential security interests”
in GATT. The U.S. also asserted that there were no other qualifications or limitations in
the language of Article XXI, or elsewhere in GATT, regarding the application of this
provision.
Until recently, Article XXI had not been the subject of WTO litigation. However,
in April 2019 a separate WTO dispute panel issued a report that will likely serve as a
powerful precedent foretelling the outcome of the Section 232 cases before the WTO. 409

See “First Written Submissions of the United States of America, United States – Certain Measures on
Steel and Aluminum Products (DS556),” June 12, 2019, U.S. Trade Representative,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/DS/US.Sub1.%28DS556%29.fin.%28public%29.pdf.
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The case involved a complaint brought by Ukraine regarding trade restrictions imposed
by Russia during the tensions between the two states. Russia made the same claim that
the U.S. has made in its cases, namely that a member state’s decisions under Article XXI
were not subject to review. 410 The panel flatly rejected this argument. A fuller analysis
of the panel’s decision is in Appendix C.
What are the implications of this panel’s decision on the pending Section 232
cases? First, the panel’s rejection of the U.S. position that these matters are outside the
jurisdiction of the WTO dispute resolution system was based on a detailed reading of
Article XXI. The panel’s decision also made extensive reference to the negotiating
history behind Article XXI from 1946 to 1948 noting that the provision was originally
proposed by the U.S. delegation helping craft post-war trade arrangements. The panel
noted that the U.S. negotiators crafted the language narrowly to prevent a state from
unilaterally invoking “security” as a pretext for protectionist measures that that could
undermine the entire multilateral arrangement. The present panel hearing the Section 232
cases will be unlikely to reject this reasoning.
Second, will the present panel find that there was a “crisis in international
relations” as required by the language of Article XXI(b)(iii)? Or will it conclude that the

report was accepted by the Dispute Settlement Body and became a binding decision on April 29, 2019.
World Trade Organization, “Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit: Panel Report – Action of
the Dispute Settlement Body,” (29 April 2019) WT/DS512/7,
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/DS/512-7.pdf&Open=True.
Ironically, despite opposing Russia’s aggression regarding Ukraine, the U.S. entered the case as a thirdparty supporting Russia’s position on Article XXI because the U.S. sought to apply the same jurisdictional
argument in its Section 232 cases. See Annex D-10, to the WTO Russia Panel Decision.
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Trump administration’s actions were taken during a political or economic dispute which
had no objective impact on “military or defense interests or law and public order
interests?” Here the 2018 Steel Report’s finding that the U.S. needed only 3 percent of
domestic steel production to satisfy defense requirements will likely undermine the U.S.
position on Article XXI. Recall that instead, the 2018 Steel Report relied on the broader
importance of a healthy steel industry to the U.S. economy considering the global excess
production capacity. The 2018 Steel Report’s findings made it appear that the U.S. was
addressing a broader commercial interest, not an “essential security interest.” This
appears to be exactly the pretextual use of Article XXI that the U.S. delegation was
concerned about in 1946-48. This is a conclusion the panel hearing the Section 232 cases
will likely share.
Even if there were a “crisis in international relations” as construed under Article
XXI(b)(iii), would the Trump administration’s basis for Section 232 tariffs articulate an
“essential security interest,” meaning a “quintessential governmental interest” like
protecting domestic borders or populations from a foreign enemy or protecting law and
order? There is no articulation of such an existential threat to the United States in the
2018 Steel Report. The argument made there was one of general economic welfare.
Again, the Section 232 panel seems likely to find against the U.S. on this ground.

D. Conclusions on Section 232
Despite seeming to be similar terms, the discussion above makes clear that
“national security” in Section 232 and “essential security interests” in Article XXI have
119

different meanings based on their divergent histories. The older of the two provisions,
Article XXI of GATT, was drafted by U.S. negotiators intent on avoiding the perceived
failures in the global trading system that were thought to have contributed to the outbreak
of World War II.
Broadly speaking, these U.S. negotiators were internationalists who had also
helped construct the United Nations, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund to
build a multilateral framework for peace and security out of the ruins of war. When
contemplating “security,” these drafters had in mind the direct existential threats faced by
the U.S. and other nations during that great crisis. By adopting Article XXI, GATT built
in flexibility for member states to depart from their obligations so that they could protect
themselves in the face of those very immediate and direct threats. However, Article XXI
was not intended to allow countries to escape their obligations under the pretext of
security interests and thus undermine the carefully negotiated multilateral arrangements
in GATT.
In contrast, Section 232 was the product of the U.S. Congress, a body
unsurprisingly protective of domestic interests, and which had by 1950 effectively
rejected membership in the International Trade Organization. 411 Section 232 was
originally part of a 1955 law, born after the Korean War and other crises, and recognized
that the U.S. was engaged in a longer-term political, economic, and military contest
against communism. Congress went to lengths to indicate in Section 232 that the general

411
The Truman Administration gauged that political support had collapsed for the ITO and withdrew it
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economic welfare of the U.S. was no small part of the internal calculations about
“national security.” As might be expected, Congress showed little deference in Section
232 to multilateral trade obligations that had been the focus of U.S. negotiators crafting
GATT.
Despite Section 232’s having been on the books since 1955, prior to President
G.W. Bush no presidential administration had ever applied its broadest possible
definition of national security to include general economic welfare. When prior
Presidents felt compelled to apply protective measures, they turned to other authorities.
For example, President Nixon turned to the Trading With the Enemy Act and not Section
232 to impose a ten percent “supplemental duty” on all imports. 412 President Reagan
applied voluntary restraints to limit automobile and steel imports from Japan. President
G.W. Bush was the first to depart from nearly five decades of self-restraint.
This chapter examined Section 232 and its use to control imports which
“threatened to impair the national security.” The Trump administration used a broad
definition of “national security” to justify tariffs on steel and aluminum imports under
this statute. As of this writing, the bulk of these tariffs remain in place. Interestingly,
Congress used similar language about “threats to impair the national security” in their
construction of the law governing the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS) which reviews foreign direct investment. The next chapter will explore

412
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whether the Trump administration has used its authority to regulate foreign direct
investment as broadly as it used its authority to control imports.
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V. CONTROL OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
A. Background
The previous chapter analyzed how the Trump administration applied its
conception of “economic security is national security” protect the U.S. steel industry
through import tariffs. This chapter will explore the administration’s approach foreign
investments in the U.S. that might trigger national security concerns. The entity that
reviews those transactions is the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS).
CFIUS consists of nine cabinet-level officials, chaired by the Secretary of the
Treasury, who are charged with reviewing on a case-by-case basis certain foreign
investments in the U.S. to assess their impact on national security. 413 CFIUS can then
recommend to the President that an investment be blocked or altered. CFIUS was
originally created by President Ford via an executive order out of concerns that members
of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries were using petrodollars to buy
U.S. strategic assets, namely ports. 414 Congress eventually passed legislation authorizing
CFIUS.
Prior to the arrival of Trump administration, certain legislators began expressing
concerns about increasingly active Chinese investments across the U.S. economy,

“The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS),” February 26, 2020,
Congressional Research Service, RL33388, 1. Hereafter “CRS CFIUS Report.”
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CRS CFIUS Report, 4. See also Thomas P. Feddo, “Keynote Remarks by Assistant Secretary Feddo at
the American Conference Institute’s Sixth National Conference on CFIUS,” (speech), July 15, 2020, U.S.
Department of the Treasury, https://home.treasury.gov/news/pressreleases/sm1067.
414

123

including in areas considered cutting edge and potentially impactful on national
security. 415 In March 2017, the New York Times published leaked information about a
Pentagon report indicating that China was participating in between 10 percent and 16
percent of all Silicon Valley venture deals, all with little or no national security review. 416
This fed critics who thought CFIUS was without sufficient staff or guiding rules to
respond. The Trump administration had identified a desire to strengthen CFIUS in the
National Security Strategy 417 and supported these Congressional reform efforts. In 2018,
Congress passed the “Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act” (FIRRMA)
substantially enhancing the Committee’s mandate. 418
From a macroeconomic perspective, CFIUS represented a compromise between a
desire to foster an environment in the U.S. that was welcoming of foreign investment
while still preventing foreign access to, or control of, critical U.S. assets. 419 This was a
classic balancing of liberal free trade desires against a mercantilist intention to keep U.S.
technologies impacting national security out of the hands of rivals. According to an
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Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development report, in 2020 the U.S.
remained one of the world’s largest recipients of foreign investment. 420
Traditional economic theory posited that the huge U.S. trade deficits took billions
of dollars out of the country, while foreign investment provided an essential return
flow. 421 As stated by Theodore Moran of the Brookings Institution, it is generally
thought that foreign multinational corporations
pay higher wages, offer greater benefits, exhibit higher productivity, provide more
value-added to U.S. domestic inputs, import via superior access to external supply
chains, export more goods and services, and engage in greater research and
development than purely U.S. domestic firms. 422
Also important from a liberal international trade perspective, the U.S. wanted to
maintain a welcoming environment for foreign investment to support its arguments that
U.S. investors should be welcomed in foreign countries. The U.S. remains one of the
world’s largest foreign investors. 423
The U.S. was the leading recipient of FDI in 2019 and was second behind China in 2020. Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, “FDI in Figures,” April 2021, 3,
https://www.oecd.org/investment/FDI-in-Figures-April-2021.pdf.
420

421
See generally Dennis R. Appleyard and Alfred J. Field, Jr., International Economics (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 2017), 459-465. The substantial foreign purchases of the growing U.S. public debt
represented another important reverse flow of dollars from overseas.

Theodore H. Moran, “Proposed Changes to Foreign Investment Committee are Damaging to the US,”
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From a microeconomic point of view, CFIUS review represented a potential
direct governmental invention in a particular firm’s growth plans and, to some, a
governmental meddling in America’s very lucrative international finance industry. Rogin
reported that President Trump’s Treasury Secretary Mnuchin, leader of the Wall Street
clique on the White House staff, involved himself in the Congressional negotiations on
updates to the CFIUS statute so that he could minimize impacts on the U.S. financial
industry. 424 Rogin also reported that these efforts were part of the competition for
influence within the administration between Mnuchin who controlled CFIUS, Ross
whose Commerce Department took action under Section 232, and Lighthizer who
directed sanctions under Sections 201 and 301. 425 As will been seen in pages to follow,
Mnuchin’s influence over the CFIUS process led to a much more restrained use of
national security to control of foreign direct investment than occurred with imports under
Section 232.
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B. The CFIUS Statute
Turning to key aspects of the CFIUS statute, just as with Section 232, “national
security” is not defined though it expressly includes “homeland security,” a term which is
also undefined. 426 Also, like Section 232, CFIUS is authorized to review and block a
transaction when “the transaction threatens to impair the national security of the United
States” because of the foreign control or influence over the domestic entity. 427 Note that
this language precisely tracks the language in Section 232. 428
To make the “threat” determination, the President is to weigh a non-exclusive list
of multiple factors similar to those in Section 232. 429 However, the new CFUIS statute
expanded the factors beyond Section 232 by adding a reference to specific targets of
attention including those countries who pose “a potential regional military threat to the
interests of the United States,” in addition to those who may support terrorism or the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 430 Another new factor for the President to
consider was what the impact a transaction may have “on the United States international
technical leadership in areas affecting United States national security.” 431 Finally, the
President’s attention is newly directed to the need to protect the “criticals” – “critical
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infrastructure,” “critical technologies,” as well as “critical resources and materials.” 432
This last element included “sources of energy.” 433
The previous CFUIS statute had required that the President “find” that other
available laws were inadequate to protect national security, and that there existed
“credible evidence” that the foreign interest threatened to impair national security –
FIRRMA continued that requirement. 434 This was a somewhat higher burden on the
President than under Section 232 which required no “evidence” or “findings” of any kind.
FIRRMA also expanded the kinds of transactions CFIUS had authority to review.
Added were real estate transactions that were near government or military installations;
nonpassive investments in critical industries or critical technologies; transactions
changing a foreign investor’s rights to control a U.S. business; transactions in which a
foreign government had a substantial direct or indirect interest; transactions trying to
evade CFIUS regulations; and transactions that could result in the compromise of
personally identifying information of U.S. citizens. 435
It should be noted that there is but a single U.S. court case on CFIUS. The court
held that parties to transactions to have a procedural due process right to notice, access to
the unclassified evidence used to evaluate the transaction, and the opportunity to rebut
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that evidence. 436 The courts could not, however, second guess the President’s
determinations about national security.

C. CFIUS’s Impact
In their 2019 report to Congress, the Committee reported that it had reviewed
1,574 transactions since 2010. 437 The number of transactions CFIUS reviewed increased
from 172 in 2016 to 237 in 2017 and stayed above 200 through 2018 and 2019. Out of
all these cases, there was presidential action on just five, only two of those arose during
the Trump administration. 438 From 2010 to 2019, parties withdrew 240 transactions from
consideration. 439 In 2019, the committee required steps mitigating national security
concerns in 28 of 231 transactions reviewed (noting that 30 transactions that were
withdrawn in 2019). 440
The 2019 CFIUS Report to Congress also indicated that in the three-year period,
2017-2019, it reviewed 697 transactions from 48 countries. 441 The highest percentage of
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transactions reviewed involved Chinese investors (140 transactions, or 20 percent).
Notably, that number dropped significantly from 60 in 2017 to 25 in 2019.
A study by Chinese authors, and funded by Chinese foundations, concluded that
the number of Chinese mergers and acquisitions of U.S. entities had declined because of
unfair CFIUS discrimination against Chinese companies, and that this would deter future
Chinese investment. 442 The Financial Times, citing a consultancy, reported that Chinese
venture capital investments in the United States had dropped by nearly half in 2019 from
2018, to $2.5 billion.443 Another report applying economic modeling implied that there
might be a cost to new innovation in the U.S. if foreign venture capital funding for U.S.
start-ups was deterred by an inhospitable investment environment. 444 However, the
report noted there had been little economic analysis of this issue. 445
The essential question was whether a strengthened CFIUS would be effective in
keeping the “crown jewels” of American technology out of rivals’ hands, particularly
China’s. In December 2020, the Financial Times reported that Chinese state-backed
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funds had recently invested in three companies in the U.S. semiconductor industry at
least feeding a perception that CFIUS remained ineffective. 446
One challenge to effectiveness may be the Committee’s long reliance on selfreporting. In that sense, it has been a passive monitor. Parties to a transaction covered by
the statute are required to submit information to the Committee to initiate a review. 447
Failure to comply risks only the issuance of a “civil penalty.” 448 To address these
concerns, a CFIUS official recently reported that the CFIUS staff had been expanded to
include an enforcement and monitoring group responsible for surveying investments
across the economy and following up on tips received from the public. 449 However,
given the sheer volume of foreign investments in the U.S., $194.7 billion in 2019, 450 one
can be skeptical whether CFIUS really has the resources to systematically monitor these
transactions. 451 As a result, CFUIS reviews will likely remain on a reactive, case-by-case
basis, and therefore neither be strategic nor systematic.
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It can be admitted that a strengthened CFIUS probably reduced the ease with
which malicious actors plucked what they wanted from the U.S. market. If so, such
actors would have been forced to find less convenient means to secure the technology or
resources they sought. However, research uncovered no evidence to prove or disprove
this point.
It should also be said that if CFIUS was intended to be a mercantilist tool,
particularly in a great power contest with China, it is half-hearted and toothless. For
instance, FIRMMA did not criminalize CFIUS violations. All that is at risk for a
noncomplying foreign investor is a potential civil penalty. Also, as noted above, CFIUS
appears to lack a pro-active strategy, or the necessary resources, to aggressively search
out those who might be violating the requirements. Instead, the CFIUS process appears
only to add to the transaction costs of foreign financiers who are already law-abiding.
The added cost, delay, and uncertainty may thus deter even benign investment.
A true mercantilist tool aimed at China would have barred all Chinese investment
in U.S. companies. Neither the Trump administration nor the Congress appeared ready to
go that far when FIRRMA was enacted in 2018. So, in contrast to President Trump’s
ready use of tariffs and willingness to trigger a trade war in goods, the Trump
administration took no similarly broad action of the battlefield of foreign direct
investment. Mnuchin and the liberal free trade interests represented by the Wall Street
Clique appeared to have prevailed.
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The next chapter will explore yet another trade battlefield -- export control. In
addition to continuing conflict within the administration, this was an area that particularly
suffered because of President Trump’s disdain of allies.
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VI. NATIONAL SECURITY AND EXPORTS
A. Background
Gary Cohn, President Trump’s first National Economic Council Chair, frequently
argued against the more protectionist inclinations of his colleagues and the President,
saying that America’s economy was based on trade. 452 Woodward and Rogin report
heated, insult-laden arguments between Cohn, Peter Navarro, and others, on that subject,
sometimes in front of President Trump, sometimes in a weekly, informal gathering to talk
about trade policy moderated by Rob Porter, President Trump’s staff secretary. 453 As has
been seen, disagreements and competition between Mnuchin, Ross and Lighthizer had
played out in the impositions of tariffs and in CFIUS reforms. Control over exports was
yet another battlefield.
The U.S. does not have a single government authority for export control. Export
licensing jurisdiction is divided among four departments: Commerce, State, Energy and
Treasury. A fifth, the Department of Defense, plays a major influence but does not issue

452

Woodward, Fear, 56, 135.

453

Woodward, Fear, 135. Rogin, Chaos Under Heaven, 32, 73-7484-85

134

licenses. 454 Coherent policy and efficient operation in export licensing has depended on
cooperation among the several competing agencies which, exporting industries lament,
has rarely been the case. Instead, as one Trump administration official described it in a
speech in 2020, “U.S. export policy is extraordinarily difficult to study, inasmuch as
policymaking and implementation involves a convoluted labyrinth of statutes,
regulations, authorities, and stakeholders.” 455
Before a more detailed discussion of how the U.S. administers its export
licensing, it is appropriate to briefly describe some of the history behind the process.
Contemporary control of exports began in 1940 with attempts to limit shipments of
materials to the Japanese Empire. 456 The controls continued into peacetime as the Cold
War took shape and they evolved to balance the promotion of trade against protecting
technology important to national security. The Cold War objective was to exclude the
Soviet Union and the Communist bloc from access to Western goods and technology – a
very mercantilist approach directed against a particular target, the Soviet Union and its
satellites. 457 The U.S. encouraged other Western nations to follow a similar strategy and
Each of the five departments mentioned has investigative authority, however only the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (Department of Homeland Security) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct any
criminal investigations. The Department of Justice reviews and prosecutes any criminal cases. “The U.S.
Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Initiative,” Congressional Research Service, Report
R41916, January 28, 2020, 7-8.
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in doing so established a multilateral group called the “Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls” (COCOM).
COCOM did not survive the end of the Cold War and by 1996 had been replaced
by other loose multilateral arrangements that were similarly based on consensus, not legal
obligation. 458 Unlike COCOM, these new arrangements were not directed against any
particular bloc but rather intended to address “countries of concern,” non-state entities
like terrorists, or the proliferation of particular systems like missiles or nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapons.
Interestingly, China had been included in the Communist bloc and locked out of
trade with the West ever since the Communist victory in 1948 in China’s civil war.
However, the opening of diplomatic U.S. relations in 1972 in hopes of using China as a
counterpoise to the Soviet Union, and the granting of “most favored nation” status in
1980, led to a loosening of U.S. export controls to China through the rest of that decade.
Controls tightened again in 1989 in reaction to the Tiananmen Square massacre.
However, the granting of “Permanent Normal Trade Relations” status by the U.S. in
2000, and the China’s admission to the WTO in 2001, led to a deep entangling of the
U.S. and Chinese economies in the ensuing years. By 2016, China sent more goods to
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the U.S than any other nation, totaling $463 billion. 459 That same year, the U.S. exported
some $116 billion in goods to China, the third ranking destination behind Canada and
Mexico. 460
Consequently, as President-elect Trump prepared to take office, the U.S. stood in
a very different place in terms of great power competition with China than it did in 1950
when President Truman faced the Soviet Union. 461 In 2016, as now, America’s main
strategic rival was also a key U.S. export market and the main source of U.S. imports.
For export control, this reality created very different challenges for trying to preserve
national security – a simple fencing off of rival economies, as was accomplished with the
Soviet bloc during the Cold War, would seem virtually impossible now. 462

B. Reforming Export Control
A 2009 National Research Council report highlighted the dramatic changes to the
global economy that had taken place since the end of the Cold War, and described how
those changes impacted a U.S. export control system built for the great power
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competition with the Soviet Union and its satellites. 463 It noted that the Cold War export
control focus on maintaining the overwhelming U.S. dominance in technological quality
to offset the Soviet bloc’s quantitative advantage gave rise to a “Fortress America”
perspective that no longer served America’s national security interests. In fact, the report
found that export controls “undermine our national security and our national economic
well-being.” 464
The report noted that, unlike in the post-Cold War era, security threats were no
longer focused on a single bloc, but were diffused and included non-state actors. 465 The
diffusion of threats contributed to a loss of consensus among nations about what kinds of
goods and technology should be controlled, eroding the Cold War-era multilateral export
structure.
The report also highlighted that critical defense technologies now originated in
the commercial sector rather than in the military. Additionally, instead of the U.S. being
in a place of technological dominance, as during the Cold War, the U.S. had now lost that
dominance to a variety of competitors in a range of industries, and important defense
innovations were now taking place overseas. To compete economically and defensively,
the U.S. was now increasingly reliant upon other global producers of technology.
In the face of these realities, the report found that the existing export control
system forced the U.S. to turn inward instead of actively engaging abroad. It observed

National Research Council, Beyond “Fortress America:” National Security Controls on Science and
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that “our export controls retard both the United States and its allies from sharing access to
military technology, and handicap American business from competing globally.” 466
Thus, the report concluded that controls imposed “in the name of national security”
actually weakened national security and economic prosperity, which “is an essential
element of national security.” The result was a weaker America, defensively and
economically, the report declared.
Among the flaws in the existing system, the authors noted, was that it was “listbased.” Such lists simply could not keep up with the sprinting pace of innovation. 467
Instead, the report recommended that export controls be “principle-based,” and that these
principles needed to focus on only those areas of technology where the U.S. had
dominance and where keeping them from adversaries was critical to America’s security.
Others have described this narrower focus as “building a higher fence around fewer
items.” 468 Further, these controlled areas needed to “sunset,” prompting a continuous
review to ensure they were still relevant. 469
Another systemic flaw that the report highlighted was the dispersion of regulatory
responsibility through multiple agencies. The report recommended a single entity serve
as the “coordinating center” for all export requests. 470 It also recommended a neutral
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appeals panel be housed in the National Security Council (NSC) to adjudicate disputes
between agencies about setting export policy, granting or denying export requests, and
enforcing “sunset” reviews. The authors expressly rejected the notion of an interagency
panel performing this role because historically such panels had proved ineffective. To
ensure expeditious resolution, the report urged that such disputes be elevated above the
agency level to the White House (note that the NSC reports to the President, not to any
agency head).
The report strongly urged these changes to promote a new “run faster”
approach. 471 Meijer noted that during the Cold War, policymakers had set export
controls balancing national security interests and economic interests, pitting what he
called “control hawks” wanting to maintain a military edge versus “pro-traders” focusing
on job creation, export profits and economic growth. 472 The new “Run Faster” coalition
advocated for the “streamlining” of U.S. export controls, recognizing that there was
diminished ability to prevent the diffusion of technology in the modern global economy.
This was especially true given the increasing commercialization of defense goods and
technology; the ineffectiveness of unilateral controls; and the resulting weakening of the
commercial industrial base without exports (an industrial base upon with the Defense
Department increasingly relied). For this new “run faster” coalition, instead of a simple
trade-off between national security and economic interests, the focus would be a more
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nuanced maintenance of “American military preeminence vis-à-vis potential competitors
in a post-Cold War strategic, technological, and economic environment.” 473
In 2009, the Obama administration took up the challenge of trying to reform the
export control process along the lines suggested in Beyond Fortress America. 474 It
proposed setting up a single export licensing agency; unifying control lists (then divided
between a “Commerce Control List” (CCL) and “U.S. Munitions List” (USML)); 475
establishing a single enforcement agency; and moving all export matters to a single
integrated information system that would also include a single list of all “denied” or
“sanctioned” parties to whom exports were prohibited. Under this initiative, export
controls would focus on a “small core set of key items that can pose a serious national
security or intelligence threat.” Those controls would be coordinated with international
allies to increase their effectiveness. Control lists would clearly indicate what was
controlled and would be updated regularly. Licensing would be timely. Enforcement
would be enhanced.
Unfortunately, President Obama’s executive branch initiative was never passed
into law. Not being law, President Trump never formerly adopted Obama’s reforms
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when he came into office in 2017. However, individual agency leaders in the Trump
administration were reported to have continued some aspects of the Obama initiative. 476
In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) at the same
time it passed FIRRMA. In it, Congress adopted some, though not all, of the reforms
suggested in Beyond Fortress America or undertaken in President Obama’s initiative. As
an initial matter, Congress had to address the fact that it had allowed the Export
Administration Act of 1979 to expire in 2001 without enacting anything to replace it.
The Commerce Department’s immense and complicated “Export Administration
Regulations (EAR),” 477 were based on the lapsed law. But rather than let the
administration of exports collapse into anarchy, successive Presidents had extended the
operation of the EAR by declaring a national emergency under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Despite this “national emergency,”
Congress did not act for 17 years.
The ECRA echoed the Beyond Fortress America report in expressing the need for
U.S. industries to retain their international competitiveness by requiring there to be an
assessment of the availability of foreign items that would render U.S. controls
ineffective. 478 It also required that the procedure establishing any licensing regime
address whether it would have a “significant negative impact” on the defense industrial
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base. 479 A significantly negative impact could result from a prohibition on exports
reducing the availability of a U.S. produced item that the Defense Department would
potentially purchase in the future; or reducing U.S. production for export based on U.S.funded research and development; or reducing U.S. employment for continued
production for export of items that the Defense Department might buy in the future. 480
Like Beyond Fortress America, the ECRA encouraged the executive to focus
national security controls “on those core technologies” whose use might “pose a serious
national security threat.” 481 The ECRA did not define “national security.” Identifying
“specific threats to the national security” was also left up to the President. 482
The ECRA, like Beyond Fortress America, called for controls to be administered
in a timely, efficient, transparent, and flexible manner. 483 It similarly encouraged the
pursuit of support among international allies for export controls whenever possible,
disfavoring unilateral measures. 484 In fact, the ECRA suggested that a controlling agency
consider dropping any unilateral measures if those measures had not found multilateral
support within three years. 485 The ECRA also repeated the calls in Beyond Fortress
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America and President Obama’s initiative for more interagency cooperation and for
increased monitoring and enforcement. 486
Congress added a new feature in the ECRA when it required the President to
identify “emerging and foundational technologies” that “are essential to the national
security of the United States” and to take steps to control their export. 487 The act left
defining “emerging and foundational technologies” up to the President. Unfortunately,
nearly three years after ECRA’s passage, neither the Trump administration nor the Biden
administration have described a method for defining “emerging or foundational
technologies,” much less provided any definitive list of such technologies. 488
This list would also impact review of foreign direct investments because
Commerce Department export controls over such technologies triggered the requirement
for CFIUS to review transactions involving those same technologies. One analyst
pointed out that the delay in creating this list meant that CFIUS had not reviewed some
$17 billion of foreign venture capital investment into U.S. start-ups in artificial
intelligence, for example, with the main location of these foreign investors being
China. 489
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Critics also pointed out that Commerce’s delay in producing the list contributed to
uncertainty for U.S. producers who were waiting to see whether their technologies would
be included, with uncertainty potentially scaring off both their domestic and foreign
investors. 490 This may be one more factor contributing the generally uncertain trade and
investment environment which led to the decline of FDI into the U.S. since 2018,
including a 37.7 percent drop in 2019. 491
As of 2019, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) continued to list
export control and its protection of national security technology as a “high-risk area,”
meaning it was “in need of transformation to address economy, efficiency, or
effectiveness challenges.” 492 The GAO report indicated that while the Trump
administration did not formally take up President Obama’s initiative, agency officials
continued to implement aspects of it, like consolidating the lists of controlled items.
However, the report noted that the ongoing lack of interagency cooperation and
coordination remained a major impediment to reform.
Despite the lack of formal Trump administration support, the Congressional
Research Service reported that by 2020 some progress had been made. 493 The Obama
administration had decided to first focus on producing a single control list though a
490
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merger of the USML and CCL, from which it was thought other reforms would follow. 494
As of 2020, 15 of 20 categories of goods had been shifted from the USML to the CCL.
The Obama administration had also set up an “Export Enforcement Coordination Center”
to deconflict enforcement actions between the multiple agencies with enforcement
authority. 495 By 2020, Commerce, State and Defense had begun to use a single
information technology system and it was thought that other licensing entities in Treasury
and Energy would soon join. 496 The efforts to create a single export licensing agency,
however, went nowhere.
So, despite Congress’s attention in 2018, the government’s overall structure for
export control remains today much the same as it had during the Cold War. As noted
earlier, Commerce shares export licensing responsibility with the State Department,
Energy Department 497 and Treasury Department. 498 The continued division of licensing
jurisdiction between agencies continues stakeholder competition and barriers to
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coordination among government departments, as well as adding cost, delay, and
uncertainty for U.S. exporters.
A brief historical digression is in order here to explain the State Department’s role
in export licensing. In 1976, Congress passed the Arms Export Control Act (AECA)
regulating defense items. The ECRA left this unchanged. The authority to license under
the AECA fell to the State Department, which promulgated the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations (ITAR). 499 The ITAR created a U.S. Munitions List (USML) which
enumerated the items subject to its controls. The USML complimented the “Commerce
Control List” (CCL) which enumerated the goods subject to export controls under the
EAR. 500
The shift of attention to arms sales in the 1970s, one scholar wrote, was in
response to the end of the Vietnam War and the end of the large defense budgets that
came with it. 501 The defense industry increasingly looked to foreign sales to make up the
difference. 502 As defense budgets shrank, the Department of Defense became
increasingly aggressive advocates of foreign arms sales to help them hold down the costs
of their own weapons procurements. 503 Additionally, the end of the Cold War eliminated
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ideological and strategic constraints to such sales and led to a literal explosion of arms
sales around the world. 504 By 2020, U.S. arms sales amounted to $175 billion, 505
representing 0.3 percent of all U.S. exports. 506 The U.S. is the world’s largest arms
exporter. 507
With the U.S. deindustrialization that began in the 1970s, defense industries were
among the few remaining manufacturing sectors that still promised stable, well-paying
blue-collar jobs. During the Cold War, U.S. weapons sales were predominantly focused
on supporting national security. 508 Thereafter, however, defense spending, including
arms sales, increasingly focused on providing economic stimulus to otherwise shrinking
manufacturing communities. 509 Consequently, these industries often found sympathetic
listeners in the executive branch and in Congress as they sought speedier export licensing
of arms, fearing that if the U.S. did not make the sales Americans would lose jobs to
other global competitors. 510
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The division of export licensing jurisdiction between the State Department and
the Commerce Department had been based on the idea that Commerce would handle
“dual-use” goods which have both civilian and military uses, while State would handle
“defense items” under the AECA. Over time, however, the line between what is a
civilian good and what is a defense good has been blurred to the point of being almost
indiscernible. 511 Additionally, the U.S. armed forces were turning more frequently to
commercial goods to apply to military uses because of declining defense budgets, the
rocketing costs of weapon systems, and the higher rate of innovation in commercial
industry. 512
The blurring between defense and private industry has been further compounded
by China’s development strategy, “Made in China 2025,” a strategy intended to create
competitive advantages for China in strategic industries. 513 This effort included
procuring technology from the U.S. and other foreign sources by licit or illicit means.
Further, China’s doctrine of “military-civilian fusion” had sought to leverage gains by
private Chinese entities to increase China’s military capabilities, essentially breaking
down all distinctions between China’s civilian and military sectors. 514 As a result, the
concern was that all U.S. exports to China were ultimately going to a military use.
511
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Implicit in the concerns expressed by many was that the erosion of the distinction
between military and civilian uses in the modern economic environment had rendered
“dual-use” foundation for export control nearly meaningless, especially where China was
concerned. 515 One scholar concluded that any export control system built on this
foundation would be ineffective and that efforts to limit the dissemination of sensitive
technology would be nearly impossible. 516 Yet, this remains the basis for the ongoing
division of U.S. export licensing jurisdiction between Commerce and State.
Ironically, the U.S. had its own initiative to promote a military and civilian fusion
of defense technologies in the 1990s. Economic historian Koistinen described how thenSecretary of Defense William J. Perry and Under Secretary John M. Deutch endeavored
to broaden civilian and military cooperation throughout the West, instructing U.S. armed
services to modify their procurement policies along that line. Koistinen noted that they
felt that the “future health of the [U.S. defense] industry depended on breaking down the
domestic barriers between commercial and military output.” 517 Perry and Deutch noted
further that private commercial industry was more innovative and they felt that linking
the military more directly into that innovation would make defense items better at less
cost. 518
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To protect national security, Commerce had long banned exports to certain
countries via the “countries of concern” list, as well as to specific entities included in the
“Banned Entity List.” As will be discussed more fully in the following pages, the Trump
administration did increase scrutiny on certain end-users. Specifically, the administration
expanded the “Banned Entity List” to include Chinese telecommunications giant,
Huawei, and other Chinese companies. 519
While this might sound dramatic, the actual impact of these steps on overall U.S.
exports to China was minimal, at least in dollar terms. In 2020 only about 12 percent of
the $1.4 trillion dollars in U.S. exports was subject to any kind of Commerce licensing
review under the EAR. 520 That year Commerce received 39,410 license applications and
denied just 421 -- a denial rate of a little over 1 percent. 521 In 2020, U.S. exports to
China amounted to $124.6 billion (8.9 percent of all U.S. exports) with only $22 billion
of that being subject to a Commerce license review, or 18.1 percent of overall exports to
China. 522 That year Commerce approved 3451 of 4236 export license applications for
China (a 9 percent denial rate); Commerce returned 977 applications without action. 523
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C. ZTE and Huawei
Just as uncertainty pervaded the Trump administration’s policy on imports, so too
did it permeate export policy. Among the issues was Trump’s penchant for using Twitter
to make announcements that might conflict with other administration statements, or even
reverse them. For example, in April 16, 2018, Secretary Ross announced that the
Commerce Department was placing Chinese telecommunications giant ZTE on the
“banned entities list.” 524 The action came after ZTE had violated terms of a settlement
agreement with the U.S. for breaking U.S. sanctions on Iran and North Korea, paying
over $1 billion in fines. 525 In a Tweet on May 13, 2018, President Trump reversed Ross,
526

purportedly in response to a telephone request from President Xi. 527 The issue divided

Trump advisors. Rogin reported that Mnuchin supported the decision to let ZTE off the
hook, while then-National Security Advisor John Bolton, Lighthizer and Navarro
opposed. 528
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The U.S. sanctions on Iran and North Korea were based on national security
grounds, yet Rogin reported that Trump traded away penalties on ZTE to gain President
Xi’s favor in the ongoing trade negotiations with China. 529 Trump had linked broader
commercial trade issues with national security matters. President Trump’s attitude was
consistent with a mercantilist approach blending trade and national security into a single
equation for national power in a zero-sum competition with a rival. China certainly
appeared to use that same calculus -- Rogin reported that China asked for a full pardon
for ZTE as part of the trade negotiations. 530
The challenge was how to fit allies into such a mercantilist approach. President
Trump, and others in the Trump administration, perhaps failed to understand that, as
scholar Chad Bown put it, “if everything is about national security, nothing is about
national security.” 531 Bown observed that to be effective, export controls depended on
multilateral support. If multilateral partners believed that an actor was taking a trade
action for purely domestic economic reasons, as the U.S. appeared to do in imposing
Section 232 import tariffs, and not to truly address a threat to security, then these allies
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would not cooperate by also prohibiting their exports. That was especially the case if
they produced competing products and they were being asked to sacrifice export sales.
The allies’ failure to cooperate would then undercut the effectiveness of any unilateral
export controls.
The Trump administration’s vacillations about export control continued with
Huawei, another Chinese telecommunications giant. Huawei’s issues began with a U.S.
Justice Department criminal indictment for violations of U.S. sanctions on Iran. 532 That
indictment led to the arrest on December 1, 2018, of Meng Wanzhou, Huawei’s Chief
Financial Officer, by Canadian officials at the request of the U.S. The arrest came the
day before President Trump met President Xi in Buenos Aires, Argentina as part of a
Group of Twenty wealthy nations (G20) summit. President Trump was not told of the
arrest in advance and the news broke as he was sitting down for dinner with President Xi.
Journalist Rogin reports that President Trump was angry claiming that “we had arrested
‘the Ivanka Trump of China.’” 533
The unprecedented arrest of a senior Chinese executive had obvious diplomatic
and political implications. National Security Advisor John Bolton had been informed of
the impending arrest yet had not told President Trump -- a particularly odd choice given
Trump and Xi were about to meet face-to-face for just the second time.
Afterward, Trump administration officials diverged on how the situation should
be managed. The Justice Department saw Huawei as a criminal organization. Bolton
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saw it as a Chinese intelligence apparatus. Interestingly, Rogin reported that Mnuchin’s
chief of staff, with Mnuchin’s tacit approval, began quiet conversations with the Chinese
about dropping the case in exchange for Huawei accepting some other kind of noncriminal punishment. 534
At the time, President Trump implied Huawei’s criminal case might be used as a
bargaining chip in the ongoing trade negotiations with the Chinese. Again, this was
unsurprising given his mercantilist power equation. On the same page, President Xi also
linked Huawei’s criminal case to trade negotiations. Further, Xi used China’s own
criminal justice system to exert leverage against the Canadians by imprisoning two
Canadian journalists.
The trade talks with China having stalled for several months, President Trump
further escalated the tension on May 15, 2019 by signing an executive order under
IEEPA which prohibited any U.S. person from purchasing information and
telecommunication technology “designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied” by
companies “beholden to foreign adversary governments.” 535 This was a measure aimed
directly at Huawei claiming it was a threat to U.S. national security. 536
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On the same day, the Commerce Department placed Huawei and affiliated companies on its banned
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Shortly after this order was issued, President Trump told reporters in the Oval
Office
“Huawei is something that’s very dangerous. You look at what they’ve done
from a security standpoint, from a military standpoint, it’s very dangerous…so
it’s possible that Huawei even would be included in some kind of a trade deal. If
we made a deal, I could imagine Huawei being possibly included in some form of,
or in some part of a trade deal.” 537
Rogin pointed out that these actions against Huawei and other Chinese
telecommunications companies had significant ramifications that rippled through U.S.
and foreign companies operating around the world, yet the Trump administration had
consulted no one. 538 Further compounding the uncertainty was the fact that no one could
be sure that at any given moment President Trump would not change his mind, as
President Xi had convinced Trump to do with ZTE. Confusion continued June 29, 2019,
when after dinner with President Xi the night before, Trump was reported to have told a
press conference, “US companies can sell their equipment to Huawei…equipment where
there is no great national security problem.” 539
On January 15, 2020, the U.S. and China signed a “Phase One” trade deal. 540 The
agreement did not reference Huawei. This small step toward resolving trade tensions
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created a brief hope that overall relations with China might improve. That hope soon
evaporated in the heat of the COVID outbreak.
Huawei’s saga continued when, in February 2020, the Justice Department issued a
superseding indictment charging Huawei with additional violations of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), a statute aimed at organized crime,
for “decades-long efforts” to steal intellectual property from U.S. companies. 541 On May
15, 2020, the Commerce Department dramatically upped the ante yet further by
amending the “Foreign Direct Product Rule” to prevent the sale of U.S. semiconductor
manufacturing equipment or software to foreign producers who supplied Huawei, again
for national security reasons. 542
Anticipating these potential Trump administration steps, the Semiconductor
Industry Association, representing U.S. manufacturers, had commissioned a study that
estimated the potential impacts of export restraints against China on its members. 543 The
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various scenarios anticipated the loss in export sales for its members to be tens of billions
of dollars. The restrictions would lead to U.S. job losses, the report said, and
manufacturers would not see full returns on the $40 billion they had invested in research
and development in 2018.

Moreover, the report noted that the lost export revenues were

how these companies funded further research and development, the loss of which could
cause long-term damage to U.S. innovation and competitiveness.
This rule also put foreign semiconductor manufacturers in a bind. 544 If they
wanted U.S. equipment, they would have to give up sales to Huawei. If they wanted to
keep the Huawei sales, they would have to find another source for manufacturing
equipment. Therefore, to be effective, this new rule depended on whether foreign
substitutes were available, and on whether other countries join the U.S. ban on supplying
Huawei. If not extended multilaterally, Huawei would still get its goods and the U.S.
businesses would suffer all the economic loss with no apparent benefits to U.S. national
security.
The Trump administration believed they could bank on the dominance the U.S.
had in semiconductor manufacturing equipment and software, and that these steps would
protect that technological edge. 545 The administration seemed to have high hopes for
multilateral support for the measure. As of this writing, allied support for these export
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restrictions seems unclear as foreign capitals wait for the Biden administration to set its
policies.

D. WTO—GATT Implications
If China wished, it could bring a WTO case challenging the Trump
administration’s export bans on Huawei and other companies. Article XI:1 prohibits use
of export licensing as a form of quantitative restriction on trade with a member state. As
with the Section 232 cases, the U.S. could argue that the Article XXI “essential security”
exemption applied. As was evident in an earlier chapter, it is likely that any WTO
dispute resolution panel would construe this exception very narrowly and disqualify
measures taken in response to domestic economic pressures not related war or
international emergencies.
As in Section 232, the ECRA relies on the President to define “threats to national
security.” The credibility of that assessment matters. To allies, it seemed a stretch to
declare that U.S. national security was really at risk as a basis for the Section 232 tariffs.
Ironically, there may be a legitimate national security case to be made for measures
against Huawei based on the criminal indictment (which is an unproved charge) and other
intelligence. Unfortunately, President Trump’s ramblings about including Huawei’s
issues in trade negotiations demolished any credibility he might have had that his actions
were truly based on national security.
Bown suggested that there were few WTO cases involving national security
because nations hesitated to invoke national security as a basis for trade restrictions and
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trade partners were hesitant to bring WTO cases where national security would be
invoked as a defense. 546 Bown believed that the hesitation arose because member states
foresaw the untenable, lose-lose dilemma this caused for the WTO. If the WTO struck
down a national security measure, the stricken state might feel that its sovereign duty to
defend itself had been infringed. On the other hand, if the WTO upheld the measure,
other member states would feel encouraged to use the same justification to impose trade
restrictions, unraveling the shared commitment to liberalizing trade that is the foundation
of the WTO.
Bown also suggested that the WTO’s lack of experience in these specific issues
has left it ill-prepared. However, as noted in the chapter on import control, a pending
WTO panel has several cases regarding U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum through which
it will get an opportunity deepen its experience.

E. Concluding Thoughts on Export Control
The U.S. export control system appears to be a mercantilist legacy left over from
the Cold War that is poorly adapted for a globalized technological environment where
most innovation occurs in the commercial sector. The U.S. system remains slow and
encumbered by the same lack of interagency cooperation and coordination that was
reported in Beyond Fortress America. Further, in the modern global economic
environment, international cooperation is even more vital to make any controls effective.
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While the Trump administration was successful in raising attention to the danger that
China poses to the U.S. and other democracies, Trump had damaged his credibility with
the very allies upon whom the effectiveness of export controls depends. President Biden
appears to be continuing this attention on China and devoting substantial efforts toward
working with allies toward building an international consensus on how best to face this
ascending rival. This corrects for a fundamental dissonance and strategic error in the
Trump administration’s approach.
The conflicts within the Trump administration evident in imports, foreign
investment, and exports continued into the last area of international trade policy that this
study will take up – the exercise of emergency economic powers. This will be the focus
of the next chapter.
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VII. THE ECONOMIC “FULL MONTY” – TWEA AND IEEPA
A. Background
The “Full Monty” 547 in U.S. international trade law would be the Trading with the
Enemy Act (TWEA) 548 and International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). 549
When these statutes are applied to their fullest, they can completely sever economic
relations between the U.S. and a target country – a mercantilist “Full Monty.”
TWEA dates from 1917 and the massive economic mobilization for World War
I. 550 President Wilson took a different approach from past Presidents who had reacted to
national crises by applying ad hoc emergency measures hoping for later congressional
ratification (or fearing impeachment). Instead, to prepare America to join the conflict,
President Wilson sought congressional approval in advance for the government’s
intervention in economic affairs. TWEA was one of 22 laws passed for that purpose. It
authorized a President to control international trade, investment, migration, and
communications between the United States and an “enemy” in time of war.
When President Roosevelt took office, he immediately used TWEA to proclaim a
banking holiday to stem the cascade of bank failures threatening to bring a complete
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collapse of America’s financial system. To justify his unprecedented peacetime use of
TWEA, a wartime measure, he declared that the Great Depression was as intractable as
any conflict. Days later Congress ratified this action, and then amended TWEA to allow
its use during time of war or “any other period of national emergency declared by the
President.” 551 President Roosevelt then used this authority to exercise control over
virtually all aspects of domestic and international banking, 552 and together with other
authorities, to involve the federal government in virtually all aspects of the domestic
economy.
During World War II, Congress expanded TWEA to allow the government not
just to regulate enemy property, but also to take title to it. 553 At the same time, Congress
expanded the scope of enemy property to include any economic transaction in which a
foreign country or foreign national had “any interest.” 554 These authorities remained in
place as the Cold War developed, and through the wars in Korea and Vietnam.
Later Presidents also made extensive peacetime use of TWEA. These included
President Kennedy’s efforts to control the hording of gold, President Johnson’s desire to
limit U.S. investments overseas to strengthen the U.S. balance of payments position in
1968, and President Nixon’s 1971 declaration of the end of dollar convertibility to gold,
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as well as the imposition of an additional ten percent tariff on all dutiable goods imported
to the U.S. 555
Watergate and the revelation of other executive excesses prompted congressional
efforts in the late 1970s to curb presidential authority in general and TWEA in particular.
To this end, Congress enacted IEEPA to correct the perceived flaws in TWEA by
requiring the President to consult with Congress, if possible, before invoking the act and
to notify Congress once IEEPA was invoked. Additionally, Congress was to review
presidential actions biennially; the President was to review and extend any declared
emergencies annually; and Congress could terminate the President’s action through an
appropriate resolution.
When IEEPA passed, TWEA was amended back to permit its use only in
wartime. IEEPA’s use was to be limited to “national emergencies” other than war that
were the result of any “unusual or extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign
policy, or economy of the United States” originating outside the U.S. Notably, IEEPA
did not define “national emergency” or “unusual or extraordinary threat.” In practice,
Presidents have interpreted these terms, and IEEPA’s authorities, very broadly.
Notably, no President has yet used IEEPA to impose import tariffs, as President
Nixon did with TWEA, though such an action appears legally feasible. Nor has any
President yet acted which was primarily domestic in effect. However, in a globally
interconnected economy it would seem likely that one could find a foreign financial
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interest in virtually any significant transaction in the U.S. economy. Therefore, using
IEEPA to regulate transactions with significant domestic impact also seems legally
feasible. 556
Though IEEPA was intended to reign in the executive’s practice of using national
emergencies to exercise powers without congressional review and oversight, Presidents
have frequently embraced the use of IEEPA. As of July 2020, Presidents have invoked
IEEPA 59 times. 557 Of these, 33 IEEPA national emergencies remain in place. President
Carter’s IEEPA proclamation in response to the Iran Hostage Crisis in 1979 is the oldest
still in effect.
In retrospect, frequent use of IEEPA is unsurprising. Turning to IEEPA is
appealing because a President can take dramatic unilateral action, without the need for
evidence or findings, and in a manner virtually unassailable by the courts. 558 On the
other hand, the effectiveness of these measures has been uneven and sometimes
counterproductive. 559
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From the author’s count, it appears that President Trump has invoked IEEPA 15
times. Of course, that does not count President Trump’s threats to use IEEPA.

B. IEEPA – Trump and Mexico
As noted, no President has yet attempted to use IEEPA to impose a tariff.
However, on May 19, 2019, President Trump threatened to do just that to compel Mexico
to take more action to address illegal migrants crossing into the U.S.560 President Trump
announced via Twitter his intention to put a five percent tariff on everything imported
from Mexico beginning June 10, 2019. In a statement following the Tweet, President
Trump declared that the tariffs would be imposed under IEEPA and would increase by
five percent each month for three months and then stay at 25 percent until Mexico “took
some action.” Just days before the tariffs were to take effect, on June 7, 2019, President
Trump reversed course via Twitter indicating that tariffs would be “indefinitely
suspended” after Mexico committed to taking additional steps to increase border
enforcement. 561
The New York Times reported that President Trump’s decision to announce tariffs
came amidst significant internal division where he sided at first with Navarro, Stephen
Miller (one of the authors of his Monessen, Pennsylvania speech and now a senior
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foreign policy advisor), and White House Counsel Pat Cippolone. 562 Trump expressed
frustration with others who “slow-rolled” his decision. Kushner, Mnuchin, and
Lighthizer warned that such an action might imperil the pending congressional
ratification of the recently signed U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade agreement (USMCA).
Mnuchin successfully argued to delay the implementation of tariffs for a few days to buy
time to talk to the Mexican government. According to the report, President Trump had
not consulted anyone in Congress before the announcement. Congressional members and
business groups warned of the more than $17 billion in higher costs that would be passed
on to American consumers for the $347 billion in goods passing over the border annually
and of the disruption of highly integrated supply chains between the U.S. and Mexico. 563
The back and forth over a matter of days revealed President Trump’s continued
unpredictability. Why the President wanted to start a trade war with Mexico, the number
two supplier of imports, at the same time the U.S. was in a trade war with its number one
supplier, China, seemed hard to fathom. However, from a mercantilist perspective, it
made sense to use economic power to extract concessions, here with regards to
immigration -- a core issue for the Republican base. On the other hand, there were few
indications that President Trump truly understood the full impact of his actions on the
U.S., including the massive disruption to U.S. businesses and consumers, the escalation
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of uncertainty freezing U.S. investment, and the further evaporation of U.S. credibility
with its closest allies.

C. IEEPA – Trump and China
Of President Trump’s 15 executive orders invoking IEEPA, ten involved China
directly or indirectly. They began with telecommunications issues similar to those with
Huawei discussed above and, in May 2019, resulted in an IEEPA executive order
banning transactions relating to “information and communications technologies or
services” provided by “foreign adversaries.” 564 China was not named in the order but was
clearly the target as clarified by a Commerce Department “interim final rule” issued on
January 19, 2021. 565 This interim final rule explained that the executive order meant to
address the vulnerabilities of these technologies to foreign attack; the potential
harvesting, diversion, theft or corruption of U.S. intellectual property; and risk of the
compromise of sensitive personal data via foreign hardware, software, or applications. 566
Interestingly, the executive order gave the task of reviewing any covered
transactions to the Commerce Department, essentially setting up a process that
overlapped with the CFIUS review run by Mnuchin at Treasury. One could speculate
564
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that President Trump had lost faith in Mnuchin where China was concerned. Or one
could speculate that President Trump liked to see his advisors compete for his
attention. 567
Rogin reported that in the summer of 2019 Mnuchin had sidetracked similar
concerns about vulnerabilities and risks directed at Google, claiming to have investigated
and eliminated any concerns about foreign infiltration in just eight days. 568 Chinese
companies TikTok and WeChat were not so fortunate. In successive IEEPA executive
orders issued on August 6, 2020, President Trump ordered the prohibition of any
economic transactions by American individuals or businesses with ByteDance, TikTok’s
parent, and with Tencent Holdings, WeChat’s parent. 569 The effective dates of the orders
were delayed for 45 days, but once in effect they had the potential to directly impact
millions of American users of these applications.
Rogin reported that the TikTok order was based on evidence that it was censoring
messages critical of the Chinese Communist Party, and that it was diverting U.S. user
data through China. 570 President Trump indicated that ByteDance would have to sell
TikTok or shut it down. Rogin reported that though it was the national security group
and anti-China elements in the administration that were pushing the prohibitions,
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Mnuchin took over negotiations and suggested spinning TikTok off to Oracle or
Microsoft which would have netted substantial fees for the Wall Street operatives
brokering the deal. In an odd turn, President Trump also demanded $5 billion in “key
money,” a kind of kickback not uncommon in the real estate business, to be paid to the
U.S. Treasury for Trump’s having brokered the arrangement. 571 The Chinese
government forbid the deal. 572 TikTok was also able block the effects of the executive
order in U.S. courts. 573 President Biden ultimately revoked both the TikTok and WeChat
executive orders. 574
In a late victory for the anti-China elements in the administration, however, on
November 12, 2020, President Trump gave a clear expression of his national security
concerns in an IEEPA executive order prohibiting Americans from investing in Chinese
companies associated with China’s military-industrial complex. 575 In the preamble of
that order, he noted that China “is increasingly exploiting United States capital to
resource and enable the development and modernization of military, intelligence, and
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other security apparatuses.” President Trump further stated that China was developing its
military strength through its strategy of “Military-Civil Fusion” “by compelling civilian
Chinese companies to support its military and intelligence activities.” He then observed
that these same civilian companies were simultaneously raising capital by selling
securities to U.S. investors. He therefore concluded that U.S. investors were funding
China’s military expansion, at least indirectly.
Though this preamble would seem to justify completely prohibiting U.S.
investment in any Chinese entity, the Trump administration limited the prohibition to just
those entities designated a “Communist Chinese military company” by the U.S.
Department of Defense. 576 Clearly, this order did not go as far as desired by advocates,
like Peter Navarro, for complete economic decoupling. However, the significant
implications for both the U.S. and Chinese economies of a complete denial of U.S. capital
to Chinese companies seem obvious.
Having said that, Chinese companies have typically lacked the transparency
necessary to be listed directly on U.S. exchanges, as set out in rules issued by the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), because China’s own laws prohibit
them from doing so. 577 However, Rogin reported that by using work-arounds such as
“reverse mergers,” Chinese companies have nevertheless gained access to U.S. capital
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markets. 578 Yet, it has not been possible for U.S. investors to perform due diligence on
these companies before parting with their capital, the result of which, Rogin contended,
was massive fraud as documented in a 2018 film called “The China Hustle.” 579
In response to increasing U.S. scrutiny, Rogin reported that Chinese companies
switched strategies by turning to Wall Street index providers and pressuring them to
include Chinese companies on U.S. indexes, including the world’s largest index,
“MSCI.” 580 Once on such an index, large institutional investors typically add the newly
listed companies to their portfolios. These institutional investors include some of
America’s largest pension funds, such as the federal government’s “Thrift Savings Plan,”
into which federal employees and military members invest. Rogin pointed out the irony
that Chinese companies listed on U.S. indexes could be the very ones the U.S.
government was sanctioning through exports bans or import tariffs. 581 Nevertheless,
these companies were receiving from U.S. investments. Rogin reported that in 2019
MSCI quadrupled the number of mainland Chinese companies on its index, sending
approximately $80 billion in U.S. capital to China amid a trade war. 582
In final twist to this executive order, President Trump directed that the Defense
Department “designate” “Communist Chinese military companies.” 583 This was unusual
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given that the IEEPA “designations” process was one for which the Treasury Department
had an extensive history and a well-established procedure that had survived frequent
judicial scrutiny. 584 It might have been another sign of a loss of trust in Mnuchin as well
as a desire to put a thorough Trump loyalist, the newly-named Acting Secretary of
Defense Christopher Miller, in charge of the process.

D. TWEA/IEEPA Conclusions
Of all the mercantilist tools in a President’s arsenal, TWEA and IEEPA are the
most powerful. With them, a President can sever all economic relations between the U.S.
and any other country. However, both are also versatile and do not require going as far
as complete economic disconnection. A President can carefully tailor measures to meet
specific foreign policy and economic objectives. For instance, the Trump administration
narrowly tailored the IEEPA prohibition on U.S. investors to just “Communist Chinese
military companies” though IEEPA’s authority and the expressed rationale for the
national emergency could well have extended the prohibition of all U.S investments in
China. Beyond symbolism, however, Trump’s actions will likely have little effect on
Chinese behavior. Having said that, together with other actions, President Trump has

The author participated in this work during his years with Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control,
1999-2007. One of the Chinese companies the Defense Department designated secured a preliminary
injunction in a U.S. court, in part due the Defense Department inexperience in the process. U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, “Economics and Trade Bulletin,” June 21, 2021, 4,
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/June_2021_Trade_Bulletin.pdf.
President Biden agreed with, and continued Trump’s executive order, though it was redrafted to correct
legal flaws and to give the designation process back to Treasury. See Exec. Order No. 14,032, 86 Fed.
Reg. 30145-30149 (June 3, 2021).
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successfully brought national and international attention to the potential threat China
poses, and he clearly redirected the course of the U.S.-Chinese relationship -- no small
achievement.
Whatever the achievements, President Trump’s use, or not, of IEEPA revealed the
same internal divisions and dysfunctions that had challenged the effectiveness of the
administration’s policies for imports, exports, and foreign investments. Further, the
Trump administration’s decisions on IEEPA had the same unpredictability as in other
international trade policy areas and injected yet more uncertainty into an already anxious
domestic and global economic environment. Dysfunction and uncertainty had become
the hallmarks of President Trump’s international trade policy.
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CONCLUSION
This study asked whether the U.S. was a mercantilist, liberal or economically
nationalist country. It questioned whether there was truly a dichotomy between
mercantilism and liberalism that made them mutually exclusive approaches. It also
questioned whether economic nationalism was necessarily damaging to other countries.
The study went on to explore how these ideas might have been reflected in Trump
administration views on national security as implemented in its international trade policy.
Before examining President Trump’s policies, the study defined terms and set the
historical stage. The first chapter discussed mercantilism, liberalism, and economic
nationalism using, in part, the views of Alexander Hamilton, Adam Smith, and Friedrich
List. The second chapter’s brief historical discussion concluded with the notion that in
the 20th century the U.S. had practiced both mercantilism and liberal free trade to various
degrees, all under a rhetoric of economic nationalism that sometimes identified the
freedom of the world as dependent on U.S. economic success. Each presidential
administration in that era used mercantilist tools as they thought necessary to strike the
balance between mercantilism and free trade appropriate to the circumstances.
The mercantilist tools used included import controls, control of foreign direct
investment, export controls and emergency economic powers. The U.S. legal and
organizational structures for each were fully developed through the Cold War era, with
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the goal then being to ensure the economic separation between the “free” West and the
“Communist” East. They were also intended to assure, in a pure mercantilist sense, that
the economic power of the West protected its ideological survival while at the same time
diminishing the Soviet bloc.
While using mercantilist tools against Communism, the U.S. began to liberalize
its markets by lowering tariffs with non-Communist countries. The U.S. participated in
international agreements and joined international institutions promoting liberal free trade
ideals, however imperfectly. The U.S. economy became increasingly globalized in the
process.
The U.S. was also increasingly reliant on the global economy for defense
technology. While still leading in key areas, the complete U.S. dominance enjoyed
during the “golden age” of the 1950s and 1960s was gone. As the world economy
globalized from the 1970s on, national security increasingly required the U.S. to be more
connected to allies in trade and technology, not less.
Into these challenges stepped Donald J. Trump, a President using a sharply
economically nationalist and anti-liberal rhetoric, embracing mercantilist notions of
national power, and relying on trade deficits as the paramount metric of that power.
Trump campaigned on a populism that was fed by grievances about manufacturing job
losses due to unfair global trade. 585 Trump used the term “economic security is national

585
Trump’s populism was ironic given the President’s purported wealth, the wealth of key cabinet
members, and the influence of Trump’s wealthy friends on his decisions.
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security” to justify a more mercantilist approach to international trade by claiming U.S.
decline was based on “unfair” trade practices.
During his administration, Trump readily turned to Cold War-era mercantilist
tools. It is too soon to definitively judge whether these mercantilist tools were effective
in protecting U.S. economic interests, but some early economic indications seem to raise
doubts. Part of the reason it is hard to gauge the effectiveness of these tools is that they
were inconsistently implemented by an administration that was inadequately staffed and
particularly discordant. On top of that, the President vacillated with his views depending
on who last talked to him, whether that be White House staff or his wealthy friends with
substantial commercial interests at stake. President Trump was also subject to
manipulation, particularly by China’s President Xi, who would ask for and receive
“personal favors” that undermined Trump’s own policies.
In addition to inconsistent application, the long-standing mercantilist policy tools
for import control, foreign direct investment control, export control, and emergency
economic powers were ineffective because the U.S. economy was so firmly embedded in
the global economy. For instance, high tariffs placed on imports had little significant
impact on the U.S. trade deficit because they adversely affected U.S. exports as well. In
fact, trade deficits grew during Trump’s term. Therefore, if one embraces the
mercantilist argument that trade balances were the essential measure of national power,
as President Trump did, then these measures seem to have failed.
It is important to note that though some feared the end of the global free trading
system under a Trump presidency, Trump never went so far as to withdraw the U.S. from
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the WTO or abandon trade agreements altogether, despite threatening to. 586 Aides talked
him out of it. They argued that the U.S. economy was simply too intertwined with the
global economy to end the U.S. participation in liberal free trade agreements without
doing substantial harm to the U.S. economy, and ultimately U.S. national security.
Instead of abandoning KORUS or NAFTA, the Trump administration replaced them with
new agreements.
Though the Cold War is three decades past, and America’s unrivaled
technological and industrial supremacy has faded, U.S. mercantilist laws and structures
have not fundamentally changed. One must ask whether these tools are fit for the
challenges the U.S. faces in the coming years, particularly against a rival People’s
Republic of China which is in an ascending trajectory, possesses substantial economic
means, and exhibits, some think, an existentially threatening ideology.
Yet, the U.S. export control system has not adapted. It remains antiquated,
cumbersome, and bureaucratic. Interagency tangles continue to fetter it. Controls are
both too broad and too narrow. They are too broad because they control items widely
available in the global market at needless cost to U.S. businesses. They are also too
narrow because new technology, particularly in the internationalized commercial world,
quickly diffuses across borders before it ever makes it onto a U.S. control list.
President Trump appeared to pay little attention to the needs for export control
reform so amply illustrated in Beyond Fortress America. Instead, he appeared to use the
export control system as economic leverage in the purest mercantilist sense to try to
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secure a more advantageous trade agreement with China. Though the Trump
administration proclaimed success in securing the Phase One Agreement, commentators
are less sanguine. 587
Despite reforms, the U.S. controls on foreign direct investment implemented
through CFIUS to protect U.S. technology seemed to have been captured by Wall Street
interests. Mnuchin appears to have limited the full effects of CFIUS reform to protect the
prerogatives of his former Wall Street colleagues. Thus, a single interest group appeared
to limit the exercise of this important economic tool, imposing a constraint on national
security policymaking.
Outgoing U.S. investment represents both a U.S. economic power and a
significant constraint on national security decision making. As a source of power, the
U.S. remains the world’s preeminent source of capital. As a vulnerability, due to the
globally integrated financial system, as many as 100 million Americans have passively
invested in Chinese companies through China’s strategy of pressuring the major indexes
to include Chinese companies. 588 Consequently, American pensioners are indirectly
funding China’s military expansion and geopolitical aggressiveness at the same time that
other elements of the U.S. government are trying to constrain those efforts. This U.S.
investment in Chinese companies coupled with the sheer volume of U.S. sovereign debt
held in China, renders the U.S. substantially vulnerable to Chinese economic pressure

Rogin, Chaos Under Heaven, 300-303. A full analysis of the “Phase One Agreement” is beyond the
scope of this study. From one perspective China secured few meaningful concessions since tariffs
remained in place and gave few benefits to the U.S. in the purchase of American goods.
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should China ever choose to exercise it. 589 This is a classic mercantilist dependence that
Alexander Hamilton sought so desperately to avoid.
As has been demonstrated, the President has authority through IEEPA to exercise
complete control over all economic relations between the U.S. and other countries. But,
President Trump’s exercise of IEEPA was limited to symbolic attacks on TikTok,
WeChat, and on Chinese companies linked to the Chinese military. This restraint seems
appropriate given the known and unknown consequences of broader action. Yet the
vulnerability of the U.S. financial system to Chinese influence is a vital concern going
forward.
The Cold War’s mercantilist tools to control import, export, and finance have
allowed Presidents to act quickly in response to emergencies. When using these
authorities, Presidents need consult no ally, despite the obvious international
ramifications. 590 In fact, the extent to which the U.S. is integrated into the global
economy now demands international cooperation for any of these tools to be effective. In
the globalized economic environment in which the U.S. finds itself, the need for allied
cooperation represents both a political and economic constraint on national security
decision making.

Certainly, China would suffer from the loss of access to U.S. capital as well as a collapse on the value of
the U.S. dollar should China choose to precipitously liquidate its holdings of U.S. debt. Assessing these
comparative risks is beyond the scope of this study.
589

Nor prior to exercising these powers need a President consult any member of Congress, representative
of industry, or leader of a union, despite the huge potential domestic political and economic impacts such
steps may have. Securing domestic political support prior to taking dramatic trade steps also seems
something that Trump was uninterested in doing, at least in several instances discussed in this study.
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In the area of international cooperation, the Trump administration failed
dramatically. President Trump seemed uninterested in working with allies and this
resulting lack of united international effort undermined effectiveness of U.S. national
security policies regarding international trade. President Trump’s lack of allied
engagement represented a fundamental strategic flaw in his approach. Thankfully,
President Biden appears to understand this reality and his administration appears to be
positively and constructively engaging America’s allies to address the damage done by
the previous administration. President Biden’s efforts at reconciliation were on full
display during his first overseas trip to summits of the Group of Seven wealthy
democracies, NATO, and European Union, in sharp contrast to President Trump’s first
overseas visit described in the second chapter. 591
References to China appear throughout this study. It is beyond this study’s scope
to evaluate and report definitively on China’s ideology and intentions. However, to
understand the Trump administration’s decision making, it is appropriate to accept as an
assumption, as President Trump and many of his advisors did, that China is a strategic
competitor with aims at regional hegemony. China appears to be building its military and
economic power to exert that hegemony. It appears to reject ideals of democracy and
political freedom, as evidenced by its anti-democratic actions in Hong Kong and its
systematic repression of Uyghurs and Tibetans. In fact, it appears that China views these
values as an existential threat. China also appears to exercise a pure mercantilist
See James Marson, Andrew Restuccia, and Vivian Salama, “Putin Meeting to Test Biden’s Bid to Rally
Western Allies,” Wall Street Journal, June 15, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-meeting-to-testbidens-bid-to-rally-western-allies-11623771627?page=1.
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equation of national power, subsuming all other elements (economic, political, and
military) to the preservation of the Chinese Communist Party and its control over the
nation.
As the Chinese Communist Party celebrates its 100th anniversary and its 72nd year
in power, it is not without its challenges. 592 Party membership represents just eight
percent of the Chinese population. While the state presence in the Chinese economy is
pervasive, there is a substantial element that is privately owned. There is a growing
middle class with increasing demands to maintain a steadily improving standard of living,
which seems dependent in part on China’s private economy. China is dependent on
imports for energy, food, and other natural resources. Its economic growth is dependent
on a steady flow of foreign technology and capital.
China also has a succession issue. President Xi has concentrated his power,
eliminated his term limits, and declined to name a successor. As in any authoritarian
regime, succession presents a moment of enormous domestic and international danger.
Past successions in China have often brought substantial upheaval. For the West, there is
no guarantee that whoever follows President Xi will not find it valuable to heighten
nationalistic rhetoric and take even more aggressive steps against China’s immediate
neighbors, especially Taiwan, and against the West as a way to consolidate power. Xi’s

See “A Hundred Years of Evolution,” The Economist Special Report: The Chinese Communist Party,
June 26, 2021. See also Sun Yu and Tom Mitchell, “The Communist party at 100: is Xi Jinping’s China on
the right track?” Financial Times, June 28, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/faf2226b-be95-4c52-a10b653f3137b90d.
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passing will represent a point of extraordinary risk to China’s neighbors, to the U.S., and,
ultimately, to the rest of the world.
The U.S. will need to shape its national security policy regarding China based on
these realities. In a globally integrated economy, a full Cold War-style economic
separation between China and the West now seems quite implausible. A U.S. move
toward isolation and autarky seems similarly implausible and ultimately self-defeating.
Unlike the beginning of the Cold War, the U.S. no longer enjoys technological and
manufacturing dominance. Therefore, it will need allied engagement to ensure the
continuing technological innovation that is essential to both prosperity and national
security.
So, in the author’s opinion, the oft-described dichotomy between mercantilism
and liberalism that purportedly makes them mutually exclusive approaches simply does
not exist. Both elements have coexisted in U.S. international trade policy since the end of
World War II. The Trump administration continued to balance mercantilist elements and
liberal free trade elements in his international trade policy just as prior administrations
had done. Like most prior administrations, the Trump administration employed
mercantilist tools as it thought appropriate. It challenged, but did not abandon, liberal
free trade institutions like the WTO. Nor did it abandon bilateral or regional trade
arrangements without replacing them with new ones.
It seems like the U.S. has consistently used an economically nationalist rhetoric to
describe its international trade policy. However, for most of the 20th century, this rhetoric
identified the success of the U.S. economy with the defense of the free world against
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Communism during the Cold War, and with the promotion of global democracy and
freedom since then. The past U.S. approach seems to belie the notion that economic
nationalism necessarily demands the harm of another nation’s interest. As Helleiner
noted, one can be an economic nationalist and still promote liberal free trade which is
premised on mutual gain.
President Trump differed from his predecessors by embracing populist rhetoric
with more sharply economically nationalist tones. With his strident attacks on globalism,
Trump abandoned any notion that he sought U.S. economic advancement to benefit all
mankind. Further, Trump’s anti-globalism seemed to extend to a deep disdain of
traditional U.S. allies in trade and security, also a dramatic departure from his
predecessors.
It must be recalled however, that though President Trump’s tone was more
strident, virtually all U.S. Presidents since the Second World War had justified their
policies to the American voter in terms of economic nationalism. And just like
Presidents since the war, Trump employed both mercantilist and liberal elements in his
international trade policy. Therefore, it is the author’s opinion that United States ended
President Trump’s term as a mercantilist, liberal, and economically nationalist country,
just as it had been since World War II.
This characterization is unlikely to change under President Biden. His first
challenge will be to repair the damage President Trump did to America’s allies. As a
second step, President Biden will need to modernize U.S. Cold-War era organizations
and policies regarding imports, exports, and finance. Traditional mercantilist tools may
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still have their place in international crises. But their use will be complicated by the fact
that the global economy, and the U.S. place in it, is dominated by liberal free trade
institutions and practices. Finally, President Biden should set a new U.S. national
security goal to eliminate dependence on a single potentially hostile rival as its main
source of consumer goods, a main market for its exports, a primary destination for its
capital, or a key source of foreign investment.
These will be enormous challenges. As international relations historian Francis
Gavin wrote recently,
The United States is at an inflection point, both in how its economy operates and
in the global security landscape it faces. How it handles the balance between the
two – generating wealth while also creating security – will have consequences for
years to come. 593
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Appendices
Appendix A – Section 232 in Detail.
This appendix will examine in detail Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962. 594 To begin any discussion of U.S. law, one must acknowledge that all federal
legal authority originates from the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Constitution empowers
Congress “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations” and “to lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 7. As is common in areas of foreign
affairs, Congress may delegate its authority to the executive and has done so in Section
232.
The U.S. Constitution also gives the President direct foreign affairs authorities.
Specifically, he or she has the authority “to make Treaties” and “appoint Ambassadors.”
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2. The U.S. Supreme Court noted, “The President is the sole organ
of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.”
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).

Under U.S.

law, the President is acting at the pinnacle of virtually unreviewable discretion when

594

19 U.S.C. § 1862 (2021).
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making decisions pursuant both to his given constitutional authority and pursuant to a
delegation of Congressional authorities. 595
Section 232 has six subsections. 596 The first, subsection (a), authorized the
President to decline to reduce or eliminate duties or other import restrictions pursuant to
other trade agreements on any article if the President “determines that such reduction or
elimination would threaten to impair the national security.” 597
The second, subsection (b), authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to initiate
investigations to determine the effects on national security of the import of specific
articles. 598 This subsection requires the Secretary of the Commerce to consult with the
Secretary of Defense and other government agencies, as well as to seek information from
other interested parties through public hearing and public comment. Subsection (b) sets
out a specific deadline of 270 days to complete the investigation after which the Secretary
of Commerce is to present his conclusions as to “the effect of the importation of such
article in the quantities or under such circumstances upon the national security (emphasis
added).” 599 Thus, the investigation is expected to gather facts about the volume of and

See Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
635-36 (1952).
595

Apparently in the original legislation, there were two subsections both labeled “(d)”. 19 U.S.C. §
1862(d), footnote 1.

596

597

19 U.S.C. § 1862(a) (2021).

598

19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (2021).

599

19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (2021).
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terms of trade for a particular article, evaluate the impacts on national security, and report
the facts and conclusions to the President.
Subsection (c) further requires that, given findings of impact on national security,
the Secretary of Commerce make recommendations as to whether or not the President
should take action. 600 If the Secretary of Commerce finds that there is an imported article
that threatens to impair the national security, subsection (c) empowers the President to
concur or not with the Secretary of Commerce’s finding, and if concurring, to determine
the “nature and duration” of the trade action that, in the President’s judgment, will “adjust
imports of the article and its derivatives” such that they will no longer threaten to impair
the national security.
Subsection (c) anticipates that the President might seek to negotiate an agreement
to limit imports and gives the President 180 days to accomplish this. If not done or it was
done but was not effective, the subsection authorizes the President to take other actions as
necessary, or to take no further action.
The fourth subsection, (d), provides criteria for the Secretary and the President to
consider in making their determinations “in the light of the requirements of national
security and without excluding other relevant factors.” The subsection begins with a list
that appears directly linked to national security. 601

Ibid. The subsection states that any unclassified portions of the report “shall be published” in the Federal
Register. This part of the law also authorizes the Secretary of the Commerce to implement regulations
necessary to carry out the statute. 19 U U.S.C. § 1862(a). These regulations are found in Title 15, Code of
Federal Regulations, Part 705 (cited as 15 C.F.R Part 705).
600

601
The “national security” list includes domestic production needed for projected national defense
requirements; the capacity of domestic industries to meet such requirements; existing and anticipated
availabilities of the human resources, raw materials, and other supplies and services essential to the national
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The next part of subsection (d) takes a more expanded view than traditional
notions of national security. The executive branch is directed in making its
determinations, to “further recognize the close relation of the economic welfare of the
nation to our national security.” In determining whether the “weakening of our internal
economy may impair national security,” the executive branch is directed to take into
consideration a long list of general economic factors, “without excluding other
factors.” 602
The President’s decisions need no Congressional approval to have the effect of
law. However, the sixth subsection establishes a Congressional disapproval process
regarding only the importation of petroleum or petroleum products. If Congress
disapproves of a presidential action, that disapproval would terminate the legal effect of
the President’s action. To disapprove of a presidential action for all imports other than
petroleum or petroleum products, Congress would have to pass superseding legislation
which would be subject to a President’s possible veto.
Justice Thurgood Marshall provided a detailed discussion of the drafting of
Section 232 in his opinion upholding the constitutionality of that section in Federal

defense; the requirements of growth of such industries and such supplies and services including investment,
exploration, and development to assure such growth; and the importation of goods in terms of their
quantities, availabilities, character, and use as those affect such industries and the capacity of the United
States to meet national security requirements.
The broader criteria are the impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of individual
domestic industries; and any substantial unemployment, decrease in government revenues, loss of skills or
investment, or other serious effects by the displacement of any domestic products by excessive imports.
The fifth subsection, also labeled (d), directs the Secretary of Commerce to report to Congress the
disposition of every request received to take action under Section 232. The Department of Commerce has
issued regulations to implement Section 232. They are found at 15 C.F.R. Part 705 and largely restate the
language of the statute.
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Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc. 603 Congress enacted the first version of
the statute in 1955, re-enacting it as Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. 604
Thus, this section is a product of the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union. The Trump
administration’s revival of its use seems to echo the anxiety of rivalry – but this time
between America and China.
Prior to the Trump administration, there had been 26 Section 232 investigations,
the last undertaken in 2001. 605 Of those, there was a finding of no threat to impair the
national security in 16 – a 17th was ended before a finding. In the other nine, there was a
finding of a threat to impair the national security. In six of those nine cases, the President
took action to adjust imports through import bans or quotas, or sought voluntary import
quotas, or imposed import fees or duties. In three of the nine cases with positive
findings, the President took no action.
As stated above, the Trump administration has initiated eight Section 232
investigations. 606 In five of those, the Secretary of Commerce found that the imports
concerned “threatened to impair national security.” Of those, President Trump agreed
with the Secretary Ross’s determination and imposed tariffs in the two investigations
regarding steel and aluminum, respectively. Reports of these two investigations have
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426 U.S. 548 (1976).
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426 U.S. at 550.

Congressional Research Service, “Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress,” CRS
Report R45249, August 24, 2020, Table B-1, 58-60.
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606
CRS Report, “Section 232 Investigations: Oversight and Issues for Congress,” Report R45249,August
24, 2020, Appendix B.
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been released – the Trump administration did not release the other three reports. In a
third investigation regarding automobiles, the President concurred but directed the United
States Trade Representative to negotiate with trading partners to address the threat to
impair national security. In a fourth investigation regarding uranium ore and products,
the President disagreed with the Secretary’s determination of a threat to the impairment
of national security. In a fifth regarding titanium sponge, the President concurred but
elected not to act against imports. The last three investigations are ongoing and regard
electric transformers and certain grain-oriented electrical steel parts, mobile cranes, and
vanadium.
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Appendix B – The 2018 Steel Report.
This appendix will review in detail the January 2018 report of the Commerce
Department’s Section 232 investigation into steel imports. 607
The 2018 Steel Report concluded that the U.S. steel industry was essential to
national security, even though only three percent of domestic steel production was
required for direct national security requirements. 608 The implication of this low amount
was, the report concluded, that domestic producers could not rely on defense sales alone
to be viable businesses – they needed sufficient commercial and industrial sales to be
profitable. The report goes on to indicate that critical industries also had a high need for
steel if the $4.5 trillion of hoped for infrastructure investments were made through
2025. 609 The authors estimated that some 54 million metric tons annually would be
required for critical industries. 610
The report next determined that the economic welfare of U.S. steel producers had
been eroded by imports of lower-priced steel from countries with directly or indirectly
subsidized steel production. 611 Even non-subsidized foreign competitors felt pressured

U.S. Commerce Department, “The Effect of Imports on the National Security: An Investigation
Conducted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, As Amended,” (January 11, 2018), 1314. (Hereafter 2018 Steel Report).
607
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2018 Steel Report, 23.

2018 Steel Report, 24, citing a report from the American Society of Civil Engineers. Ibid., 27. No
infrastructure measure was passed during the Trump administration.
609
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2018 Steel Report, 27.

2018 Steel Report, 25. The report blames higher U.S. prices on “higher taxes, healthcare, environmental
standards, and other regulatory expenses.” Ibid., 31-32. The report does not discuss factor or technology
allocations (like wage or productivity differentials).
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by subsidized competitors to export to the U.S., the report stated. 612 As evidence for
inappropriate state subsidies, the report pointed to 164 cases where anti-dumping or
countervailing duties (ADCV) had been imposed (with 20 more under investigation). 613
The excessive imports, the report concluded, had driven U.S. steel producers out of
business, forcing plant closures and layoffs. 614 Survivors were overleveraged and the
loss of revenue due to unfair imports, low prices, and declining demand had forced them
to defer or eliminate investments in modernization and research and development. 615 The
report indicated that the U.S. steel industry had net negative income between the years of
2009-2016. 616
An analysis of the 2018 Steel Report reveals evidence that it appears to be,
perhaps unsurprisingly, more political advocacy than objective economic inquiry. The
2018 Steel Report utilized an expanded view of “national security” that embraced broader
economic welfare and not just elements directly impacting defense. This expanded view
seems consistent with the language and history of Section 232 discussed above. As
referenced earlier, Congress noted the close link between overall economic welfare and
the security of the nation in Section 232. However, Congress probably did not expect an
exact identity between the two in the way that President Trump expressed it in his
2018 Steel Report, 32.
2018 Steel Report, 25, 28-29. The authors relay that the expense, cost, and delay in remedies for ADCV
duties made them ineffective in the steel industry with its volume and diversity of products. They note that
small producers often cannot afford to seek this relief.
612
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2018 Steel Report, 33-36. The report added that U.S. steel producers were burdened with high debt.
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statement in the 2017 National Security Strategy that “economic security is national
security.” If it had, Congress could have said so in the statute. Nor may this exact
identity comport with Justice Thurgood Marshall’s dicta in Federal Energy
Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., where he stated that “national security” must be
interpreted more narrowly than “the national interest.” 617 But, the statute gives wide
latitude to the sitting President to interpret “national security” as the executive thinks
best. Additionally, with its present conservative majority, the U.S. Supreme Court may
well reconsider Justice Marshall’s dicta.
Having said that, one might have expected a more balanced economic inquiry in a
Section 232 investigation even if it embraced an inquiry into the broader impacts of
imports on the U.S. economy. The most compelling evidence that the report is not an
objective economic analysis is what the report leaves out of its discussion.
For instance, the 2018 Steel Report does not examine evidence of the importance
to the broader U.S. economy of the cost of imports on downstream producers, including
those that turn the imports into higher value products for export. The modern U.S.
economy closely intertwines imports and exports in a way that appears to go
unacknowledged in the report. Nor does the report discuss the implications of promoting
U.S. steel production that further consumes the very limited U.S. stocks of iron ore. Nor
does the report assess the likely impact of entirely predictable retaliatory measures taken
by trading partners on key U.S. exports, particularly agricultural products. The report
426 U.S. at 569. Ultimately, the Secretary of Commerce determined that there was no probative
evidence that imports of iron ore or semi-finished steel threatened to impair the national security, even
under the broader definition. 2018 Steel Report, 1.
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does not compare the direct and indirect costs of imposing tariffs on the broader U.S.
economy with the economic benefit sought by those tariffs. If the adverse impacts are
greater than the benefits, then has not the administration’s action itself “threatened to
impair the national security?” Finally, the report makes no effort to assess the potential
cost of the tariffs to the American consumer.
Nor does the 2018 Steel Report discuss the foreign policy impacts of unilateral
trade action. Although the report focuses on China’s subsidized excess capacity in steel
production, the actual impact on the tariffs fell upon Canada, Mexico and other close
trading and security allies. Looking just at the global steel industry, was this a necessary
distraction to the otherwise broad consensus emerging among developed nations to
address the global overcapacity in steel production? Had the U.S. harmed those efforts as
it weakened its own economy? Did the tensions distract from other efforts to address
global issues like the pandemic, Chinese aggressiveness in the South China Sea, Russian
aggression in Ukraine, or climate change? Then-U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis
pointed out these concerns in his letter to the U.S. Secretary of Commerce when he
stated, “DoD continues to be concerned about the negative impact on our key allies
regarding the recommended options within these reports.” 618 The report nowhere
analyzes these concerns though it does recognize that the President could exempt certain
countries from the trade actions.

U.S. Department of Defense, “Memorandum for the Secretary of Commerce,” July 10, 2021,
https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/department_of_defense_memo_response_to_steel_and_alum
inum_policy_recommendations.pdf.
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Also missing from the report is an analysis of possible alternatives to trade action.
If the source of the problem was China’s overcapacity, what steps other than tariffs might
be taken to address that concern? For instance, the U.S. had previously supported an
effort by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to establish a
global forum on excess steel capacity in hopes of generating pressure on those nations
subsidizing and expanding steel production capacity to reconsider their policies. 619 The
possible benefits of international action were not compared to the potential harm inflicted
on close trading allies by unilateral U.S. tariffs.
The 2018 Steel Report did not consider steps to strengthen existing remedies to
perceived unfair state support of steel production, such as anti-dumping or countervailing
duties (ADCV). Though the issues of global overcapacity, and the resulting incentives to
cheat, were well known, and the challenges of cost and timeliness in bringing ADCV
cases were well documented, the report does not consider changes to improve the
effectiveness the available ADCV remedies. Such steps could have included establishing
a governmental entity to monitor steel imports and empowered to bring actions on its
own rather than requiring those private parties claiming harm to bear the cost of
initiating, investigating and prosecuting claims. Minimally, the administration could
have considered providing more resources for the quicker adjudication of pending claims
under the existing system. Again, the costs of these more direct governmental efforts
were not weighed against the costs of unilateral U.S. quotas or tariffs.

619
See the discussion in Congressional Research Service, “Section 232 Investigations: Overview and
Issues for Congress,” Report R45249, August 24, 2020, 34-36.
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Finally, the 2018 Steel Report did not discuss other ways to strengthen the U.S.
steel industry. This would have required a deeper analysis of steel production in the U.S.
Instead, the report settled on the typical Republican complaints about “higher taxes,
healthcare, environmental standards and burdensome regulations,” coupled with unfair
trade, as causes for the decline of the industry. These outside forces were blamed for
declining investment modernization or research and development. Nowhere was
discussed why U.S. steel companies were so overleveraged or found such difficulty in
obtaining financing. Also missing was any effort to understand the broader shift in the
U.S. economy from manufacturing to services as it impacted the domestic steel industry.
Further, the authors neglected to address the risk that trade measures would protect
inefficient or poorly run companies by enabling those companies to avoid the
improvements they needed to compete, or if unable to, from shifting those resources to
industries that were more competitive. 620
A more thoughtful analysis would have identified how other forms of
governmental intervention might have more directly benefited the steel industry. As
trade divergence theorists would point out, direct subsidies are less economically
distorting than tariffs. In short, the 2018 Steel Report does not compare the costs of other
possible government steps to support to the U.S. steel industry against the potential
adverse impacts of Section 232 tariffs on the U.S. economy.

Robert E. Scott of the Economic Policy Institute observed that the decline in American manufacturing
has taken place over decades. He noted influences of “decades of trade, currency and tax policies that
incentivized off-shoring” in “We can reshore manufacturing jobs, but Trump hasn’t done it,” EPI Policy
Center, August 20, 2020, 1.
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Appendix C – GATT Article XXI and the WTO Panel Report on Russia.
This appendix will provide a detailed review of the 2019 WTO panel decision
reviewing a complaint from Ukraine against trade measures imposed by Russia. 621
The panel first reminded readers that the interpretation of any treaty provision
begins by giving ordinary meaning to its terms in light of its context, and in view of the
object and purpose of the treaty. 622
Article XXI of GATT reads in full
Security Exceptions
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security
interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which
they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements
of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is
carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying
a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international
621
World Trade Organization, “Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit: Report of the Panel,” 5
April 2019, WT/DS512/R, (hereafter WTO Russia Panel Decision),
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/DS/512R.pdf&Open=True. The
report was accepted by the Dispute Settlement Body and became a binding decision on April 29, 2019.
World Trade Organization, “Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit: Panel Report – Action of
the Dispute Settlement Body,” 29 April 2019, WT/DS512/7,
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/DS/512-7.pdf&Open=True.
622
WTO Russia Panel Decision, 39, citing Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 18232.
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relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its
obligations under the United Nations.
The specific subparagraph under which the U.S. claimed it could disregard its
general obligations under GATT was (b)(iii) of Article XXI.
The panel examined the construction of Article XXI and concluded that the three
subparagraphs under (b), identified as (i), (ii), and (iii) were “limitative qualifying
clauses.” 623 That meant that a member state could apply the GATT exception in
paragraph (b), the “taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its
essential security interests,” only when the circumstances in (i), (ii) or (iii) applied.
Consequently, the application of paragraph (b) was limited to actions (i) relating to
fissionable material; or (ii) relating to traffic in arms, etc., or (iii) “taken in time of war or
other emergency in international relations.” 624
Russia had claimed the application of subparagraph (b)(iii), asserting that its
actions were “taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations.” The
panel took note that subparagraph (b)(iii) necessarily implied a temporal limitation, that
the action took place during war or other emergency in international relations. 625 The
panel concluded that the condition of war or emergency in international relations was one
of “objective fact,” amenable to an “objective determination.” 626
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624

WTO Russia Panel Decision, 40-41.

625

WTO Russia Panel Decision, 41.

626

WTO Russia Panel Decision, 41.

219

After noting common definitions of “war” and “international relations,” the panel
then construed what was meant by “crisis in international relations” by looking at the
construction of Article XXI(b). The panel observed that all the items covered by (i),
fissionable material, and (ii), traffic in arms, all related to “defense and military interests,
as well as maintenance of law and public order interests.” 627 When added to (iii) which
specifically began with “war,” then added “crisis in international relations,” the panel
concluded that such “crisis in international relations” necessarily related to the very same
type of interests: military, defense, or law and order. 628
Further, the panel observed that including “war” and “crisis in international
relations” in the same clause meant to distinguish such circumstances from typical
political and trade differences between states. The panel stated, “Indeed, it is normal to
expect that Members will, from time to time, encounter political or economic conflicts
with other Members or states.” 629 The panel concluded, therefore, that such conflicts
cannot be a “crisis in international relations” in the meaning of subparagraph (b)(iii),
“unless they give rise to defense and military interests, or maintenance of law and public
order interests.” 630
The panel reminded readers that the purpose of GATT was “to promote the
security and predictability of the reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangement and
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the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade.” At the same time, member
states had the leeway to depart from their obligations in specific instances “in order to
achieve particular non-trade legitimate objectives.” It would be “entirely contrary to the
security and predictability of the multilateral trading system…to interpret Article XXI as
an outright potestative condition, subjecting the existence of a Member’s GATT and
WTO obligations to the mere expression of unilateral will of that Member.” 631
To drive home its conclusion, the panel examined the negotiating history of
Article XXI. It turns out that the language in the article originated from proposals
coming from the U.S. delegation during parallel negotiations between 1946 and 1948 for
an International Trade Organization (ITO) Charter (the ITO was intended as an
organization to complement the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in the goal
of stabilizing the international economy after World War II) and a general agreement on
tariffs. 632 The exact terms of Article XXI reflected a concern from the U.S. delegation
that too broad an exception would lead to abuse by a nation taking unilateral action using
a “simple pretext” that would allow a “legal escape from compliance” and thereby
destroy the efficacy of the entire system. 633 In answer to questions from another nation’s
delegate, a U.S. delegate stated,
As to the second provision, “or other emergency in international relations,” we
had in mind particularly the situation that existed in the last war, before our own
participation in the last war, which was not until the end of 1941. War had been
going on for two years in Europe and, as the time of our own participation
631
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approached, we were required, for our own protection, to take many measures
which would have been prohibited by the [International Trade Organization]
Charter. Our exports and imports were under rigid control. They were under
rigid control because of the war then going on. 634
The U.S. delegation went on to express that the language they proposed (which
ultimately became Article XXI) allowed for legitimate security concerns but did not
allow states to apply measures that where really for a “commercial purpose” but were
taken “under the guise of security.” 635 As a final observation here, the panel noted how
important it was that this discussion of “security” occurred immediately following the
conclusion of World War II. 636
Thus, the panel concluded that the U.S. position during the drafting of what
ultimately became Article XXI totally contradicted the position taken by Russia (and
supported by the U.S.) that its actions under Article XXI were not subject to review under
GATT. 637 Specifically, the panel concluded that it had the jurisdiction to determine (1)
whether the circumstances in (b)(iii) were present, i.e. that there existed a “war” or “crisis
in international relations” and (2) whether the trade measures in dispute were “taken
during” those circumstances. 638 After reviewing the evidence, the panel found both that
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the circumstance of a crisis in international relations existed (the conflict in Ukraine) and
that the trade measures Russia took were taken during that crisis. 639
The panel next took up the issue as to whether a member state’s determination (1)
that there was an “essential security interest” at issue and (2) that the selection of actions
taken to protect that interest was left entirely to the member state’s discretion. The panel
noted that “essential security interests” must be something more than just “security
interests” and were generally understood to relate to “quintessential functions of the state,
namely, the protection of its territory and its population from external threats, and the
maintenance of law and public order internally.” 640 Having said that, the panel observed
that such determinations were generally left for a state to define as long as the state acted
“in good faith.” An example of bad faith would be to “simply relabel trade interests” as
“essential security interests” to escape obligations under GATT. Therefore, a member
state was expected to “articulate the essential security interests said to arise from the
emergency in international relations sufficiently enough to demonstrate their veracity.” 641
Moreover, the trade measures taken to protect the “essential security interests”
must “meet a minimum requirement of plausibility in relation to the proffered essential
security interests, i.e., that they are not implausible as measures protective of those
interests.” 642
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The panel found that Russia’s claim of essential security interests arising from the
conflict in Ukraine seemed sufficient and not intended to circumvent its obligations under
GATT. 643 It further found that the measures at issue were not so remote from or
unrelated to the described emergency such “that it is implausible that Russia implemented
the measures for the protection of its essential security interests arising out of the
emergency.” 644
Consequently, the panel found that Russia had acted consistently with Article
XXI and that its trade actions did not violate its obligations under GATT. The panel
therefore rejected Ukraine’s compliant.
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